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CONSTITUTIONALIZATION OF HUMAN RIGHTS
I. INTRODUCTION: COMPARING APPLES AND ORANGES? NOT EXACTLY
Experts studying the process of political transformations in Latin America
and the post-Soviet states have observed that constitutional systems of the
countries of both regions continue to change.' The wave of constitution-
making,2 which in the region of former Soviet dominance started in the 1990s
3
and in Latin America has intensified in the last several decades,4 has by no
means been completed. In the early twenty-first century, numerous constitu-
tional amendments were adopted and some states superseded relatively young
constitutions with new ones.
5
' See generally Carlos Santiago Nino, Transition to Democracy, Corporatism, and
Presidentialism with Special Reference to Latin America, in CONSTITUTIONALISM AND
DEMOCRACY: TRANSITIONS IN THE CONTEMPORARY WORLD 46 (Douglas Greenberg et al. eds.,
1993); Council for the Consolidation of Democracy, Constitutional Reform in Argentina, in
PARLIAMENTARY VERSUS PRESIDENTIALGOVERNMENT 158 (Arend Lijphart ed., 1992); Paul E.
Sigmund, Latin America: Change or Continuity?, 60 FOREIGN AFFAIRS 629 (1981); Rett R.
Ludwikowski, Latin American Hybrid Constitutionalism: The United States Presidentialism in
the Civil Law Melting Pot, 21 B.U. INT'L L.J. 29 (2003) [hereinafter Ludwikowski, Hybrid
Constitutionalism]; 1 COMPARATIVE HUMAN RIGHTS AND FUNDAMENTAL FREEDOMS (Gisbert
H. Flanz & Rett R. Ludwikowski eds., 2002).
2 See Jon Elster, Forces andMechanisms in the Constitution-Making Process, 45 DUKE L.J.
364, 368-73 (1995).
3 Id. at 369; see also Rett R. Ludwikowski, Searching for a New Constitutional Model for
East-Central Europe, 17 SYRACUSE J. INT'L L. &COM. 91, 165 (1991).
4 See, e.g., Donna Lee Van Cott, Latin America: Constitutional Reform andEthnic Right,
53 PARLIAMENTARY AFFAIRS 41, 41 (2000).
' Donna Lee Van Cott wrote with regard to Latin American constitutionalism: "[The
region's new constitutions have been as frequent as they have been meaningless. The average
life span of Latin American constitutions is less than 20 years. More than 200 have been written
in the 150 years since independence, with a fresh constitution typically accompanying each
change of power." Id. The 1988 Constitution of Brazil may serve as an extreme example; at the
beginning of 2002; it had been amended forty-four times. Gisbert H. Flanz, Editor's Note to
Brazil, in 3 CONSTITUTIONS OF THE COUNTRIES OF THE WORLD iii, iii (Albert P. Blaustein &
Gisbert H. Flanz eds., 2003) [hereinafter CONSTITUTIONS]. Besides the Constitution of Brazil,
only two other constitutions were adopted in the 1980s: the 1982 constitutions of El Salvador
and Honduras. All other constitutions in the continental countries of Latin America were either
adopted or heavily amended in the 1990s.
Similarly, after the fall of communism, the region of former Soviet dominance became a
major laboratory of constitutional works, and the constitution-making process did not end with
the adoption of the new constitutions. By the early twenty-first century, several basic laws had
already been amended. In 2003 alone, the constitutions of Azerbaijan, Georgia, and the Kyrgyz
Republic were amended; in the case of the Georgian act, several times.
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When several countries in the same region are engaged in the constitution-
drafting process, they look to the experiences of other states which are
transforming their own systems.6 Constitutions do not develop in a political
vacuum and countries borrow from each other particularly heavily during
transitory periods.7 While drafters draw upon the experiences of countries
with similar histories, they also look to well-tested constitutional models and
attempt to rebuild them in the context of their own geopolitical circumstances.
Designing basic laws from scratch is a formidable challenge for any
constitutional drafter. Research shows, however, that borrowing concepts or
even selecting the templates for further experiments might be a difficult task
as well. Several factors have contributed to the constitutional engineers'
problems. First, there are very few so-called models of governance which
states in the process of transforming their constitutional systems may consider
for adoption. The scope of constitutional research in the post-socialist states
illustrates the problem well. The drafters in post-socialist states looked most
often to the liberal traditions of the United States, United Kingdom, France,
and Germany.! Similarly, if constitutional modeling "means searching for a
structural design for prospective constitution-making, then.., the ... Latin
American constitutions [arguably were originally] 'modeled' on the United
States Constitution."9 Nevertheless, recent transformations have brought the
constitutional drafters in this region closer to French, German, or Spanish
alternatives."
Second, an awareness of the countries' traditions and cultural legacies
contributes to a unique dual approach to borrowing. On the one hand, drafters
6 See generally Lee Epstein & Jack Knight, Constitutional Borrowing andNonborrowing,
1 INT'LJ. CONST. L. 196 (2003) (presenting general arguments in favor and against constitutional
borrowing).
7 See, e.g., Imre VWros, Contextuality and Universality: Constitutional Borrowings on the
Global Stage- The Hungarian View, 1 U. PA. I. CONST. L. 651 (1999) (describing constitutional
borrowing by Hungary during its transition from communism).
' Cheryl Saunders even shortened this list. She wrote, "At the end of the twentieth century,
most constitutional systems are or were derivative in part, with the possible exceptions of the
ancestor systems of the United Kingdom, the United States and France." Cheryl Saunders, A
Constitutional Culture in Tradition, in CONSTITUTIONALCULTURES 37 (Miroslaw Wyrzykowski
ed., 2000). The most frequently examined systems were the presidential model, the parliamen-
tary and parliamentary-cabinet model, the chancellor's model, and the semi-presidential model.
See KONSTYTUCYJNE SYSTEMY RZADow: MozIwosci ADAPTACJI DO WARUNKOW POLSKICH
[Constitutional Systems of Government: The Chances for Adoption in the Polish Conditions]
(Michal Domagala ed., 1997).
9 Ludwikowski, Hybrid Constitutionalism, supra note 1, at 29.
'o See id. at 53 n.133, 59-61.
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of the new constitutions want to assimilate well-tested models; on the other
hand, they listen to some scholars from the "model" countries who suggest
looking to local traditions for guidance rather than to the constitutional
histories of the United States or Europe, which reach back to the era of the
Enlightenment." Following these suggestions usually results in an entirely
new approach to constitution-making and has the tendency to create hybrid
models, which are an amalgam of many well-known systems. 2
For example, constitutional engineers currently are reviewing the concept
of judicial review of the constitutionality of the law. 3 However, very few
classic models ofjudicial enforcement exist. Some of these models, such as
the so-called American decentralized model, were rooted in the concept of
constitutional supremacy and the principle of stare decisis;'4 others, such as
the Austrian centralized model, were usually adopted in countries with civil
law traditions.'5 Selecting one of these models for the new constitutions may
result in a failure to meet local expectations;" on the other hand, blending the
features of these models may not fit other components of the legal system and
affect its ultimate coherence. 7
Drafting a new bill of rights also brings more specific problems. Contem-
porary human rights movements have produced an expansive amount of
"1 See Stanley N. Katz, Constitutionalism in East Central Europe: Some Negative Lessons
from the American Experience, in COMPARATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 283, 283 (Vicki C.
Jackson & Mark Tushnet eds., 1999).
12 Rett R. Ludwikowski, Constitutional Culture of the New East-Central European
Democracies, in CONSTITUTIONAL CULTURES, supra note 8, at 55.
13 See MAUROCAPPELLETTI, JuDIcIALREvEw IN THE CONTEMPORARY WORLD 57-65 (1971);
Larry Cata Backer, Retaining Judicial Authority: A Preliminary Inquiry on the Dominion of
Judges, 12 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 117 (2003); Aharon Barak, The Role of a Supreme Court
in a Democracy, and the Fight Against Terrorism, 58 U. Miami L. Rev. 125 (2003).
14 See CAPPELETT1, supra note 13.
"5 Rett R. Ludwikowski, Judicial Review in the Socialist Legal Systems: Current
Developments, 37 INT'L & COMP. L.Q. 89, 91-92 (1988) [hereinafter Ludwikowski, Judicial
Review] ; RETT R. LuDwKOwsKm, CONSTITUTION-MAKING IN THE REGION OF FORMER SOVIET
DOMINANCE 193-218 (1996) [hereinafter LUDWIKOWSKI, CONSTITUTION-MAKING].
"6 For example, early enthusiasm in the post-Soviet region about the adoption of the French
preventive model was dampened by critics who claimed that review of the bill before
promulgation interfered with the legislative process. Rett R. Ludwikowski, "Mixed"
Constitutions - Product of an East-Central European Constitutional Melting Pot, 16 B.U. INT'L
L.J. 1, 52-53, 59-63 tbl.9 (1998).
"7 See Seth F. Kreimer, Invidious Comparisons: Some Cautionary Remarks on the Process
of Constitutional Borrowing, 1 U, PA. J. CONsT. L. 640 (1999).
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literature presenting international concepts of human rights protection.' 8
However, these venerated standards are neither universally welcomed nor
automatically recognized as superior.
Legal literature does not provide a satisfactory explanation of the reasons
for the unequal protection of rights in different ethnic regions. Constitutional
experts studying this problem have realized that human rights attitudes are
deeply rooted in the legal and political cultures of national and ethnic groups
and cannot be explained without an examination of the historic factors that
contribute to the patterns and paradigms for human rights protection in a given
culture. 9 Without an examination of all these factors, it is difficult to decide
to what extent the universally accepted standards might be adaptable and
enforceable in specific national and regional circumstances.
Even without an exhaustive analysis of the methodology of constitution-
making, however, the comments above warrant two conclusions. First,
constitutional drafters do not just borrow models or concepts; they look for
remedies to common problems. Thus, comparing constitutions does not only
mean the exposition of similarities and differences, but also the opportunity for
some countries to learn from the experiences of others. Second, regardless of
the inherent complications related to constitutional borrowing, the process
guarantees the discovery of enough common constitutional features to make
the comparison of constitutions, even those produced in distant regions, at least
justifiable.
This reflection has guided this Article's development. The project builds
on several books and numerous articles already published by the author on the
political transformation of the Eastern and Central European and Latin
American states.2 This Article, however, goes beyond the main topic of the
prior studies, namely, the development of political structures in transitional
democracies, and focuses on the constitutionalization of human rights. It also
covers a different region of former Soviet dominance. Although it refers to
general experiences of post-socialist countries, its main objective is to compare
the constitutional protections of human rights in the states of Latin America
and the former Soviet Union which, at some period in their history, developed
presidential or semi-presidential systems.
IS Gisbert H. Flanz, Preface to Comparative Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms of
1 COMPARATIVE HUMAN RIGHTS AND FUNDAMENTAL FREEDOMS, supra note 1, at xi, xi-xiii.
19 See id. at xi-xii.
20 This Article utilizes, in particular, observations produced by two studies: Ludwikowski,
supra note 16, and Ludwikowski, Hybrid Constitutionalism, supra note 1.
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This Article analyzes the process of drafting bills of rights in a broad
context, going beyond the examination of traditional lists of rights. It assumes
that most normative constitutional provisions can be translated into the rights
of the people and duties of governmental organs. For this reason, it also
analyzes the systems of governance, relations between the powers, and
mechanisms of judicial enforcement of rights and freedoms.
This Article consists of four parts. The first, which is more general,
addresses the question to what extent the system of governance adopted by the
countries of both regions affected the record of the states' protection of human
rights. For instance, this Article considers whether democratization of the
political system necessarily results in better protection of human rights. The
second part analyzes the placement of human rights in the framework of the
Latin American and post-Soviet constitutions. The third part identifies and
discusses the problem of individual and group rights, an issue crucial for both
regions. The fourth part provides a comparative analysis of the main
categories of constitutionalized rights and freedoms. Although this part
examines the general approach of the constitutional drafters to social,
economic, and cultural rights, it focuses on so-called first category rights, such
as personal freedoms and civil and political rights, as well as on enforcement
mechanisms. The conclusion will supply observations on the most important
lessons that constitutional drafters can learn from the experiences of others.
II. PRESIDENTIAL SYSTEM OF GOVERNANCE AND
CONSTITUTIONALIZATION OF RIGHTS AND FREEDOMS
Even a superficial search for similarities in the systems of governance of
the Latin American and post-Soviet states reveals an inclination to borrow
from the U.S. presidential system. The main features of U.S. presidentialism
are apparent in the constitutional systems of many countries of both regions;21
the components of the U.S. system, however, have not been duplicated. The
Latin American and post-Soviet presidential systems, which both have roots
in U.S. traditions, are in many ways different from the U.S. prototype. As this
Article will argue, the differences have consequences for the constitutional
protection of human rights.
2 Robert S. Barker, Constitutionalism in the Americas: A Bicentennial Perspective, 49 U.
PITT. L. R~v. 891, 899 (1988).
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A. U.S. Presidentialism and the European Doctrine ofDivision of Powers
From its conception, the U.S. version of the doctrine of division of powers
differed from its European prototypes. The concept of presidential power in
the United States was deeply rooted in the American system of checks and
balances, which differed from the classical European doctrine of division of
power. For European philosophers John Locke and Baron de Montesquieu, the
main rationale for the distribution of power was the protection of society from
an absolute, arbitrary authority22-the powers did not need to be equal or even
separate. Locke listed three powers in the British Commonwealth: legislative,
executive, and federative; however, he suggested that supreme power lay in the
legislature and did not recognize the judiciary as a separate power.23
Montesquieu enumerated the judiciary among the powers, but as Mauro
Cappelletti convincingly argued, Montesquieu believed that the judiciary, in
fact, was "no power at all."24 Montesquieu wrote, "Of the three powers of
which we have spoken, the judicial is, in a sense, null. 25
The forefathers of the U.S. model shared the European concept of a
government whose authority was limited through its diffusion among several
organs.26 For both the Europeans and Americans, limited government
guaranteed individual freedom, however, the two groups differed regarding the
scope of protection of other fundamental values, such as equality, religious
liberty and toleration, and property.27
The American model did not strictly require equality of powers, but it could
not accept the supremacy of one power over the others. It emphasized the
22 John Locke wrote, "Absolute arbitrary power, or governing without settledstanding laws,
can neither of them consist with the ends of society and government." JOHN LOCKE, TWO
TREATISES OF GOVERNMENT, in CLASSICS OF MORAL AND POLITICAL THEORY 661 (Michael L.
Morgan ed., 3d ed. 2001).
23 See Scott Fairley, John Locke's Two Treatises of Government and the American
Founders' Separation of Powers (1995) (unpublished M.A. thesis, University of Guelph)
(offering a more detailed examination of Locke's theory of separation of powers).
24 See Mauro Cappelletti, Repudiating Montesquieu? The Expansion and Legitimacy of
Constitutional Justice, 35 CATH. UNIV. L. REV. 1, 12-14 (1985).
21 Id. at 13-14 (translating CHARLES DE SECONDAT, BARON DE MONTESQUiEU, DE L'EsPRIT
DES Lois bk. XI, ch. VI (Gamier Frrres 1973) (1748)).
6 See Ludwikowski, supra note 16, at 7.
27 See, e.g., Rett R. Ludwikowski, The Beginning of the Constitutional Era: A Bicentennial
Comparative Study of the American and French Constitutions, It MICH. J. INT'LL. 167, 192-96
(1989) (describing American and European concepts of the protection of "sacred and
imprescriptible rights").
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powers' "equilibrium," a "sharing" of functions, and a "hampering" of one
power by another.2" The threat of arbitrariness was less real in American
geopolitical circumstances than in Europe. Thus, the main goal of the
distribution of powers in the United States was to improve the stability of the
government and guarantee that the divided authorities would not violate the
rights and freedoms of individuals.
B. Transformations of Latin American Presidentialism
Although the intention of the Latin American states to borrow from the U.S.
presidential model has been well documented, they were also quite aware of
their European legacies."0 This is one of the reasons that the constitution-
making process in this region did not produce many states that could be
classified as purely presidential republics.3 The fact that the provisions of
several Latin American constitutions, particularly the language of the
preambles, clearly resemble the U.S. Constitution often obliterated the
evidence that the Latin American countries, from the early stages of the
constitution-making process, adopted the U.S. prototype with numerous
modifications.
Although many features of the presidential system, such as the concept of
checks and balances, the personal incompatibility of the executive and
legislative positions, the presidential right to veto legislative actions, and direct
presidential elections, have been incorporated into many parliamentary or
hybrid presidential-parliamentary systems, several traditional attributes of the
presidential model remain almost intact.32 These attributes are the concentra-
tion of the functions of a head of state and head of government in the position
of the president, the lack of political responsibility of the members of cabinet
before the parliament, and the lack of a presidential or executive prerogative
28 See, e.g., RIcHARDE.NEUSTADT, PRESIDENTIALPOWER:THEPOLITICSOFLEADERSHIP 33-
57 (1960) (explaining that presidential power is limited because it is shared).
29 See ALLAN R. BREWER-CARiAS, JUDICIAL REvIEw IN COMPARATIVE LAW 156 (1989).
30 See, e.g., David S. Clark, Judicial Protection of the Constitution in Latin America, 2
HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 405, 406-13 (1975) (examining the spread of Iberian law to Latin
America).
31 AREND LUPHART, DEMOCRACIES: PATrERNS OF MAJORITARIAN AND CONSENSUS
GOVERNMENT IN TWENTY-ONE COUNTRIES 38 (1984); see also GIOVANNI SARTORI, COMPARA-
TIVE CONSTITUTIONAL ENGINEERING: AN INQUIRY INTO STRUCTURES, INCENTIVES AND
OUTCOMES 83-86 (1994).
32 See Ludwikowski, Hybrid Constitutionalism, supra note 1, at 37-38 (discussing the
absorption of the attributes of the presidential system into hybrid models of governance).
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of dissolution of the legislature. The adherence of a constitution to these
classic features of the U.S. system has always been a litmus test of the drafters'
readiness to adopt the presidential model in its relatively pure form.
Latin American constitutionalism thus clearly reveals its ambivalent
character. On the one hand, Latin American elites, separated from the
indigenous communities, peasants, and racial and religious minorities, viewed
strong presidents as protectors of their social position.3 On the other hand, the
elites understood that the transfer of the Latin American social caudillismo to
the political arena might help transform a presidential system into a dictator-
ship. 4 In contrast to the situation in the United States, the Iberian political
leaders were not prepared to make the sacrifices necessary for the democratiza-
tion of their ethnically diversified societies; rather, they were determined to
curb the political power of the president by taking away certain discretionary
powers or adding prerogatives more typical of the parliamentary than
presidential system of governance.35
Although the Latin American deviations from U.S. presidentialism cannot
explain all of the political and social hardships of the region, they have
contributed to the alternation between insecure presidencies which are unable
to resolve the social problems of highly polarized societies and dictatorships
J Jacques Lambert links the process of the development of the presidential system in Latin
America with the isolation of the small communities under tutelage of the landowners. He
claims, however, that the adoption of the system "stenmed far more from the backwardness of
the social structure, and insufficient integration" than from the clear intention ofthe Iberian elites
to control the entire population. JACQUES LAMBERT, LATIN AMERICA: SOCIAL STRUCTURE AND
POLITICAL INSTITuTIONS (Helen Katel trans., 1967), reprinted in JOHN HENRY MERRYMAN &
DAVID S. CLARK, COMPARATIVE LAW: WESTERN EUROPEAN AND LATIN AMERICAN LEGAL
SYSTEMS 334-35 (1978). He wrote:
The extreme de facto inequality in the largest part of Latin America does not
stem from the deliberate intention of those who govern to subjugate people.
Rather it derives from the governments' helplessness to eliminate archaic
structures with sufficient speed, to administer the entire country effectively,
and to raise standards of living and education.
Id.
34 d.
35 To provide a few examples, some constitutions, even those adopted in the early stages of
political development in the Latin American countries, required the ministers' endorsement for
presidential actions. See, e.g., ARG. CONST. of 1853, art. 87. Thisprovision of Argentina's 1853
Constitution has remained substantively intact in subsequent constitutions. See, e.g., ARG.
CONST. art. 100. Other constitutions added the position of chief of the cabinet of ministers,
subject to censorship and removal by the parliament. See, e.g., id. Still other constitutions
vested in the president the right to dissolve the legislature. See, e.g., CONSTITUCION POLITICA
DE PERU art. 157.
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which attempt to introduce social order at the cost of violating fundamental
human rights.36 Latin American experiences with weak or excessively
powerful presidencies resulted in such experiments as no re-election schemes
for presidents, the elimination of corporatism or praetorianism, and quasi-
presidential or quasi-parliamentary models."' Latin American countries tried
to incorporate into their systems some elements of mixed models of gover-
nance, claiming that U.S. presidentialism is inherently less democratic.38
With regard to human rights protection, the exhaustion of many political
remedies has produced social movements calling for the transformation of
Latin American constitutions into multicultural laws which protect each
person's rights and support the involvement of indigenous groups and ethnic
and religious minorities in common social activities.39 Donna Lee Van Cott,
Assistant Professor of Political Science and Latin American Studies at Tulane
University, wrote:
The political conjuncture presented by public debates on
constitutional reform in the 1990s provided the perfect philo-
sophical and practical context for indigenous peoples to put
forward their claims. Constitution-making is a symbolic act in
which the people (or peoples) give their consent to the institu-
tions and values that define the terms of their self-government.
Prior to the recent constitutional debates in which they took part,
indigenous people were excluded from the process of constituting
36 See, e.g., AMNESTY INT'L, TRANSITION ATTHE CROSSROADS: HUMAN RIGHTS VIOLATIONS
UNDER PINOCHET RULE REMAIN THE CRUX (1996) (describing human rights violations and the
military restrictions imposed in Chile by the Pinochet regime), at http://web.amnesty.org/
library/Index/engAMR220011996; EDWARD L. CLEARY, THE STRUGGLE FOR HUMAN RIGHTS IN
LATIN AMERICA (1997) (offering a more general study of human rights protection in Latin
America).
3 See Nino, supra note 1.
3 Juan J. Linz wrote, "A careful comparison ofparliamentarism as such with presidentialism
as such leads to the conclusion that, on balance, the former is more conducive to stable
democracy than the latter." Juan J. Linz, The Perils of Presidentialism, in PARLIAMENTARY
VERSUS PRESIDENTIALGOVERNMENT, supra note 1, at 119. Linz emphasized, "This conclusion
applies especially to nations with deep political cleavages and numerous political parties; for
such countries, parliamentarism generally offers a better hope of preserving democracy." Id.;
see also Nino, supra note I, at 60.
39 Van Cott, supra note 4, at 41. See generally DONNA LEE VAN COTT, THE FRIENDLY
LIQUIDATION OF THE PAST: THE POLITICS OF DIVERSITY IN LATIN AMERICA (2000) [hereinafter
FRIENDLY LIQUIDATION]. But see Kirsten Matoy Carlson, Notice, Premature Predictions of
Multiculturalism?, 100 MICH. L. Rv. 1470 (2002).
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the states of Latin America. They now have opportunity to
participate autonomously.40
Although Van Cott may have prematurely heralded the success of the new
multicultural constitutionalism, Latin Americans' awareness of their social and
ethnic problems is unquestionably growing. Paradoxically, the
constitutionalism of Latin America, despite incorporating European constitu-
tional components, came closer to at least theoretical recognition of the
traditional priorities of U.S. presidentialism, such as the concept of limited
government, a democratically organized society, and human rights.
C. Presidential System of Governance in the Post-Soviet States
Which of the two major systems of government, the presidential or
parliamentary, will prevail in the republics of the former Soviet bloc? This
question became a leitmotiv of the early stages of constitution-making in the
region of former Soviet dominance. For commentators, it was unclear whether
the inexperienced drafters would attempt to experiment with models which
blended components of several major political systems. Many experts
anticipated that, tired with the rules of communist strongmen, the new states
would opt for the well-tested parliamentary systems of government.41 After
more than a decade of experimental constitutional drafting, most commentators
admit that these early expectations proved incorrect.4" The drafters of the new
post-socialist constitutions did not hesitate to experiment with classical
presidential and parliamentary systems,43 but also produced mixed semi-
presidential and semi-parliamentary models which borrowed from both
Western and socialist traditions." Several examples illustrate this point.
The first constitutional drafts of the Slavic republics of the former Soviet
Union (Belarus, Russia, Ukraine) clearly borrowed from the American
presidential system. The Presidential Draft Constitution of Russia reserved for
40 Van Cott, supra note 4, at 4 1.
4' Ludwikowski, supra note 16, at 2.
42 See Frederick Starr, The Investment Climate in Central Asia and the Caucasus
(commenting on inherited pathologies of the region), http://www.cacianalyst.org/Publications
Starr.invest.htm.
"3 With the exception of the Baltic states, presidentialism arguably prevailed in most of the
former Soviet republics. The former satellite republics of East-Central Europe opted for the
parliamentary system; some states of the region clearly mixed both systems.
" Ludwikowski, supra note 16, at 1.
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the president the right to control the executive; to veto any law enacted by the
parliament, subject to the blocking vote ofa two-thirds parliamentary majority;
and to be elected in nationwide elections in tandem with a vice-president who
would automatically become speaker of the parliament's upper chamber.4" The
final text of the 1993 Russian Constitution departed from the pure U.S. model,
however, and combined French and American features. The Russian president
has the power to initiate legislation,46 which the French Constitution vests in
the prime minister and members of parliament.47 The Russian Constitution
reserves for the president the power to veto legislative acts,48 while the French
president may only ask for a reconsideration of the law.49 In Russia, the
president also has the right to dissolve the parliament, ° a right which has not
been vested in his American counterpart. In contrast to the American
president, the Russian president is the head of state but is not simultaneously
head of government; however, his power to control the executive is stronger
than that of the French president. The presidential appointments of the
Russian prime minister require the consent of the state Duma, but the president
has the power to call for the resignation of the whole government.5 The
French president does not have the discretion to terminate the functions of the
prime minister since this requires the prime minister's resignation, which is
obligatory only when the parliament has successfully censured the government
or failed to approve its program. 2 In contrast, if the Russian state Duma
adopts a no-confidence resolution, the president may approve it or dissolve the
Duma after a second vote of no-confidence.
53
Also borrowing from the American system, the early Ukrainian constitu-
tional drafts declared that the president was both head of state and head of
government-the prime minister was only a deputy "subordinated and
45 See Presidential Draft Constitution of Russia Discovered, SOVIET PRESS DIGEST, Apr. 9,
1992; see also The President's Draft Constitution of Russia is Found (official Kremlin
international news broadcast, Apr. 9, 1992).
46 Russ. CONST. art. 84, § d.
47 FR. CONST. art. 39.
48 Russ. CONST. art. 107.
49 FR. CONST. art. 10.
50 See Russ. CONST. arts. 109, 111, 117. The French president may dissolve the national
assembly but he must consult with the premier and the presidents of the chambers of parliament.
FR. CONST. art. 12.
" RUSS. CONST. art. 83.
52 FR. CONST. arts. 8, 50.
53 RUSS. CONST. art. 117.
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accountable" to the president.' The executive and legislative branches were
separate and independent." With the exception of the failure of an all-
Ukrainian referendum to terminate the tenure of the head of state, the president
could not dissolve the assembly. 6 The 1996 Constitution made concessions
toward the parliamentary system. Similar to Latin American constitutions, it
provided for dual executive power and ministerial counter-signature on some
presidential decrees.5 7 However, the presidential power to annul acts of
ministers was retained with some limitations."8
The constitutional changes in Belarus also departed from the American
presidential model, but they clearly transferred more power to the president of
the republic. The Belarus Constitution, amended by the referendum of
November 24, 1996, 59 gave the president the right to dissolve the legislative
chamber and the right to initiate and veto legislation." The president is also
allowed to issue decrees and regulations binding on the territory of the whole
country, which do not require any governmental counter-signature. 6 The
president is the head of state and government; he appoints and recalls ministers
and only his nomination of the prime minister has to be approved by the
parliament.62
The evolution of the constitutional system in Moldova brought the country
closer to the parliamentary system than its post-communist neighbors.
However, even in Moldova, the process was hampered by attempts by the
president and parliament to roll back some democratic freedoms.63 Blending
54 See LUDWIKOWSKI, CONSTITUTION-MAKING, supra note 15, at 89-93; see also
Ludwikowski, supra note 16, at 38-41.
35 See LUDwIKOwSKI, CoNsTrrUTION-MAKING, supra note 15, at 89-93.
56 Id. at91.
5 See UKR. CONST. art. 106, § 31.
58 See id. arts. 75, 106.
5 Gisbert H. Flanz, Introductory & Comparative Notes to Belarus, in 2 CONSTITUTIONS,
supra note 5, at vii, vii. The original Constitution of the Republic of Belarus was adopted on
March 15, 1994, and amended according to Alexander Lukashenko's draft at the end of 1996.
Id. The text of the original Belarus Constitution of 1994 is reprinted in LuDwiKOwsKI,
CoNsTrrUTION-MAKiNG, supra note 15, at 332-50.
60 BELR. CONST. arts. 93, 99, 100.
61Id. art. 85.
62 Id. arts. 79, 84, 106.
63 For several years following the adoption of the Constitution, the political system of
Moldova looked unstable. Mircea Snegur and Petru Lucinschi, former presidents, were both in
favor of changing the Constitution through a referendum and turning the country into a
presidential republic. See International Foundation for Election Systems (Dec. 4, 2000),
available at http://www.ifes.md/cdpd/commentaris/20001204.htnil; see also Basic Facts of
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the features of the parliamentary and presidential systems resulted in the
creation of an unstable set of checks and balances. The Constitution prohibits
members of the government and deputies from holding other remunerated
positions,' which means that in practice joint legislative and executive
appointments are prohibited. On the one hand, the fact that the ministers do
not sit in the parliament limits the executive's control of the legislative
process. On the other hand, the Constitution still leaves the president with the
right of legislative initiative, the right to request a reconsideration of the law,
and the right to dissolve the parliament.65 These rights hamper the activity of
the legislature without leaving the government enough authority to balance the
relations between the parliament and the president. In addition, the right of the
parliament to suspend the president and initiate the process of removal of the
head of state without implementing the regular impeachment procedure further
destabilizes the system.'
In the states of the South Caucasus and Central Asia, the initial predilection
for the presidential model of governance was clear, but in contrast to Moldova,
the incorporation of the features of the parliamentary system only strengthened
the president's power. For example, the heads of state in Kazakhstan and
Kyrgyzstan initially did not have power to dissolve the parliament, 67 but this
prerogative has been making inroads in almost all countries of the so-called
southern cluster of the non-Slavic republics of the former Soviet Union. In all
of the countries of this region, with the exception of Azerbaijan, Georgia, and
Tajikistan, the presidents may dissolve the legislative body.6" The presidents
control the government and, through an extensive appointment authority, the
judiciary as well. In some extreme cases, the presidents even attempted to
Moldova, at http://www.europeanforum.bot-consult.se/cup/moldova/facts.htn (last modified
Feb. 19, 1997). Contrary to their intentions, the historic referendum of July 5, 2000, decided the
modification of the Constitution but with an entirely different result. It replaced direct
presidential elections by secret vote in the parliament. The new Law on the Procedure of
Electing the President of the Republic of Moldova of September 22, 2000, was returned to the
Parliament by President Lucinschi for reconsideration and was not signed until October 27,
2000, when the Parliament, in the second vote, confirmed that the law is in accordance with
constitutional reform. International Foundation for Election Systems, available at http://www.
ifes.md/news/0001 (June 29, 2001).
MOLD. CONST. arts. 70, 99, § 1.
65 Id arts. 73, 85, 93, § 2.
Id. art. 89, translated in 12 CONSTrruTIoNs, supra note 5 (allowing for removal by two-
thirds vote for "grave offenses infringing upon constitutional provisions").
67 See the charts in Ludwikowski, supra note 16, at 46-47.
6 See, e.g., ARM. CONST. art. 55, § 3; KAz. CONST. art. 63, § 11; TuRKM. CONST. art. 64.
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constitutionalize the right to execute legislative mandates.69 In most of the
countries, referenda extended presidential terms from five to seven years, and
by allowing more than two consecutive terms, practically secured lifetime
presidencies for almost all incumbents.7" These arrangements formally
brought the concept of the presidential system dangerously close to authoritar-
ian rule.
D. System of Governance and Human Rights Protection
The poor human rights record of Latin American and post-Soviet states has
been well documented by governmental and non-governmental organizations."l
Some questions, however, remain. To what extent is the problem related to
common legacies and objective obstacles faced by both regions in the process
of democratization and creation of the rule of law? To what degree has the
69 For example, in Kazakhstan, the senate is formed by indirect election by a joint session
of the deputies of all local representative bodies (Maslikhats). KAZ. CONST. art. 51, §§ 2-5. It
consists of two representatives from the capital and provinces (oblasts) and seven appointed by
the president. KAZ. CONST. art. 50, § 2.
70 In Kazakhstan, the 1998 constitutional amendments eliminated the sixty-five-year age
limit on presidential candidates, increased the term from five to seven years, and removed the
fifty percent minimum participation barrier for election. See KAZ. CONST. art. 41, § 1 (amended
1998). In Central Asia, Kyrgyzstan is an exception: the 2003 constitutional amendments
provided that the president may be elected for five years and serve two consecutive years; the
age limit of candidates is thirty-five to sixty-five years. KYRG. CONST. art. 43, § 3. The
Tajikistan Constitution, amended in 2003, allowed the president to serve two consecutive seven-
year terms; the amendments removed the sixty-five-year age limit. TA. CONST. art. 65 (amended
2003). In Turkmenistan, the five-year term of President Niyazov was extended by the national
referendum in 1994 and the People's Council for an infinite period in December 1999. BUREAU
OF DEMOCRACY, U.S. STATE DEP'T, HUMAN RIGHTS & LABOR, Turkmenistan, in COUNTRY
REPORTS ON HUMAN RIGHTS PRACTICES-2001 (2002), available at http://www.state.gov/g/drl/rls/
hrrpt/2001/eur/8359.htm. The Uzbekistan Constitution allowed the president to serve two five-
year terms. The 2002 referendum amended the Constitution to allow for seven-year presidential
terms. Human Rights Watch, Uzbekistan: President Rigs Extended Term of Office (Jan. 26,
2002), available at http://www.muslimuzbekistan.com/englennews/2002/0 l/ennews26012002.
html. There are also speculations that, after the second presidential election in Russia in 2004,
the supporters of President Putin may collect more than 300 of 450 votes, enough to amend the
Constitution to allow for a third presidential term. Familiar Candidates Skipping Russian
Presidential Race, WASH. POST, Dec. 31, 2003, at A13.
7" See generally CLEARY, supra note 36; RettR. Ludwikowski, Fundamental Constitutional
Rights in the New Constitutions of Eastern and Central Europe, 3 CARDOZO J. INT'L & COMP.
L. 73 (1995).
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selection of the presidential or mixed model over the parliamentary system
hampered the development of adequate human rights protections?
U.S. presidentialism in Latin America has been tested under unique ethnic
circumstances and cultural traditions.72 While the relatively ethnically
homogenous settlers in North America primarily followed English parliamen-
tary and democratic traditions, the political culture of the Iberian colonists was
more elitist and they were less disposed to animate politically passive groups
of society. Latin American societies were more ethnically diverse than North
American societies, and their leaders were more inclined to seek efficient
measures to control indigenous groups, religious minorities, and peasants, than
to accept the hardships which often accompany the process of democratization.
While North Americans wanted to limit presidential power by balancing it
with the other branches of government, Latin Americans wanted to blend
presidentialism with other systems of government. Adopting civil law
foundations, Latin American leaders were predisposed to experiment with
continental European mixed systems of governance. Mixed systems were
supposed to create strong executive branches without forming a dictatorship.
In other words, the power in Latin America was divided but the powers, in
contrast with the United States, were not equal or even well balanced.
Objective hardships also hampered the development of effective instru-
ments of human rights protection in the post-Soviet states. All of the new
republics experienced some communist traumas. Paradoxically, however,
certain human rights-related problems surfaced after the fall of communism.
The problems stemmed from several factors. First, the post-socialist republics
inherited numerous regional problems with ethnic minorities, which tradition-
ally worked against the healthy tendency to produce self-governing societies.
The ethnic conflicts had been suppressed by communist totalitarian policies
but were revived in the atmosphere of free dialogue and democratic transfor-
mations. Second, the communist legacy, which had an enduring impact on the
social culture, hampered the democratization of post-socialist communities.
A fundamental premise of the concept of civic society is the reconciliation of
individual and social interests. Civic-mindedness cannot, however, flourish in
an atmosphere of cynicism and distrust in common social values, which has
been typical for socialist societies. Third, the development of a mature civic
culture, characterized by respect for equal rights and freedoms of individuals
and ethnic groups, requires time. The citizenries of the new democracies
quickly learned to speak freely and openly; however, they could hardly digest
72 See Ludwikowski, Hybrid Constitutionalism, supra note 1, at 49-54.
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the lesson that freedom of speech requires dialogue and the ability to listen to
others' arguments. Characteristically, high levels of public emotions, often
accompanied by ordinary public political passivity, hampered the development
of a mature political and legal culture.
Communist jurisprudence has also never recognized the significance of
separation of powers or checks and balances. Although socialist law theorists
claimed that government legislative departments should be recognized as the
supreme organs of power," in fact, these organs followed recommendations
of the Communist Party, the leading force of socialist society. The supremacy
of the parliament thus always had a window-dressing character; the real
supreme power was reserved for a very narrow group of party elites,
Most of the new leaders of the post-Soviet states inherited this philosophy
along with their communist background. They tried to artificially marry the
idea of checks and balances with the principle of supremacy of parliament.74
The attempt resulted in striking incoherencies; the leaders declared parliament
as the real source of power but their actual concern was the restoration of the
system that would reserve ultimate control in state affairs for the executive.
All other issues, including the protection of rights and freedoms, were beyond
the list of priorities. The rhetoric of constitutional chapters on rights and
freedoms resembles Western bills of rights, but the careful commentator still
may find the socialist caveats that rights cannot be exercised "to the detriment
" For example, Aleksander lakovlev, head of the Theory and Sociology of Criminal Law
Section of the Soviet Academy of Science, wrote:
Democracy only exists when the most important social and economic issues
facing the nation are resolved by freely elected representatives. These
representatives, through the soviets, express the sovereign will of the Soviet
people. As we have noted, their rights must not be usurped by executive
organs of State government or by officials at any level of the political
structure.
Aleksander Iakovlev, Constitutional Socialist Democracy: Dream or Reality?, 28 COLuM. J.
TRANSNAT'L L. 117, 126-27 (1990).
" The Constitution of Kazakhstan referred to the organs of power as "cooperating with each
other, [and] using the system of restraints and counterbalances." KAZ. CONST. § VI (Basis of the
Constitutional System) (repealed 1995). However, the Constitution also described the
parliament as "the highest representative body of the Republic of Kazakhstan." Id. art. 62
(repealed 1995). The Constitution of Moldova describes the powers as "separate and
cooperat[ive] in the exercise of their prerogatives in accordance with the provisions of the
Constitution." MOLD. CONST. art. 6, translated in 12 CONSTrrUTIoNs, supra note 5. But see
id. art. 60, § I (referring to the parliament as the "supreme representative body").
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of the society's interest""5 and that the protection of rights and freedoms is
inseparable from the performance of duties.76
The objective factors, which have contributed to the weak record in the
protection of human rights in both regions, must be recognized. Blaming
presidentialism for problems related to the process of democratization is,
however, much less constructive. It must be emphasized that presidentialism
as such is not less conducive to the protection of human rights or democracy
than parliamentary systems; the authoritarian deviations ofpresidentialism are
detrimental to such protection, however. The presidential system and its core
principles are rooted in the concept of balanced powers and without adequate
checks and balances, the entire model ceases to operate. In other words, the
real threat to the protection of human rights in the post-Soviet states or Latin
America is not the governments' intention to borrow from the traditions of
presidentialism, but the lack of respect for the concept of limited and balanced
government.
In summary, the panacea for human rights-related problems cannot be
found in a mere transformation of the "pseudo-presidential" republics to more
mixed systems. In both regions, the success of reforms creating a legal
framework that adequately protects human rights is not only contingent on a
mature political leadership with a convincing and credible vision of the future,
but also on the active involvement of the citizenry in political and legal
dialogue. The promotion of this dialogue or, more generally, the concept of
civic society, usually is not in the best interest of authoritarian leaders who
benefit from the en bloc support of politically passive societies. Any attempt
to animate passive or emotionally reactive minorities must come from the
grassroots of society. According to this viewpoint, Latin American multicul-
tural constitutionalism is at least a promising remedy, which may increase
public identification with the constitutions. Post-Soviet societies may learn
from these experiences in the same way that the Latin American countries may
learn from the difficult and often disappointing post-socialist experiments with
mixed or semi-presidential systems of governance.
75 E.g., Uze. CONST. art. 20.
76 E.g., UKR. CONST. art. 23.
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I1. PLACEMENT OF HUMAN RIGHTS IN THE FRAMEWORK OF THE LATIN
AMERICAN AND POST-SOVIET CONSTITUTIONS:
POSITIVISTIC VERSUS NATURALISTIC CONCEPTS OF RIGHTS
A. The Language and Philosophy ofRights: Inherent Versus Granted Rights
A careful examination of the U.S. and early European constitutions reveals
numerous differences in the philosophical background of the constitutional
protection of rights and freedoms. Although the French Declaration of the
Rights of Man and Citizen, with its main assertion that "men are born free and
equal in rights,"" remained a general philosophical manifesto of the entire
Western world, subsequent European constitutions became more pragmatic
and did not emphasize the philosophy of inalienable rights.7" While the
opinion prevailed in the United States that rights are not a gift from society but
are natural or inherent, Europeans asserted that rights are derived from
constitutions.79 As Wiktor Osiatynski observed, "[A]nother important
difference between American and European constitutional orders which is
worth discussion is that the American order rests on the principle that power
is a grant of freedom and the European order rests on the principle that
freedom is a grant of power."80
Nineteenth century European constitutions declared that rights are
constitutionally protected within the boundaries of the law." Rights and
freedoms were granted as a result of legislative actions that constituted new
legal situations. Thus, they could not be limited by arbitrary governmental
decisions but could be curbed or expanded through further activities of
" DECLARATION OF THE RIGHTS OF MAN AND THE CITIZEN art. 1 (Fr. 1789), available at
http://www.yale.edu/Iawweb/avalon/rightsof htm (last visited Jan. 11, 2005).
" See Geoffrey Bruun, The Constitutional Cult in the Early Nineteenth Century, in THE
CONSTITUTION RECONSIDERED 259, 263 (Conyers Read ed., 1938).
79 See Helmut Steinberger, American Constitutionalism and German Constitutional
Development, in CONSTITUTIONALISM AND RIGHTS: THE INFLUENCE OF THE UNITED STATES
CONSTrTuTIoNABROAD 199,202 (Louis Henkin& AlbertJ. Rosenthal eds., 1990) (commenting
on the fundamental rights in nineteenth-century Germany).
80 Wiktor Osiatynski, Remarks at the Conference on Constitutionalism and Human Rights
(Apr. 11, 1989), in CONSTITUTIONALISM AND HUMAN RIGHTS: AMERICA, POLAND AND FRANCE
146, 156 (Kenneth W. Thompson & Rett R. Ludwikowski eds., 1991).
81 For example, Article 1 of the French Constitution of 1830, rather than referring to the
rights acquired at birth, begins with the statement: "Frenchmen are equal before the law,
whatever may be their titles and rank." FR. CONST. of 1830, art. 1, available at http://www.
fordham.edu/halsall/mod/1 830frenchconstitution.html (last visited Aug. 18, 2004).
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legislative assemblies. Although the Europeans were slowly adopting the
concept of division of powers, they believed that powers are not equal, and that
legislative power, being supreme, determines the limitations of fundamental
rights.82 Thus, European constitutions provided elaborate lists of rights that
may be exercised only "in the manner expressly provided by law." 3
Latin American constitutionalism simultaneously looked to the United
States system of governance and borrowed from European philosophical
traditions.8 4 Consequently, the constitution drafters in the region eliminated
much of the ideology that had sanctioned the "inalienability" of rights. The
language of the bills of rights adopted in the nineteenth century and early
twentieth century became predominantly positivistic, referring only to the laws
established or recognized by state authorities.85
The concept of granted rights also gained a decisive upper hand in socialist
constitutionalism. Socialist jurisprudence attempted to distinguish human
rights as a philosophical category from fundamental constitutional rights as a
political one. 6 Socialist legal theory was not interested in any inherent or
natural rights and ignored them completely. John F. Cooper, explaining this
position using the example of the Chinese approach, wrote, "To Mao, all
rights-civil, political, economic, and social-were 'granted' according to the
needs of the party, and the needs of the party changed. Thus, there could be
82 JEFFREY GOLDSWORTHY, THE SOVEREIGNTY OF PARLIAMENT: HISTORY AND PHILOSOPHY
4 (1999). The concept of parliamentary supremacy was especially emphasized in the British
political doctrine which assumed (since the seventeenth century) that the monarch is a part of
the crown in parliament. Id. at 1.
83 SPAIN CONST. of 1876, art. 6, translated in 2 MODERN CONSTITUTIONS 200-01 (Walter
F. Dodd ed., 1909); see also NETH. CONST. of 1887, arts. 5, 6, 7, translated in 2 MODERN
CONSTITUTIONS, supra, at 81.
84 As Robert Barker wrote, "Thus, while Latin Americans subscribed to some French
formulations of human rights, they were less enthusiastic about France as a governmental
model." Barker, supra note 21, at 900.
85 See, e.g., ARG. CONST. of 1853, art. 14, translated in THE CONSTITUTIONS OF THE
AMERICAS 14, 15 (Russell H. Fitzgibbon ed., 1948) (stating that "[a] I1 inhabitants of the Nation
enjoy the following rights, in accordance with the laws that regulate their exercise"); MEX.
CONST. of 1915, art. 2, translated in THE CONSTITUTIONS OF THE AMERICAS, supra, at 498
(stating that "[e]very person in the United Mexican States shall enjoy the guarantees that this
Constitution grants"); CHILE CONST. of 1925, art. 10, translated in THE CONSTITUTIONS OF THE
AMERICAS, supra, at 140 (confirming that "[tihe Constitution insures to all inhabitants of the
Republic [the enumerated rights]").
86 See Chris Osakwe, The Common Law of Constitutions of the Communist Party States, 3
REV. SOCIALIST L. 155, 194-95 (1977).
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no constant or unchanging tenet of human liberties and rights.""7 With the
exception of a few socialist countries experimenting with judicial review, the
constitutional enumeration of granted rights and freedoms did not provide any
legal basis for enforcing them in the courts."8
When the post-socialist states began drafting their constitutions, it was clear
that they would not blindly follow the socialist concept of merely granted
rights. However, the question remained as to whether they would entirely
reject the anti-naturalistic philosophy of socialist constitutionalism or take a
middle-ground approach, emphasizing that a consensus reached by the people
at the constitution's adoption is the result of their recognition of some
commonly accepted values.
In the meantime, the idea that liberties and rights should be protected as
uniform features of human nature was spreading throughout the world and
contributed to the theory of core rights, rights which should be universally
recognized. 9 The selection of core rights was based on agreement, however,
and the final decision concerning which rights should be incorporated was not
unquestionable. The drafters of the new constitutions were aware that merely
labeling the rights as "natural" might not secure universal acceptance of the
rights' fundamental character.9" Although the concept of universal, inalien-
able, and imprescribable rights seemed to prevail in modem
constitutionalism,9 reports from regional human rights monitoring groups,
especially in Asia, have provided evidence that this concept was not accepted
without reservations.92 Cultural relativism claimed more loudly than ever that
87 YUAN-LI WU ET AL., HUMAN RIGHTS IN THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA 12 (1988).
8 Yugoslavia and, since the late 1980s, Poland have experimented with judicial review. See
Rett R. Ludwikowski,Judicial Review in the Socialist Legal System: Current Developments, 37
INT'L & COMP. L.Q. 89, 89-108 (1988).
8" Jerome J. Shestack, The Philosophical Foundations ofifuman Rights, in HUMAN RIGHTS:
CONCEPT AND STANDARDS 31, 36-38 (Janusz Symonides ed., 2000).
" See Amartya Sen, Human Rights andAsian Values, THE NEW REPUBUC, July 14, 1997,
at 33-40; see also U.N. World Conference on Human Rights, Report on the Regional Meeting
for Asia of the World Conference on Human Rights, U.N. Doc. A/CONF/157/ASRM/8-
A/Conf. 157/PC/59 (1993).
"' The adoption of the 1948 UN Universal Declaration of Human Rights seemed to
demonstrate the victory of universalism. Michael Rosenfeld wrote, "Set against the genocidal
horrors of the Third Reich, the Universal Declaration was grounded in the firm conviction that
all humans, by the simple virtue of being human, are equally entitled to the most basic
fundamental rights." Michael Rosenfeld, Can Human Rights Bridge the Gap Between
Universalism andCulturalRelativism?, 30 COLUM. HuM. RTS. L. REv. 249,249 (1999); see also
JACK DONNELLY, UNIVERSAL HUMAN RIGHTS IN THEORY AND PRACTICE 89-106 (2d ed. 2003).
9 See Thomas M. Franck, Are Human Rights Universal?, 80 FOREIGN AFF. 191 (2001).
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the values respected by some people could not be judged by the norms of
others.93
Tension between relativity and universality, positivistic legacies, and
modem naturalism is clearly visible in recently adopted constitutions. Tracing
these influences in newly adopted bills of rights reveals that the drafters'
approaches in the post-Soviet states vary and that many drafters of the recently
adopted Latin American constitutions followed suit. Furthermore, philosophi-
cal differences affected the language of the constitutions, which in both
regions began to reflect several basic approaches of the constitutional drafters.
Relatively unambiguous language emphasizing the natural origin of the
rights can be found in very few Latin American constitutions. 4 The drafters
of the majority of Latin American constitutions either opted for a more
positivistic approach 95 or attempted to avoid clear references to "inalienable"
rights. The last ones usually presented long lists of "fundamental rights"
reserved to all persons.96 Most social and economic rights, although not
included in the group of "fundamental" values, were also granted to
everyone,97 while political rights and duties were reserved exclusively to
citizens.9"
" The countries of the East strongly emphasized that Western universalism is incompatible
with their traditions, cultural values, and religious practices. As Rosenfeld correctly observed,
Western liberal individualism is by no means the only theory with universal aspirations. This
assertion does not mean per se that moral values are relative in the sense that there is no
objective moral truth. Rosenfeld "confinefs] relativism to the situation in which a normative
claim can only be ultimately justified in terms of a contested conception of the good."
Rosenfeld, supra note 91, at 252.
"4 Article 5 of the 1991 Constitution of Colombia states, "The state recognizes, without any
discrimination whatsoever, the primacy of the inalienable rights of the individual and protects
the family as the basic institution of society." COLOM. CONST. of 1991, art. 5, translated in 4
CONSTITUTIONS, supra note 5. The 1992 Constitution of Paraguay states only that "[t]he right
to life is inherent to the human being." PARA. CONST. of 1992, art. 4, translated in 14
CONSTITUTIONS, supra note 5. The Constitution of Honduras repeats the famous formula of the
1789 French Declaration that "[a]ll men are born free and equal in rights." HOND. CONST. of
1982, art. 60 (amended 1991), translated in 8 CONSTITUTIONS, supra note 5.
" For example, the Preamble of the Constitution of Brazil of 1988 states that the people
"convened in the National Constituent Assembly ... to ensure the exercise of social and
individual rights." BRAz. CoNsT. of 1988, pmbl. (amended 2001), translated in 3 CONSTITU-
TIONS, supra note 5. The Constitution ofArgentina declares, "All inhabitants of the nation enjoy
the following rights, in accordance with the laws that regulate their exercise...." ARG. CONST.
art. 14, translated in 1 CONSTITUTIONS, supra note 5.
96 See, e.g., PERU CONST. art. 2.
9' See, e.g., id. ch. II.
9 See, e.g., id. ch. III.
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The inalienability of core rights is clearly emphasized in several newly
adopted post-socialist constitutions. Some of the drafters, however, similar to
the Latin American approach, attempted also to avoid naturalistic phraseology.
To use several examples, the Russian Constitution, contrary to the traditions
of socialist jurisprudence, declares that the rights and liberties of human beings
are "inalienable and belong to everyone from birth."" The Ukrainian
Constitution also confirms that "[h]uman rights and freedoms are inalienable
and inviolable" and that the rights listed in the Constitution are not
exhaustive. "0 New laws may guarantee rights which are not covered by the
Constitution, but cannot reduce the equal protection of rights and freedoms.'0 '
Many of the presidential republics of the former Soviet Union attempted,
however, to purge their constitutions of any naturalistic phraseology. For
example, the language of the Belarusian Constitution is clearly positivistic:
"The State guarantees the rights and freedoms of the citizens of Belarus that
are enshrined in the Constitution and the laws, and specified in the State's
international obligations."'0 2 The drafters of the Georgian and Armenian
constitutions followed suit.l03 Some other countries of the so-called southern
cluster of the former Soviet republics either tried to reach a compromise or the
drafters simply did not fully realize that the wording of the constitutional
99 Russ. CONST. art. 17, § 2, translated in 15 CONSTITUTIONS, supra note 5.
'00 UKR. CONST. arts. 21, 22, translated in 19 CONSTITUTIONS, supra note 5.
' For more examples of the use of naturalistic language, see the Constitution of Hungary,
which "recognizes the inviolable and inalienable rights of persons." HUNG. CONST. art. 8,
translated in 8 CoNsTrrUTIoNs, supra note 5 (emphasis added). The Constitution of Slovakia
also declares that "fundamental basic rights and freedoms are inalienable, irrevocable, and
perpetual." SLOvK. CONST. art. 12, § 1, translated in 16 CONSTITUTIONS, supra note 5. The
drafters of the 1997 Constitution of Poland took a more cautious approach. The list of general
principles begins with Article 30, which identifies "dignity of the human being" as a sort of
Kelsenian "norm of norms" (Norm der Normen) being "the source of the freedoms and rights."
POL. CONST. art. 30, translated in 15 CONSTITUTIONS, supra note 5. The Constitution confirms
that this fundamental right is "natural and inalienable." Id. In constitutional disputes, however,
even this limited dedication of Polish constitutionalism to naturalistic values was considered
disputable. Maria Ossowska, Normy moraine w obronie godnosci czlowieka [Moral norms in
Defense of Human Dignity], 5 ETYKA 7-27 (1969) (describing the disputes surrounding the
Polish Constitution). The Preamble of the Lithuanian Constitution states that people have "the
inborn right... to live and create freely." LrrH. CONST. pmbl., translated in 11 CONSTITUTIONS,
supra note 5. Article 18 of Lithuania's Constitution confirms that individuals are born with
inherent rights and freedoms. Id. art. 18.
102 BELR. CONST. of 1994, art. 21 (amended 1996), translated in 12 CONSTITUTIONS, supra
note 5 (stating that "[tjhe Constitution in conjunction with other laws grants the citizens of the
Republic of Moldova their rights and freedoms and also lays down their duties upon them").
103 See ARM. CoNsT. art. 4; GEOR. CONST. art. 39.
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statements might signify the adoption of a positivistic or naturalistic philoso-
phy of human rights."°
The lack of certainty or consistency also seems to characterize the
constitutions of the post-Soviet states of Central Asia. For example, the Tajik
constitutional drafters incorporated into the Constitution the statement that
human values-namely, life, honor, dignity-and other individual rights are
"inviolable."' 5 Yet they declared that "[t]he rights and freedoms of man and
citizen are regulated and protected by the Constitution, the laws ... [and]
international legal acts recognized by [the Republic]"' 6 without any reference
to their "inalienable" character. The language of the Uzbek Constitution is
similarly confusing. On the one hand, the act refers to "[c]itizens' rights and
freedoms, established by the Constitution."'0 7 On the other hand, it declares
that the rights are "inalienable."'0 8 The term "inalienable rights" does not
seem to mean inherent rights in the sense of features derivative of human
nature and as such incapable of being alienated or surrendered. This
interpretation is confirmed by the mere fact that the "inalienable" rights, with
the exception of "the right to exist,"'" are limited to citizens. As the
Constitution explains, "inalienable" means rather that "no one [has] the power
to deny a citizen his rights and freedoms."" 0 The loss of citizenship, however,
may be accompanied by the loss of the "inalienable" rights.
In sum, as illustrated by the above examples, the language of some of the
constitutions clearly reflects the drafters' naturalistic philosophy while some
other constitutions are purged almost entirely of any references to the
inalienability of rights or to their universal character. Still other constitutions
show that, regardless of the drafters' sensitivity to the philosophical back-
ground of the rights, their position is an amalgam of many well-known
approaches. These differing attitudes can be traced in the constitutionalism of
'0 For example, the intentions of the drafters of the Constitution ofAzerbaijan are unclear.
On the one hand, some statements employ the usual positivistic language stating that only those
rights and liberties "enumerated in this Constitution" are implemented in accordance with
international treaties. AZER. CONST. art. 12, § II. On the other hand, following the Russian
Constitution, and in contrast to the Armenian and Georgian constitutions, the Azerbaijani
drafters declared that the people, since the moment oftheir birth, "enjoy[ ] inviolable, undeniable
and inalienable rights and liberties." AZER. CONST. arts. 12, 24, § I.
o5 TAJ. CONST. art. 5 (amended 2003), translated in 18 CONSTITUTIONS, supra note 5.
"06 Id. art. 14 (amended 2003).
107 UZB. CONST. art. 19, translated in 20 CONSTITUTIONS, supra note 5.
108 Id.
'09 Id. art. 24.
1o Id. art. 19.
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both regions, although it should be noted that philosophical preferences have
not been affected by the drafters' selection of political models of
governance."'
B. The Length of the Constitutions
Most modem constitutions are of moderate length, 150 to 170 articles.
Some longer constitutions or constitutional drafts have been criticized for
being too detailed, while others have been faulted for being too concise, vague,
or complicated for readers untrained in constitutional interpretation." 2 Latin
American constitutions are relatively longer than post-Soviet constitutions,
with several constitutions exceeding 200 articles." 3
At one extreme, the 1991 Constitution of Columbia, one of the longest and
most detailed constitutions in the world, has 380 articles and a separate chapter
on transitory provisions comprising fifty-nine articles. The provisions on the
rights, freedoms, and duties of citizens and individuals encompass more than
one hundred articles, making the provisions more detailed than many of the
entire medium-sized constitutions." 4 Further, the Constitution shows several
common deficiencies in constitutional engineering. It distributes provisions
covering similar areas among too many sections. "5 The Constitution also has
thirteen titles and forty-nine chapters, which sometimes overlap and may
..l For example, references to "inalienable" rights can be found in the constitutions of
parliamentary republics such as Hungary, Poland, or Slovakia, and states with semi-presidential
systems such as Azerbaijan, Russia, or Ukraine.
"2 For example, due to criticism concerning the length of the 1992 Ukrainian draft
constitution, which contained 258 articles, the June 28, 1996, text of the Ukraine Constitution
was trimmed to 161 articles.
"' For example, the 1972 Constitution of Panama (amended 1978, 1983) has 312 articles;
the 1985 Constitution ofGuatemala (amended 1993) has 281 articles and twenty-seven transitory
provisions; the 1967 Constitution of Bolivia (amended 1994 and 1995) has 235 articles and five
transitory provisions.
14 For example, among the shortest post-Soviet constitutions, the 1993 Constitution of the
Kyrgyz Republic has ninety-seven articles, the 1995 Armenian Constitution has 117 articles, and
the Latvia Constitution of 1922 has 116 relatively short articles. Adopted two years after the
Colombia Constitution, the Constitution of Kazakhstan has 131 articles and thirteen transitional
provisions.
" For example, Title XII has six chapters regulating similar areas of the state's financial
activity, such as "development plans," "the budget," and "distribution of resources and
jurisdiction." COLOM. CoNsT. tit. XI, chs. 2-4. The Title also contains the chapter on "the
social purpose of the state and of the public services," id. tit. XI1, ch. 5, which is general in
nature and does not fit the main profile of the Title.
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contain just one or two articles each. Finally, the drafters tried to
"constitutionalize" too many issues, losing sight of establishing a proper
balance between constitutional rules and implementing regulations. At the
other extreme is the 1993 Russia Constitution with 137 articles. Although it
served as a prototype for many post-Soviet constitutions, it has often been
criticized for being too concise and difficult for the general populace to
understand. "16
Constitutional experts often claim that countries lacking substantial
constitutional experience and an American judicial system need more detailed
constitutions." 7 Nevertheless, while Americans may take pride in the fact that
the U.S. Constitution has just seven articles and has survived more than two
hundred years, presenting the U.S. Constitution as merely a seven-article
charter is misleading. First, several articles of the U.S. Constitution are broken
down into lengthy and detailed sections. Second, the Constitution cannot be
discussed as a complete act without its amendments and impressive body of
judicial interpretations.' On the other hand, when the U.S. Constitution was
adopted, no one could have predicted the impressive activism of the U.S.
courts or the subsequent growth of a body of constitutional law. The drafters
of new constitutions face a similar situation, and it would be presumptuous to
advise them to adopt longer acts simply because they are new.
The constitutional drafters need to understand that the flexibility and
completeness of a constitution, and not simply its length, are crucial. In order
to outlast other laws, constitutions should be both constant and elastic; neither
of these characteristics, however, guarantee that a constitution will function
smoothly.
Commentators have claimed that the framers of the U.S. Constitution
deliberately incorporated a solid dose of flexibility, supposedly to facilitate the
adaptation of the Constitution to changing circumstances."' In fact, careful
116 See Boris Yeltsin, Speech to the Nation Introducing the New Draft Constitution (Nov. 9,
1993) (BBC World broadcast, Nov. 11, 1993).
"' E.g., Herman Schwartz, The Bill ofRights in America and Central East Europe, 15 HARV.
J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 93, 97 (1992).
... Schwartz observed, "Our Constitution consists of the 1789 document, the Bill of Rights,
seventeen other amendments, and nearly 500 volumes of the U.S. Reports. It is impossible to
know the contents of our constitutional law just by reading the Constitution without studying
those cases. Developing that body of law, the body that really establishes our constitutional
structure, took 200 years." Id.
"9 William F. Fox, Amending the Constitution to Accomplish Social Goals, 9 SOCIAL
THOUGHT 3 (1983).
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research has shown that the elasticity of the U.S. Constitution did not stem
from the conscious consideration of the factors contributing to constitutional
longevity, but rather from the lack of doctrinal antecedents and lack of
consensus on the meaning of constitutional terms. 2° As such, drafters should
distinguish between flexibility and uncertainty. The former justifies the very
existence of constitutional courts, while the latter encourages the courts to
arbitrarily fill gaps in legislation.2
In summary, there is no single prescription for the length of a constitution.
In order to fulfill its goals and to create a firm framework for political, legal,
economic, and social stability, a constitution needs to provide sufficient detail.
The final product is always a sum of many, sometimes colliding elements, such
as the political and legal culture of the society, the constitutional experience
of the drafters, the activity of the judiciary, the development of civic society,
and the system of judicial enforcement of constitutional rights. The drafters
themselves must analyze these factors. Only they can decide whether a
complete and flexible constitution has to be long or short; either way, the
length should be a deliberate decision and not a side effect of inconclusive
constitutional debates.
C. Placement ofRights in the Constitution
The assumption that constitutions must contain a list of fundamental rights
was not unquestionable in the beginning of the constitutional era. The
American Federal Convention adopted the Constitution without a bill of rights.
The Convention thereby departed from the format that had previously existed
in some states. The motion of George Mason and Elbridge Gerry to preface
the Constitution with a bill of rights was opposed by Roger Sherman of
Connecticut on the grounds that "[t]he State Declarations of Rights are not
repealed by this Constitution; and being in force are sufficient."' 22  The
argument that Congress should be trusted in its intention to preserve the rights
of the people convinced the delegates of the Convention, who unanimously
"(voting as state units) opposed the motion to form a bill of rights
120 Rett R. Ludwikowski, Politicization and Judicialization of the US. Chief Executive's
Political and Criminal Responsibility: A Threat to Constitutional Integrity or a Natural Result
of the Constitution's Flexibility?, 50 AM. J. CoMP. L. 405, 405-08 (Supp. 2002).
12 Id. at 432-36.
122 ROBERT ALLEN RUTLAND, THE BIRTH OF THE BILL OF RIGHTS: 1776-1791, at 116
(Northeastern Univ. Press 1991) (1955).
[Vol. 33:1
CONSTITUTIONALIZATION OF HUMAN RIGHTS
committee."' 3  However, during the struggle for the ratification of the
Constitution, the demand for a bill of rights became widespread, and on May
4, 1789, Madison notified Congress that he intended to introduce the subject
of amendments to the Constitution. 2 4 The Amendments were passed by
Congress on September 25, 1789, and ratified on December 15, 1791.
The Preamble of the first French Constitution of September 3, 1791,
confirmed that the act was established "upon the principles it has just
recognized and declared."' 25 These principles were those contained in the
Declaration of the Rights of Man and Citizen, adopted as a separate act two
years before the Constitution.'26 The 1795 French Constitution supplemented
the Rights of Man with nine paragraphs on the duties of the citizen but the
subsequent Napoleonic constitutions were more pragmatic and they dropped
the section on the Rights of Man along with a great quantity of the ideology
that had sanctioned them.'27
The aspiration that every written constitution should guarantee fundamental
rights had been well-established when the Latin American states began
drafting their first constitutions. Bills of rights were incorporated into the
Latin American constitutions, but the rights and freedoms were often listed
chaotically and blended with provisions about the government's duties,
administrative structures, and revenues of the state. 2" As Russell H.
Fitzgibbon observed about Argentina's constitution-making process,
Moral precepts, endless philosophizing, fantastic rhetoric, and
elaborately impractical governmental machinery were common
in the first constitutions. The early constituent assemblies were
devoted to symbol words-the French trinity of liberty, equality,
and fraternity, of course, and federalism, democracy, unity, and
123 id
124 1 THE DEBATES AND PROCEEDINGS IN THE CONGRESS OF THE UNITED STATES 247 (J. Gales
ed., 1834).
125 See RETr R. LUDWIKOWSKI & WILLIAM F. FOX, THE BEGINNING OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL
ERA 227 (1993) (providing the text of the Constitution).
126 See id. at 225 (providing the text of the Declaration).
127 See Bruun, supra note 78, at 263-64; JOHN H. STEwARD, DOCUMENTARY SURVEY OF THE
FRENCH REVOLUTION 571-612,768-79 (1951) (providing the texts of the Constitutions of 1795).
128 See, e.g., ARG. CONST. of 1853, pt. I, translated in THE CONSTITUTIONS OF THE AMERICAS,
supra note 85, at 14-18.
2004]
GA; J. INT'L & COMP. L.
others-and those were clothed with an almost sacramental
virtue; the approach was ritualistic, in other words. 29
Many of the recent Latin American bills of rights still follow this pattern.
They are ofexcessive length and constitutionalize issues which should be dealt
with by implementing legislation; they mix rights not only with elaborate
social or economic aspirations, but also with provisions about public services,
the state's assets, and obligations of the state's institutions. 3 °
Bills of rights became typical components of socialist constitutions.
Lengthy lists, including numerous economic, social, and cultural rights, were
incorporated to demonstrate the superiority of the socialist state over a
formalistic capitalist approach to fundamental rights. 3 ' The placement of
rights in the constitutions, however, did not confirm their prominent standing
among the constitutionalized values. For example, the 1977 Constitution of
the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics listed the rights in Chapters 5 and 6,
after the provisions dealing with foreign policy, social development, culture,
and the economic and political system.'32
The bills of rights in the post-Soviet constitutions share many common
features. The preambles of the socialist constitutions, which provided many
references to the protection of human rights and the humanitarian mission of
communism, have been shortened or omitted altogether.'33 The lists of duties
have been shortened as well or sometimes eliminated. 34  The appeal to
"collective interests," typical of socialist constitutionalism, still is apparent in
many provisions on social and economic rights. Emphasizing the real
significance of the constitutionalization of human rights, the drafters of the
new constitutions decided, almost without exception, to move the bill of rights
to the beginning of the constitutional acts. 3 Almost all the constitutions built
129 THE CONSTITUTIONS OF THE AMERICAS, supra note 85, at 7.
"0 See, e.g., GUAT. CONST. of 1985 (amended 1993) (containing 281 articles, 151 of which
are in Title I, addressing "The Human Person, Goals, and Duties of the State"); BRAZ. CoNST.
of 1988, tit. II (Individual and Collective Rights and Duties) (amended 2001) (containing only
seventeen articles in Title II, with some articles comprising more than seventy sections).
'3' See ALEKSANDR KH. MAKHNENKO, THE STATE LAW OF THE SOCIALIST COUNTRIES 55
(B.A. Strashun ed., 1976); see also Osakwe, supra note 86, at 155-217.
3I See LUDWlKOWsKICONSTrUION-MAKING,supranote 15,at6O5-31 (providing the text).
133 See id. at 229-32 (commenting on the placement of rights in the new constitutions).
13 Id.
"' The Constitution of Latvia is an exception. The oldest constitution in the region, it was
restored in 1992, seventy years after it was adopted. As the Constitution did not have a bill of
rights, on December 10, 1991, the Parliament adopted the Law on Individuals and Citizens
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enforcement mechanisms into the constitutional texts.'36 While the drafters
attempted to make the bills of rights relatively short and provide built-in
flexibility, these efforts, unfortunately, often resulted in creating built-in
vagueness.
D. Constitutions and Implementing Laws
A flexible constitution means that the statutory laws should provide details
concerning constitutional regulations. This approach, however, does not
clearly define "details." The theory makes sense if the constitutional norms
declare principles or explain social values or patterns of socially desirable
behavior, but leave to the implementing laws the detailed explanation of what
the value or pattern means in practice or how the goals identified by the
constitutions are achieved. Thus, for example, it may be commonplace to state
that citizens have to pay taxes, but this mere statement accompanied by a
formula explaining the distribution of tax revenue between the federal
government and the federal components of the state may give a normative
character to the constitutional provision, even if details will be provided by
statutes.' References to the implementing laws cannot be used to avoid the
formulation of basic constitutional principles as often occurs in post-Soviet
constitutions; a constitution also cannot be a substitution for implementing
laws, as is frequently the case in many Latin American constitutions.
The proper level of generality in the constitution-making process is always
disputable. The addressees of the constitutions often complain that they can
find very few authoritative statements in the constitutions. 3 In reality, the
proper balance between constitutional principles and statutory regulations
cannot be measured purely by the number of references to implementing
laws.'39 In addition to the regular descriptions of legislative actions, the
Rights and Responsibilities, and on October 15, 1998, an amendment inserted a special chapter
on fundamental rights into the Constitution. LAT. CONST. § 8.
.36 Turkmenistan, which does not constitutionalize the right of courts to review the
constitutionality of laws, is the exception.
"' Compare POL. CONST. art. 84 (reading almost in a commonplace manner: "Everybody
shall comply with his responsibilities and public duties, including the payment of taxes, as
specified by law"), with GER. CONST. art. 106 (providing well-balanced provisions on the
apportionment of tax revenue with a clear explanation of the scope of the implementing
legislation).
131 See MAURO CAPPELLErI & WILLIAM COHEN, COMPARATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 21
(1979) (commenting on the "declaratory" character of socialist constitutions).
"9 For example, the commentators on the 1997 Polish Constitution reported that it endlessly
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references to "the other laws" usually have a two-fold rationale: they either
declare that the constitutionally guaranteed rights can be abridged only by laws
and not by administrative decisions, or state that only laws can explain,
mitigate, or expand the limits of the authority of the state's organs through
detailed regulations. Referring to statutory laws without any clear need often
makes the constitutions indeterminate; incorporating details of electoral laws,
tax, budgetary, or educational policies into the constitutions themselves makes
them vague and complicated. Searching for an adequate balance between
constitutional and implementing laws is a big challenge for the
constitutionalism of both regions and constitutional experts have to learn from
each other-meeting halfway may help them to improve their constitutional
products.
E. Functions of the Constitutions and Their Normative Character
Latin American and post-Soviet constitutions were adopted in different
political circumstances, which heavily determined their socio-political roles.
Latin American constitutions, typically recreated de novo or heavily amended
with each major governmental change, have a predominantly legitimizing
character. They confirm that new governments have been established
according to the recognized principles of law or that successor governments
have undertaken the rights and obligations of predecessors. In contrast, post-
Soviet constitutions play a creative function rather than a consolidating or
legitimizing one. They were adopted at a crucial time in the post-socialist
states' histories, when the so-called historical moment of creating a new
political system coincided with the constitutional moment of drafting a new
constitution. 4 ° The constitutions were expected to change, not to reform or
refers citizens to statutory regulations. In fact, the objection is not confirmed by comparative
analysis. The German Constitution, comprised of 146 articles, is shorter than the Polish
Constitution (243 articles), and refers its readers to "further regulations of the law" in forty-seven
instances, amounting to approximately thirty-one percent of the constitutional articles. The
Polish text does so eighty-seven times, which means that reference to the statutory laws can be
found in thirty-five percent of its articles, but the relatively short Constitution of Kazakhstan
(131 articles) does so only twenty-five times, amounting to nineteen percent of the articles. The
number of references to "the detailed regulations of the statutory laws" does not make the Polish
or German constitutions less clear than the Constitution of Kazakhstan.
140 For comments on the distinction between different constitutional functions, see Elster,
supra note 2, at 365; BRUCE A. ACKERMAN, TIE FUTURE OF LIBERAL REVOLUTION ch. 4 (1992);
Rett R. Ludwikowski, Types and Functions of a Constitution, in PRAwo KONSTYTUCYJNE
POROWNAWCZE [Comparative Constitutional Law] 29-38 (2000).
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sanctify, recent political transformations.'41 The question remains as to what
extent the different roles played by the constitutions of the two regions
contributed to the declaratory or normative character of the constitutional
texts.
Commentators often claim that the clear-cut distinction between Western
and socialist constitutions was that socialist constitutions contain only
"declarations" and "programmatic provisions," while Western constitutions
protect rights and freedoms which can be defended in court.'42 Commentators
also assert that the post-Soviet states were supposed to give their bills of rights
a real normative character.143 In fact, neither claims are fully corroborated by
a comparative analysis of the constitutions of Latin America and the states of
former Soviet dominance.
First, the differences between Western and socialist constitutions were
often overplayed. Western constitutions were not necessarily drafted with few
or no declaratory statements or confined to nothing more than rules of law,
while socialist and post-socialist acts were not necessarily manifestos,
codifications of economic will, or declarations of ideals that contain no legal
norms.'" Indeed, in most countries, socialist and neo-colonial countries
included, constitutions are mixtures of legal and non-legal statements.'45 The
clear-cut distinction between Western and socialist constitutions did not mean,
for example, that Western proclamations of economic, social, and cultural
rights were less declarative than those found in the constitutions of socialist or
post-socialist countries. Despite deficiencies in the socialist systems in the
enforcement of rights and the low level of quality of social services offered by
the governments, the socialist states provided many benefits guaranteed by the
constitutions, such as full employment, low-cost housing, and free access to
education and health services. Claiming that all of the socialist constitutional
provisions, even those formulated in a normative way, were merely window-
dressing would be an overstatement.
'4' Ludwikowksi, supra note 140, at 37.
142 Cf Osakwe, supra note 86, at 155-217.
143 See Ludwikowski, supra note 3, at 125-27.
'4 Osakwe, supra note 86, at 159.
The drafters in the socialist states believed that they produced acts with a truly prescriptive
character. Aleksandr Kh. Makhnenko wrote: "What is the place of constitutional norms in the
system of socialist law as a whole? Since a constitution is a fundamental law, its norms have
supreme juridical force. All the norms established by conventional laws and other legal acts
must be in accordance with constitutional norms." MAKHNENKO, supra note 131, at 65.
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Second, it has often been asserted that socialist acts failed to provide
enforcement mechanisms for the constitutional laws and therefore were only
decorative."4 This distinction has been exaggerated as well. Some Western
constitutions are not supreme over the legislatures, 47 while others do not
provide for judicial review. 4"
The real difference stemmed from the clear contrast between theory and
practice, which made many socialist and post-colonial legal concepts merely
legal fictions. Although the gap between theory and practice was less
perceptible with regard to social, economic, and cultural rights, it existed in the
areas of personal, political, civil, and due process rights; as a result, socialist
constitutions simply did not function in a political reality.
A comparison of Latin American and post-Soviet constitutions confirms
that the gap between constitutional theory and practice still exists in both
regions. The mere number of norms contained in a constitution does not by
itself guarantee that the constitution will function in any given geopolitical
circumstance. Even the best constitutional texts are hardly more than a piece
of paper if they are not supported by the government, respected by societies,
and applied in practice.
In fact, the Latin American acts have more philosophical declarations than
the relatively crisp and short post-socialist constitutions. The constitutional
drafters in both regions, however, included awkward provisions which
appeared to signify the importance of some social problems, but in fact
provided no command and had no real substance. Such constitutional
provisions as "the law may be adopted," "the provisions may regulate"
"citizens... shall pay taxes and fees as prescribed by the law," or "religion...
may be taught in schools," are simply meaningless.'49
'4 See CAPPELLETTI & COHEN, supra note 138, at 21.
147 For example, the 1919 Weimar Constitution of Germany allowed amendment of the
constitution by the vote of a qualified two-thirds majority of both chambers. As the quorum of
the chambers was also two-thirds, the amendment could be adopted by the vote of four-ninths
of the chambers' membership. The Constitution thus could be amended by the vote of less than
half of the deputies. See NIGEL FOSTER, GERMAN LEGAL SYSTEMS 24-27 (2d ed. 1996).
14' For example, judicial review in the United Kingdom presumably conflicted with the
principle of parliamentary supremacy. The accession of the United Kingdom to the European
Community required the courts "to override any rule of national law found to be in conflict with
any directly enforceable rule of Community law." Regina v. Sec'y of State for Transp. exparte
Factortame Ltd. (No. 2), [1991] 1 A.C. 603, [1991] I All E.R. 70 (H.L. 1990).
'4 See, e.g., COLoM. CONsT. art. 57, translated in 4 CONSTITUTIONS, supra note 5 ("The law
may establish incentives so that workers may participate in the management of enterprises."); id.
art. 66 ("The provisions enacted in the field of private or public credit may regulate the special
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Latin American and post-Soviet constitutions play different roles, but their
bills of rights show common deficiencies. Although the regions' different
systems ofjudicial enforcement have been constitutionalized, neither system
operates properly and judges in both regions represent a variety of extreme
attitudes ranging from passivity and political submissiveness to activism,
which does not allow them to distinguish legal intervention from the
inclination to interfere in everyday politics. In sum, while most constitutional
provisions appear to be legally binding norms, a gap between theory and
practice exists in both regions and serves to weaken public identification with
the constitution and create a high level of disapproval concerning its provi-
sions. '°
IV. MINORITY AND GROUP RIGHTS
A. Individual Versus Group Rights
The collisions between individual and group rights are a leitmotiv of the
constitutionalization of bills of rights in regions with strongly diversified
societies. In such nations, the realistic chances for the creation of one unified
community of equal individuals are weak, and problems concerning group
rights come to the forefront of constitutional disputes. In Latin America and
post-Soviet states, the debate over the rights of citizens, foreigners, social
groups, and ethnic and religious minorities provoked arguments in support of
several-sometimes colliding-positions.
On the one hand, the drafters of the new constitutions were quite aware of
the liberal background of the modem Western philosophy of human rights.
Liberals traditionally claimed that the protection of individual values was the
best way to protect the well-being of entire societies; communities thrived
when individuals were allowed to develop their initiative and energy according
conditions of agricultural credit .... "); id. art. 68 ("Individuals may create educational
institutions. The law will establish the conditions for their creation and management."); KYRG.
CONST. of 1993, art. 25 (amended 2003), translated in 10 CONSTITUTIONS, supra note 5
("Citizens of the Kyrgyz Republic shall pay taxes and charges as prescribed by the law of the
Kyrgyz Republic."); POL. CONST. art. 53, § 4, translated in 15 CONSTIUTIONS, supra note 5
("The religion of a church or other legally recognized religious organization may be taught in
schools, but other people's freedom of religion and conscience shall not be infringed.").
"0 See Rett R. Ludwikowski, Constitutional Culture of the New East-Central European
Democracies, in CONSTITUTIONAL CULTURES, supra note 8, at 65.
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to their own capacities.' As the nineteenth century British utilitarians
asserted, a society was nothing but an aggregation of individuals; in this
aggregation, each individual was to be counted for nothing more than one
unit.' Thus, liberals argued that individual rights should be defined by equal
protection guaranteed to everyone5 3 rather than by a person's group member-
ship. The state should only guard these rights, maintain neutrality, and protect
individuals against discrimination." 4
On the other hand, the application of the liberal doctrine of human rights
in multicultural societies has always been controversial. "5 Liberal individual-
ism, stimulating competition, could promote the development of market
mechanisms and become a source of economic prosperity in a region, but it
could also be counterproductive to efforts to unite politically inexperienced
and ethnically diversified societies. This threat was alarming for Latin
' John Stuart Mill claimed that:
[I]ndividuality is the same thing with development, and that it is only the
cultivation of individuality which produces, or can produce, well-developed
human beings... what more... can be said of any condition of human
affairs, than that it brings human beings themselves nearer to the best thing
they can be? [O]r what worse can be said of any obstruction to good, than that
it prevents this?
John Stuart Mill, On Liberty, in CLASSICS OFMORALAND POLITICAL THEORY 876, 907 (Michael
L. Morgan ed., 3d ed. 2001) (1859) [hereinafter CLASSICS].
152 For example, Jeremy Bentham wrote: "The community is a fictitious body, composed of
the individual persons who are considered as constituting as it were its members. The interest
of the community then is, what?-the sum of the interests of the several members who compose
it." JEREMY BENTHAM, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE PRINCIPLES OF MORALS AND LEGISLATION 12
(J.H. Bums & H.L.A. Hart eds., Oxford Univ. Press 1970) (1789).
113 John Stuart Mill elaborated on the concept of equal freedom for individuals:
It is not by wearing down into uniformity all that is individual in themselves,
but by cultivating it and calling it forth, within the limits imposed by the
rights and interests of others, that human beings become a noble and beautiful
objects of contemplation; and as the works partake the characterof those who
do them, by the same process human life also becomes rich, diversified, and
animating, furnishing more abundant alignment to high thoughts and
elevating feelings, and strengthening the tie which binds every individual to
the race, by making the race infinitely better worth belonging to. In
proportion to the development of his individuality, each person becomes more
valuable to himself, and is therefore capable of being more valuable to others.
John Stuart Mill, On Liberty, in CLASSICS, supra note 151, at 907.
154 See DONNELLY, supra note 91, at 205-08.
' See generally Susan M. Okin, Is Multiculturalism Bad for Women?, in IS MULTICULTUR-
ALISM BAD FOR WOMEN? 7 (Joshua Cohen et al. eds., 1999) (commenting on the impact of
multiculturalism on women's rights).
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American countries. In a region dominated by elites, the increase of political
participation by indigenous groups, women, peasants, and racial or religious
minorities had been a goal of fundamental importance." 6 The drafters of the
constitutions had to produce laws applicable to communities with a blend of
cultural, racial, and religious traditions. The success of Latin American
constitutionalism had to be evaluated against its ability to create a well-
balanced system of protection for individual rights, as well as for the rights of
minorities and other disadvantaged groups.
The problem was equally sensitive for the post-Soviet societies, which had
not forgotten the communist experiments with "collective mentality."
According to Marxism-Leninism, respect for collective values was to follow
the growing unity of the individual and society.' Socialist doctrine promoted
the ideas of ultimate equality, freedom, and justice, and suggested that these
goals could be accomplished only by a total reconciliation between individual
and social interests.'58 Awareness of the superiority of a shared interest to that
of individual interest was supposed to create a "collective mentality"--a
precondition for the further evolution of the society toward communism. The
individual's rights and duties were to be determined by society. 5 9
The attempt to create a collective mentality failed, however. The fact that
millions of people were encouraged, even forced, to spy, watch, and denounce
others drastically affected public morale. Many people believed that a
collective mentality would serve as an instrument for the destruction of the
individual approach to life and promote the complete atomization of society.
The fear of the communal approach to human rights was spread by the power
of mass neurosis. The drafters of the new constitutions faced a dilemma. On
the one hand, they understood that excessive protection of group rights might
be associated with old-fashioned attempts to develop collective values. On the
other hand, individualism alone was equally unfit to address the problems of
the region. With the exception of Poland, a truly homogeneous country with
'56 See Victor Rodriguez Rescia & Marc David Seitles, The Development of the Inter-
American Human Rights System: A Historical Perspective and a Modern-Day Critique, 16
N.Y.L. SCH. J. HUM. RTS. 593 (2000).
IS' See SOVIET POLTICAL SCI. ASS'N, INST. OF STATE & LAW, THE SOVIET STATE AND LAW
218 (V.M. Chkhikvadze ed., Yuri Sbodnikov trans., 1969).
158 Id.
159 THE LAW OF THE SOVIET STATE 167 (Andrei Y. Vyshinsky ed., Hugh W. Babbo trans.,
1948). As Andrei Y. Vyshinsky claimed, the only source of power is "the will of the people"
as a whole. Id. at 169.
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minorities constituting no more than 2.6 percent of the population,"6 all other
post-socialist republics have substantial ethnic minorities well prepared to
articulate their own rights.' 6' The minorities' problems thus could not be
resolved by mere application of the principle of equal treatment of all
individuals. The drafters of the new constitutions had to develop a compro-
mise, which would help prevent clashes between group aspirations and the
most fundamental rights of individuals.
B. Colliding Group Interests
Other problems, aside from conflicts between individual and group
interests, are equal protection of minorities themselves and potential clashes
between group interests and international commitments of states. 62 Conflicts
between the fundamental obligations of the state and crucial claims of certain
groups, as well as parochial or marginal aspirations of other groups, pose an
important challenge and require the evaluation of reasonable needs and
equitable access to the state's resources. 63 Relevant factors which might be
considered in an attempt to resolve colliding group interests include, but are
not limited to, the serious threat of a group's extinction; the economic, social,
and cultural importance of a group; the importance of maintaining a group's
identity; historically-recognized discrimination against a group by the majority
or other minority groups; comparative costs of alternative means of meeting
a group's claims; availability of other remedies; the degree of internal self-
determination versus separatist inclinations of a group; and the evaluation of
aspirational objectives in light of internationally-recognized rights of
minorities. Each factor should be weighed against the other factors.
'" According to Anna Kosmatka and Beata Przybylska, "the population of [the] national
minority is near to 1.2 million people. It is about 2-3% of Polish citizens." National Minority
Protection in Poland, at http://www.affenraa.dk/m99-nationalminorityprotection.html (last
visited Oct. 10, 2004).
61 Deported, Scattered or Missing: Poland's Minority Communities, I CENT. EUR. REV. 19
(Nov. 1, 1998), at http://www.ce-review.org/99/19/nieuwsma1 9.html.
162 For example, in the Latin American countries, it is a valid question whether native
minorities deserve better protection than immigrants who voluntarilyjoin a multicultural society.
See Rosenfeld, supra note 91, at 273.
163 To illustrate the possible clashes between the interests of the state and the constitutional
rights of aboriginal groups, Rosenfeld analyzes the Canadian Supreme Court's decision
evaluating the fishing needs of the Mohawk tribe against ecological concerns of the state. Id.
at 276 (discussing Regina v. Adams, 3 S.C.R. 101 (1996)).
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Several measures directed at improving the situation of minorities have
been tested. Regionalism, which recognizes the authority of the central
government, but also delegates some power to the regions provided some
protection for group rights. In Belgium, Switzerland, Italy, Canada, and many
other countries with historically distinctive provincial interests, regionalism
provided cultural autonomy or at least representation of identifiable communal
concerns, with varying levels of success." In addition, it facilitated linguistic
minorities' pursuit of cultural and educational rights. 6 '
Further, obstacles to effective political participation by minorities may be
overcome by electoral systems, specifically proportional representation or
other methods that reserve a minimum number of seats in legislative or
executive organs to minorities."r In some countries, proportional representa-
tion is guaranteed through affirmative action programs, quotas, or hiring
preferences for minority group members.'67
C. Ethnic Rights and National Minority Rights: Internationalization Versus
Regionalization of the Movements for Group Rights
The previous subsection presented problems with the constitutional
protection of group rights shared by both regions. More profound research
reveals not only similarities, but also important differences in the history of the
1" Regionalization requires incorporation of the principle of power-sharing into the system
of government. For example, in Switzerland, the seven-member Federal Council traditionally
consisted of four or five persons originating from the German-speaking regions, one or two from
the French-speaking part, and one from the Italian-speaking part. 4 LEGAL SYSTEMS OF THE
WORLD: A POLITICAL, SOCIAL, AND CULTURAL ENCYCLOPEDIA 1574 (Herbert M. Kritzer ed.,
2002) [hereinafter LEGAL SYSTEMS]. In Belgium, the Constitution states that, with the exception
of the prime minister, the Council of Ministers must consist of an equal number of French-
speaking and Dutch-speaking ministers. BELG. CONST. art. 99.
'65 See David Wippman, Practical and Legal Constraints on Internal Power Sharing, in
INTERNATIONAL LAW AND ETHNIC CONFLICT, 211 (David Wippman ed., 1998).
'" Several constitutional arrangements illustrate this approach. For example, under the
Belgian Constitution, the Dutch electoral college elects twenty-five senators and the French
electoral college elects fifteen senators. BELG. CONST. art. 67, § 1. The amendments to the
Lebanese Constitution, adopted in August 1990, provided for the proportional representation of
Christians and non-Christians in the parliament and the cabinet. Emile Sahliyeh, Lebanon, in
2 LEGAL SYSTEMS, supra note 164, at 872.
167 The 1991 Constitution of Romania guarantees, "Organizations of citizens belonging to
national minorities that do not win in the elections the necessary number of votes to be
represented in Parliament, each have the right to one deputy seat, in accordance with the election
law." ROM. CONST. art. 59, translated in 15 CONSTITUTIONS, supra note 5.
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struggle for the protection of group rights in Latin American and post-Soviet
states.
First, the transformation of grassroots social activities for political,
economic, social, and cultural rights into transnational human rights move-
ments is more advanced in Latin America than in the post-socialist states due
to both necessity and opportunity. Major internal conflicts between factions
of military governments, the democratic opposition, leftist guerrillas, and right-
wing paramilitaries touched almost all Latin American countries, affecting the
regional record in human rights protection. 6 ' Although efforts to improve the
legal framework and institutional mechanisms in order to protect the
population should not be disregarded, implementation of such protections
lagged and serious problems remained in many areas. Wide-scale conflicts
between military governments and armed opposition left civilians extremely
vulnerable and exposed to arbitrary imprisonments, relocation actions,
widespread panic, and an increased feeling of social isolation.'6 9 The common
problems stimulated the grassroots activities of peasants, workers, scholars,
lawyers, and journalists. The mobilization of major social groups, ideologi-
cally strengthened by liberation theology, 7 ' created a platform of communica-
tion, which facilitated the rapid process of internationalization of human rights
movements in this region. 171
The trend toward internationalization of human rights movements was
perceptible among ethnic minorities as well.
168 In 1997, Edward L. Cleary wrote:
Military rule now covered all but two South American countries and all but
one Central American country. Brazil, the largest Latin American country,
and Bolivia, among the smallest, suffered military takeovers in 1964. Other
countries followed in the 1960s and 1970s. The regimes of the 1960s were
considered soft dictatorships (dictablandas). Later regimes became brutally
harsh.
CLEARY, supra note 36, at 1; see also Roseann M. Latore, Coming out of the Dark. Achieving
Justice for Victims of Human Rights Violations by South American Military Regimes, 25 B.C.
INT'L & COMP. L. REv. 419 (2002) (providing a more general study of human rights violations
by military regimes).
169 See, e.g., NCARAGUA: ACOUNTRY STUDY 42 (Tim L. Merrill ed., 1993) (commenting on
the treatment of the Miskito indigenous group by the Sandinista government).
17' See generally ISMAEL GARCIA, JUSTICE IN LATIN AMERICAN THEOLOGY OF LIBERATION
(1987).
171 See CLEARY, supra note 36, at 96-102.
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Indigenous people were able to participate in the international
discourse on rights because they had begun organizing in the
1970s. By the 1980s, when most Latin American countries
shifted from authoritarian-military to elected-civilian govern-
ment, indigenous organizations had proliferated and matured, and
had created an inter-American network of advocacy and mutual
support. 1
72
The situation of the republics of the former Soviet Union is complex in a
different way. Violations of human rights have been notorious in all
communist countries.73 and they have remained a major concern for the new
post-Soviet states. Since their emergence, the new governments have
attempted to improve their record and have claimed that the new constitutions
would create an appropriate background for monitoring agencies to evaluate
the effectiveness of governmental policies.
However, the new approach contributed to confusion and suspension
between the socialist legacy and the promised "new beginning." For decades,
communist propaganda had ridiculed Western moral and social values. It
presented people in socialist countries with pictures of rotten societies living
in capitalist and Mafia-ruled urban jungles. As a result, the population has
experienced confusion about Western standards of human rights protection, 1
74
remained politically passive, and failed to recognize the sanctity of constitu-
tions. 71 Confusion about the uncertain benefits of adopting universal
standards of human rights protection has been a major obstacle to cross-
boundary communications between human rights groups. In sum, internation-
alization of human rights in the post-Soviet states does not mean integration
with international human rights movements; rather, it means toleration for
172 Van Cott, supra note 4, at 1.
173 The record of human rights violations in socialist states need not be reexamined. It is
enough to say that the declarations of the post-socialist constitutions created no direct rights that
could be claimed by individuals against the state. According to Robert G. Neumann, the
declarations were "merely a promise that the legislature would be guided by certain principles."
Robert G. Neumann, ConstitutionalDocuments ofEast-Central Europe, in CONSTITUTIONS AND
CONSTITUTIONAL TRENDS SINCE WORLD WAR 11 175-76 (A.J. Zurcher ed., 1979).
174 See Rett R. Ludwikowski, Constitutional Culture of the New East-Central European
Democracies, 29 GA. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 61 (2000).
171 See 1 COMPARATIVE HUMAN RIGHTS AND FUNDAMENTAL FREEDOMS, supra note 1, at 21-
138 (analyzing the situation in the more politically and economically developed countries, such
as the Baltic states or even larger cities in Russia and Ukraine).
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human rights monitoring by governmental and non-governmental organizations
and accession to the most important human rights treaties.
Second, the historical background of the struggles for the protection of
group rights in both regions is different and the regions have different
priorities. In most of North America, Native Americans were separated from
European immigrants; in contrast, the colonization of Latin America produced
a much stronger race mixture. The Iberian colonists brought relatively few
women with them, which resulted in the production of communities that were
a blend of cultures, races, religions, customs, and traditions. 76 Although the
Spanish and Portuguese elites retained their cultural dominance, other
communities were highly ethnically diversified.'" The Latin American
melting pot was not congenial to the development of an internal group identity.
In this social environment, the self-identification process of indigenous people
has occurred relatively faster than among other groups.
78
Indigenous people comprise about ten percent of the population in the
region, ranging from one percent of the population in Brazil to approximately
sixty percent in Guatemala and Bolivia.179 The internal claims of indigenous
groups for "collective dignity'" 0 are stronger than ever and constitutional
recognition of their rights, including the application of indigenous customary
law to the regulation of internal affairs, collective property rights, and the right
to bilingual education, is widespread in the region.' 8' The protection of the
rights of ethnic minorities of African origin is less clearly recognized, but
some constitutional drafters in countries such as Colombia and Ecuador
176 See Ralph L. Woodward, Jr., Latin America, in 15 FUNK AND WAGNALLS NEW
ENCYCLOPEDIA 418 (1986). See generally RALPH WOODWARD, CENTRAL AMERICA: A NATION
DIvIDED (1976) (providing more general comments on Latin American history, people, and
problems).
'" See generally Michael Posner, Human Rights and Non-Governmental Organizations on
the Eve of the Next Century, 66 FORDHAM L. REV. 627 (1997).
171 See generally VAN Corr, FRIENDLY LIQUIDATION, supra note 39.
' Van Cott, supra note 4, at 41.
ISO Liberals recognize dignity as a value fundamental to an individual's identity, which he
may claim regardless of his group membership. Critics of the liberal and individualistic
approaches to dignity have asserted that individuals often do not live alone and do not claim
rights against society, ethnic, or indigenous groups. Thus, according to the critics, human
communities can also demand recognition of their "collective dignity." Rhoda Howard wrote,
"[In most known past or present societies, human dignity is not private, individual, or
autonomous. It is public, collective, and prescribed by social norms." Rhoda Howard, Dignity,
Community, and Human Rights, in HUMAN RIGHTS IN CROSS-CULTURAL PERSPECTIVE 84
(Abdullahi An-Na'im ed., 1991).
"I Id. at 1-7.
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showed an inclination to recognize the African minorities among "original
inhabitants" rather than among ad hoc minorities."8 2
On the other hand, the tendency to resolve the problems of indigenous
people by the creation of autonomous territories in Latin America is limited.
Nicaragua's attempt to create autonomous regions for Miskitu Indians was a
failure 83 and, in fact, very few states constitutionalized the right of indigenous
people to create their own municipal autonomous territories. To give some
examples, references to the political autonomy of indigenous people can be
found in Colombia's Constitution, in Guatemala's 1995 Accord on Indigenous
Rights and Identity, and Mexico's 1996 San Andre's Accord on Indigenous
Rights. 8
4
The situation in the region of former Soviet dominance differs, however;
the autonomy of national minorities is the primary issue for the post-Soviet
states. In the countries of the former Soviet Union, most of the original
nationalities, with the exception of those relocated by the Soviet regime, still
live in the territories once conquered by the Russians.'8 5 On the one hand, the
communist regimes tried to atomize all communities and break all manifesta-
tions of human individuality; on the other hand, for the price of loyalty to the
Communist Party, Moscow pretended to respect various national claims for
autonomy. 86 This was reflected in the national structure of the former Soviet
Union, which was composed of autonomous Soviet socialist republics,
autonomous regions, and autonomous areas.'87 Thus, in spite of various anti-
Russian sentiments, the Soviet totalitarian regime was able to control almost
'82 See, e.g., COLOM. CONST. art. 55 (transitory), translated in 4 CoNsTITUTIONS, supra note
5. The provision states:
Within the two years following the entry into effect of the present Constitu-
tion, the Congress will issue, following a study by a special commission that
the government will create for that purpose, a law which will take cognizance
of the Black communities which have come to occupy uncultivated lands in
the rural zones adjoining the rivers of the Pacific Basin ....
Id.
183 See Van Cott, supra note 4, at 48, 54 n.5.
'u See id. at 47-48.
185 See DONALD D. BARRY & CAROLBARNER-BARRY, CONTEMPORARYSOVIET POLITICS: AN
INTRODUCTION 262 (2d ed. 1982).
186 "[I]n the USSR the members of the various nationalities in a large proportion still live on
the land of their forebears occupied for centuries and are till in touch with reminders of their
religious and cultural heritages." Id. at 262.
IS' Russ. CONST. chs. 9-11, in LUDwIKOWsKI, CONSTTUTION-MAKING, supra note 15, at 617-
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all resistance and undercut separatist ambitions of national leaders without
actually mixing national minorities.
The discussion concerning various concepts of regionalization of the
Russian Federation and the rights of minority nationalities in other post-Soviet
republics resurfaced after the fall of communism. In Russia, the problem
generated an especially vivid debate during the process of drafting the 1993
Constitution. The adoption of the Constitution clarified the sensitive issue of
the distribution of power between federal authorities and components of the
republic. The adoption of the Constitution was preceded by two 1992 treaties
on the delineation of spheres of jurisdiction between the Russian Federation
and its components. The treaties vested "all state power" in the republics
without giving a comparable "sovereign" status to the regions, which were
recognized only as "autonomous parties to international and foreign economic
relations."'l s The issue, fervently discussed at the constitutional convention
of June 1993, almost blocked the progress of the constitutional process and
forced Yeltsin to establish a special "conciliatory commission" to negotiate a
compromise between the parties in dispute. As Dwight Semler explained,
"The regions want equal 'sovereign' status, while the republics believe they
merit special status by reason of their ethnic or national foundations. In
addition, the republics resent the fact that the regions are by and large much
more prosperous and rich in resources." '' I 9
The 1993 Russian Constitution purged the text of almost all references to
the "sovereignty" of Russia's republics and declared that the Constitution
prevails over any conflicting articles of the Federation Treaty.' 90 The
statement that "the sovereignty of the Russian Federation extends to the whole
of its territory," was made a fundamental principle of the constitutional system,
and the reference to the Federation Treaty in Yeltsin's previous draft "as the
basis and an integral part of the Constitution" was dropped.' 91
The adoption of the Constitution nevertheless did not hamper the disinte-
gration of central power in Russia. Russian republics and regions wanted more
autonomy and some, such as Chechnya, sought to leave the Russian state
188 See 1 COMPARATIVE HuMAN RIGHTS AND FUNDAMENTAL FREEDOMS, supra note 1, at 349-
52. The Federation Treaties were signed on March 13, 1992, by President Yeltsin and most
leaders of the autonomous republics and other ethnic and geographical regions. Id.
189 Dwight Semler, Summer in Russia Brings No Real Political Progress; Federative Issues
Dominate Constitutional Discussions, 2 E. EUR. CONST. REv. 20-21 (1993).
,90 Russ. CONST. art. 4, § 2.
19! Russ. CONST. arts. 2, 58 (draft constitution proposed by Yeltsin on April 29, 1993).
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entirely.'92 Russia's position that the 1993 Constitution provided no legal
possibility for secession from the Russian Federation resulted in the poorly
prepared campaign intended to crush the secessionist movement in
Chechnya
9 3
Putin inherited the secession issue'94 and immediately following the
election, presented a package of measures aimed at restructuring the central
administration's relations with the administrative districts of the Russian
Federation. The reform grouped Russia's eighty-nine regions into seven
federal districts run by presidential appointees and diminished the power of
regional governors and local nomenklatura people.9 The success of the
project has been limited; corruption and Mafia-like politics still undermine the
stability of the entire country and most post-communist territorial leaders are
beyond the control of the federal government. 1
96
192 In 1991, Dzhokhar Dudayev declared Chechnya independent. David Johnson & Borgna
Brunner, Timeline of Key Events in Chechnya, 1830-2004, http://www.infoplease.com/spot/
chechnyatime1 .html (last visited Oct. 5, 2004).
193 The clumsy invasion of the republic and the Russian troops' uncoordinated assaults on
Chechen villages resulted in humiliating attacks on Yeltsin in the Russian Duma and in the
media, which presented him as bombastic and incompetent. Yeltsin's secret decrees, which he
issued without an official declaration of a state of emergency, were challenged in the
constitutional court, and his chances for reelection in 1996 were seriously jeopardized. See On
Measures to Reestablish Constitutional Law and Order in the Chechen Republic, Secret
President Decree No. 2137, Nov. 30, 1994 (repealed Dec. 1994); see also Andrew Nagorski &
Russell Watson, Yeltsin'siHollow Victory, NEWSWEEK, Jan. 29, 1996, at 32-33; Bruce W. Nelan,
Mr. Yeltsin 's Ugly War, TIME, Jan. 29, 1996, http://www.time.com/time/archive/preview/0.
10987.1101960129-135389.00.html; Igor Belsky, Constitutional. Court to Hold Hearings on
Chechnya Decrees, TASS, June 30, 1995, at 1.
"' Violations of human rights in Chechnya were still reported after Putin took over the
presidency from Yeltsin. See Physicians for Human Rights, Endless Brutality: Ongoing Human
Rights Violations in Chechnya, Jan. 23, 2001, available at http://www.phrusa.org/research/
chechnya/chech-rep.html. In 2001, the Helsinki Group for Human Rights in Russia wrote an
open letter to Putin: "The continuation ofthe conflict could lead to the total extermination of the
civilian population in Chechnya and to an increase in violence and crime in our country." Rights
Group Fears Totalitarian Tendencies in Russia (May 13, 2001), at http://www.
I worldcommunication.org/totalitariantendencies.htm.
'95 An exception was former Prime Minister Sergei Kirienko, who was appointed to run the
Volga district. See Andrew Meier & Yuri Zarakhovich, Putin Tightens His Grip, TIME (Europe),
May 29, 2000, at 22, available at http://www.time.com/time/europe/magazine/2000/0529/
pitinplans.html.
96 U.S. Representative Curt Weldon wrote: "Billions ofdollars siphoned offthat should have
gone to build roads and bridges and schools for the Russian people, siphoned off for oligarchs
setting up Swiss bank accounts, U.S. real estate investments, and what did America do? We sat
back and pretended we didn't know it was happening." Representative Curt Weldon, Problems
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Ukraine experienced similar problems with national minorities' ambitions
for autonomy. In 1995, the process of constitution-making in this country was
disrupted by the Crimean crises during which the Ukrainian Parliament
suspended the 1992 Crimean Constitution and abolished the autonomous
republic's office of the president. This crisis became more serious when the
Crimean Tatars, the ethnic group deported by Stalin during World War II,
began returning to the region demanding more independence and opposing
Russian influence in the area.
197
One of the most serious examples of ethnic struggles in the former Soviet
republics was the long-running conflict between Armenia and Azerbaijan
regarding the status of the Nagomo-Karabakh region. Fighting in this enclave
ofAzerbaijan, populated mostly by Armenians and recognized by them as their
historic land, broke out in 1988 and lasted until 1994,19' when an opportunity
for compromise and peaceful settlement of the dispute emerged.'" Especially
problematic was the treatment of 18,000 Armenians and part-Armenians living
and Opportunities, in HERITAGE FOUNDATION, HERITAGE LECTURESNO. 690, PUTIN'S RUSSIA:
How SHOULD THE U.S. RESPOND? 12 (2000), available at http://www.heritage.org/ Re-
search/RussiaandEurasia/HL690.cfn.
' David R. Marples, Kyiv and the Power Struggle in Crimea, Stasiuk Program for the Study
of Contemporary Ukraine, at http://www.ualberta.ca/-cius/stasiuk/st-articles/an-crimeal. htm
(last visited Aug. 19, 2004).
98 The conflict escalated with the fall of Azari President Abulfez Elcibey and the rise to
power of Heydar Aliyev. President Elcibey's downfall partly resulted from the government's
failure to hold parliamentary elections. A referendum on August 29, 1993, confirmed the lack
of public confidence in Elcibey and Aliyev won the presidential elections on October 3, 1993.
Although human rights violations occurred during Elcibey's rule, under Aliyev, these violations
increased in number and severity. For a history of the Nagorno-Karabakh Conflict, see
Azerbaijan Embassy, Washington, D.C., Background: Armenian-Azerbaiani Conflict (2001),
athttp://www.azer.com/aiweb/ategories/karabakh/karabakh-current/keywest-background.html.
'" Despite some successes in the Karabakh war, the internal situation in Armenia was
deteriorating. Reported voting irregularities and anti-opposition manipulations during the
parliamentary and presidential election of 1996 resulted in the resignation of Armenian President
Levon Ter-Petrosian in February 1998. The election ofMarch 1998 was won by Prime Minister
Robert Kocharian, a symbol of Armenian victories in the Karabakh war. See Elizabeth F. Defeis,
Armenia, in 1 LEGAL SYSTEMS, supra note 164, at 79; see also Elections in Armenia, Sept. 26,
2004, at http://www.electionworld.org/armenia.htm; Robert Kocharian-Armenia's New
President (BBC news broadcast, Mar. 31, 1998), at http://news.bbc.co.uk/l/hi/world/analysis/
72058.stm; BUREAU OF DEMOCRACY, HUMAN RIGHTS & LABOR, U.S. STATE DEP'T, COUNTRY
REPORT ON HUMAN RIGHTS PRACTICES-2001 (2002), available at http://www.state.gov/g/drl/rls/
nrpt/200 1/eur/8221 .htm.
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in Azerbaijan. The conflict resulted in widespread violations of human rights,
the death of 30,000 people, and left more than a million without homes.2°
In sum, the post-Soviet experiments with regionalization were chaotic and
poorly organized. In contrast to the human rights movements in Latin
America, post-Soviet regionalism did not have a grassroots character and
reflected almost solely regional, and often parochial, ambitions of post-
communist leaders, which clashed with the centrist policies of the federal
government. Improvement of the human rights record of post-socialist
countries requires changes to the political culture; it cannot be accomplished
purely by political decisions. It requires communication between human rights
groups from various regions and contacts with international human rights
organizations. The study of internationalization of human rights movements
in Latin America may provide some valuable lessons for the human rights
activities in the post-Soviet states.
D. Citizens' Rights and Rights Guaranteed to All Persons
The dispute over the treatment of minorities usually arouses discussion
concerning which rights should be reserved purely for citizens and which
should be guaranteed to everyone. Taking a closer look at this issue, several
observations must be made.
In both regions, the level of constitutional protection offered to citizens,
foreigners, and residents is unequal. The differences do not follow regional
boundaries, however, the approaches vary from state to state, reflecting
internal problems with non-citizens visiting or living in the country and the
economic potential of the state to extend equal treatment to every person.
Direct references to foreigners' rights are meaningful as they may signify to
what extent the state is ready to facilitate trade and foreign investment and to
provide sufficient protection for foreign property.
Some constitutions clearly attempt to reduce the rights reserved solely to
citizens to strictly political activities such as elections, assemblies, and
governance of the state; other rights are guaranteed to everyone either by the
principle of equality or by separate constitutional statements.2°1 Other states,
20 Jonathan Ewing, Armenia, Azerbaijan Spar Over Nagorno-Krabakh at U.N. General
Assembly, AssoCIATED PRESS, Sept. 15, 2002.
20' Several examples illustrate this approach. In Argentina, after decades of disputes over the
state's taking of foreign property, constitutional guarantees of foreigners' rights became
especially important. The Constitution clearly states:
Foreigners enjoy in the territory of the Nation all of the civil rights of citizen;
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however, provide very few economic and social rights to non-citizens. In
addition, some constitutions attempt to ease citizenship requirements202 to meet
the standards of international organizations and accommodate the needs of
residents applying for citizenship, while other constitutions make the process
of applying for citizenship lengthy and difficult.203 Finally, some constitutions
allow dual citizenship, while others ban it completely.
2°4
they may engage in their industry, trade or profession, own, purchase or
transfer real property, navigate the rivers and coasts, freely practice their
religion, [and] make wills and marry in accordance with the laws. They are
not obligated to assume citizenship, or to pay extraordinary compulsory taxes.
They may obtain naturalization by residing two continuous years in the
Nation, but the authorities may shorten this term in favor of anyone so
requesting, upon their asserting and proving services to the Republic.
ARG. CONST. art. 20, translated in 1 CONSTITUTIONS, supra note 5.
The Constitution of Brazil states: "Everyone is equal before the law, with no distinction
whatsoever, guaranteeing to Brazilians and foreigners residing in the Country the inviolability
of the rights to life, liberty, equality, security and property." BRAZ. CONST. art. 5, translated in
3 CONSTTUTIONS, supra note 5. The limitations to such rights are also listed.
202 For example, the Estonian Law on Citizenship, which was based on the Law on
Citizenship originally enacted in 1938 prior to the Soviet invasion, and reinstated on February
28, 1992, lists the requirements for attaining Estonian citizenship. Basically, the reenacted law
denied the Russian-speaking minority automatic citizenship, as well as the right to vote.
According to the law, Estonian citizenship was only granted to those who were citizens prior to
June 16, 1940, their direct descendants, and those who "provide particular valuable service to
the national defense or society of the Republic of Estonia or who are widely known for their
talents, knowledge or work." COMM'N ON SEC. & COOPERATION EUR., HUMAN RIGHTS AND
DEMOCRATIZATION IN ESTONIA (1993). The new Estonian Law on Citizenship was adopted by
the Parliament on January 19, 1995, and proclaimed as law by the President of Estonia on
January 31, 1995. Estonia eased its regulations and allowed descendants of stateless residents
to become citizens. At that time, twenty-two percent of residents still did not have Estonian
citizenship. ESTONIA ENCARTA ENCYCLOPEDIA, available at http://encarta.msn.com/
encyclopedia_76563693/Estonia.html#endads (last visited Aug. 19, 2003).
203 Although many of the Russian constitutional provisions have been copied into several
constitutions of the new post-Soviet states, their approach to citizens' rights and rights
guaranteed to all often differs from the Russian prototype. For example, the Baltic countries
have substantial ethnic minorities that reduced the national population to sixty-four percent in
Estonia and fifty-five percent in Latvia. Richard Rose, Special Reports: Rights and Obligations
ofIndividuals in the Baltic States, 6 E. EUR. CONST. REV. 35, 35-43 (1997). The sizable
minority population was primarily a result of the great number of Russian migrations to this
region after World War II. Between the years 1945 and 1959, some 280,000 non-Estonians
moved to Estonia, causing the percentage of Estonians to drop from ninety percent in 1934 to
sixty-four percent in 1991. The migration increased the Russian minority to twenty-nine percent;
the other seven percent consisted ofUkrainians, Belarusians, and Finns, and contributed to strict
citizenship requirements in the Baltic republics. ENCARTA ENCYCLOPEDIA, supra note 202.
204 For example, the Russian Constitution allows dual citizenship. RUSS. CONST. art. 62. The
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The approach of the drafters of other constitutions is less transparent. In
principle, they tried to follow the general tendency in modern constitutionalism
to extend constitutional protections beyond the group of persons enjoying
citizenship; in reality, they offered specific rights to only a narrow group. For
example, the Colombian Constitution follows this pattern. The list of rights
guaranteed to all persons is long, but the exceptions are sometimes surprising.
For example, the drafters attempted to guarantee solely to citizens the right to
dignity and the right to move within the territory of the country."' Peruvian
constitutionalism also follows a mixed approach. The Constitution has a
special chapter on political rights and obligations, which protects the rights of
citizens.20 6 Almost all other rights and freedoms are guaranteed to all persons;
the articles on social and economic rights, however, guarantee relatively few
rights.207 These constitutional provisions have a declaratory character; their
enforcement thus depends on the adoption of implementing laws or must be
confirmed by court decisions.
The 1993 Russian Constitution follows the approach of Article 14 of the
European Convention and the Fourteenth Amendment of the United States
Constitution.20 8 It guarantees the equality of all rights and liberties, and
manifests its openness in a manner similar to the language used in the Ninth
Amendment to the U.S. Constitution. The Russian act states, "The listing of
the basic rights and freedoms in the Constitution of the Russian Federation
Baltic constitutions, however, prohibit dual citizenship. E.g., LITH. CONST. art. 12 (banning dual
citizenship except for individual cases provided by law). Likewise, Armenia, Georgia, and
Kyrghystan ban dual citizenship. ARM. CONST. art. 14; GEOR. CONST. art. 12, § 2; KYRG.
CONST. art. 13, § 2. The constitutions of the Central Asian states, in contrast, do not clearly
address the issue: for example, the Kazakhstan Constitution does not recognize, but does not
clearly prohibit, duel citizenship. See KAz. CONST. art. 10.
205 The 1991 Colombian Constitution states: "Any Colombian citizen, except for the
limitations established by law, has the right to move about freely across the national territory,
to enter and exit the country, and to remain and reside in Colombia." COLOM. CONST. art. 24,
translated in 4 CONSTIrUTIONS, supra note 5. Article 51 further guarantees, "All Colombian
citizens are entitled to live in dignity." Id. art. 51.
206 PERU CONST. tit. I, ch. III.
207 Id. tit. I, ch. II.
200 See generally Sandra Fredman, Equality Issues, in THE IMPACT OF THE HUMAN RIGHTS
BILL ON ENGLISH LAW 111, 112 (Basil S. Markesinis ed., 1998). Article 14 of the European
Convention reads: "The enjoyment of the rights and freedoms set forth in this Convention shall
be secured without discrimination." European Convention on Human Rights and Fundamental
Freedoms, Nov. 4, 1950, art. 14,213 U.N.T.S. 221,232 [hereinafter ECHRI. The Fourteenth
Amendment of the U.S. Constitution provides, "No State shall .. . deny to any person within its
jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws." U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
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shall not be interpreted as a denial or diminution of the other commonly
recognized rights and freedoms of man and citizens. '2"" Like several Latin
American constitutions, the Russian Constitution emphasized the equality of
citizens' and foreigners' rights.21 The Constitution adopts a broad definition
of equality, restricted only by the principle of "equal freedom," which
prohibits the violation of the same rights of another person.2 ' More specifi-
cally, it prohibits unequal treatment based on some disqualified and enumer-
ated grounds, such as sex, race, nationality, language, origin, property,
employment status, residence, religion, convictions, and membership in
associations.2"2 The list of prohibited grounds of discrimination is not finite
as the Constitution also refers to "any other circumstances" in which
discrimination is prohibited.213 The provision reserving the right to own land
only to citizens,214 although not unusual for new democracies,21 seems to
undermine the state commitments to the principles of a market economy.
The level of constitutionalization of rights of ethnic minorities and non-
citizens in the states of the South Caucasus varies as well. For example, the
Georgian Constitution refers to minorities only briefly in Article 38, § 2, and
then in a restrictive rather than protective tone. Article 38, § 2 states, "[t]he
exercise of minority rights shall not oppose the sovereignty, state structure,
territorial integrity, and political independence of Georgia." The Constitution
of Armenia guarantees national minorities only the right to preserve their
traditions and to develop their language and culture.2"6 Both countries grant
a great number of important rights only to citizens. However, the drafters of
the Azerbaijani Constitution came closer to the Russian approach. The list of
rights and freedoms guaranteed to all persons is long and includes rights
frequently guaranteed only to citizens, such as the right to education, social
rights, as well as the right to assemble, associate, and strike.217 The rights of
citizens in Azerbaijan are clearly limited to political participatory activities.
209 RUSS. CONST. art. 55, § 1, translated in 15 CONSTITUTIONS, supra note 5.
210 Id. art. 62, § 3 ("Foreign citizens and stateless persons shall enjoy in the Russian
Federation the rights of its citizens and bear their duties with the exception of cases specified by
the federal law or international treaty of the Russian Federation.").
211 E.g., id an. 36, § 2.
212 See id. art. 19, § 2.
213 Id.
214 Id. art. 36, § 1.
211 See e.g., LrmI. CONST. art. 47.
216 ARM. CONST. art. 37.
217 AZER. CONST. arts. 36, 42, 49, 58.
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Similar to the Azari approach, the list of rights reserved by Tajik Constitu-
tion to citizens is exceptionally short. The Constitution grants citizens
exclusive rights only with regard to voting, choice of place of residence, and
the right of assembly.218 Generally, all other rights, including controversial
social benefits, such as the right to work, housing, leisure, health care,
education, and social security, are granted to "everyone." ' 9 The Constitution
of Kazakhstan states that foreigners and stateless persons have the same rights,
freedoms, and responsibilities as citizens. The focus of the Kazakh act,
nevertheless is on citizens. They cannot be deprived of citizenship, they have
the right to change citizenship, and they cannot be exiled.22° Further, they
cannot be extradited except when extradition is provided in international
221treaties.
E. Gender Discrimination and Affirmative Action
The main international human rights documents do not clearly support
affirmative action. Article 26 of the International Covenant on Civil and
Political Rights simply confirms that "all persons are equal before the law" and
condemns discrimination on any ground.222 Article 14 of the European
Convention sets up the right of equal treatment as a derivative right; only the
rights listed in the Convention are guaranteed without discrimination.223
Article 24 of the American Convention on Human Rights is very short and
states only that, "[a]ll persons are equal before the law. 224 Consequently, they
are entitled, without discrimination, to equal protection of the law. The
Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against
Women goes further. Article 4 states, "[s]pecial measures aimed at accelerat-
ing de facto equality between men and women shall not be considered
discrimination as defined in the present Convention, but shall in no way entail
as a consequence the maintenance of unequal or separate standards ....225
218 TAj. CONST. arts. 24, 27, 28.
219 Id. art. 12, § 4.
220 KAZ. CONST. art. 10, § 2. Except when provided in international treaties. Id. art. 11, § 1.
221 Id. art. 11,§ 1.
222 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, openedfor signature Dec. 19, 1966,
art. 26, 999 U.N.T.S. 171, 179 (entered into force Mar. 23, 1976) [hereinafter ICCPR].
223 ECHR, supra note 208; see also Fredman, supra note 208, at 111-12.
224 American Convention on Human Rights, opened for signature Nov. 22, 1969, art. 24,
1144 U.N.T.S. 123, 151 [hereinafter ACHR].
225 Convention on the Elimination of all Forms of Discrimination Against Women, opened
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Although the concept of affirmative action still remains controversial, 2 6
several Latin American states recognized that the elimination of de facto
gender discrimination is a condition sine qua non of the process of creating a
civic society. Sporadic legislative initiatives legalizing affirmative action can
be found in the post-Soviet states as well.
The participation of women in the politics of Latin American countries is
well documented. In Argentina, President Peron's second wife, Eva Duarte de
Peron, was the charismatic nexus between Peron and the workers. In addition,
she helped him gain the support of women and assisted in giving women the
right to vote.227 In 1955, President Peron was ousted by a military coup and
forced into exile,22 ' but when he was reelected on September 23, 1973, his
third wife, Maria Estela Isabel Martinez de Peron, became vice president.229
Upon Peron's death on July 1, 1974, his widow succeeded him in office,23 °
confirming the acceptance of women's presence in the country's politics.
Other countries followed suit.23' Women also led the way in grassroots
movements by forming human rights-oriented organizations.
[Women] were disproportionately active in groups such as
COPACHI [Committee for Cooperation for Peace in Chili],
FASIC [Foundation for Social Help of the Christian Churches],
the Vicariate, and relatives' associations. The time had come for
women at the grassroots level to call attention to the double
oppression (as women and the lower class) within the country. 232
for signature Dec. 18, 1979, 1249 U.N.T.S. 13, 16 (entered into force Sept. 3, 1981).
22' For example, in 1995, the European Court of Justice ruled that the preferential treatment
of women in the competition for public offices in Germany violates the European Union's
standards of equality. Manfred Novak, Civil and Political Rights, in HUMAN RIGHTS: CONCEPT
AND STANDARDS, supra note 89, at 100 (quoting the European Court of Justice case Kalanke v.
Bremen decided on October 17, 1995).
227 A law extending suffrage to women was adopted in 1947, and in the 1951 elections, the
Peronist Party included thirty female candidates for parliamentary seats. See Eve R. Ladmann,
in 1 WORLD ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PARLIAMENTS AND LEGISLATURES 16 (George T. Kurian ed.,
1998).
22 Jonathan M. Miller, Introductory Notes: Constitutional History andPolitical Background
to Argentina, in 1 CONSTITUTIONS, supra note 5, at vii, ix.
229 Id. at x.
230 Id.
231 See, e.g., CLEARY, supra note 36, at 48. In Chile, after Pinochet came to power in 1973,
his wife, Lucia Hiriart, became a director of several important institutions for the protection of
women's rights, including the Mothers' Centers and National Secretariat for Women. Id.
232 Id. at 13.
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The activity of women contributed to the constitutionalization of affirma-
tive action in some of the Latin American constitutions. For example, in
Colombia, with a high level of reported violations of rights of women,
2 33
children, the indigenous population, and minorities,234 the elimination of de
facto gender, racial, and ethnic discrimination has been recognized as a
condition sine qua non of the process of creating a civic society. The drafters
of the Colombian Constitution seemed to understand the importance of this
issue and constitutionalized affirmative action as a necessary instrument of the
"real and effective" protection of disadvantaged groups.23 The Constitution
guarantees equal rights to men and women and confirms that "[w]omen cannot
be subjected to any type of discrimination. 236
In Argentina, the Constitution also confirms that equality of opportunities
for men and women "shall be guaranteed through affirmative actions in the
131 See Organization Feminina Popular Threatened Again, Feb. 1, 2003, at http://www.
colombiasupport.net/cantagallo.htnl. There were numerous cases of reported threats by
paramilitary organizations against leaders of the women's movement. Id.; see also Gaby Ord-
Aguilar, Sexual Harassment and Human Rights in Latin America, 66 FORDHAM L. REV. 631
(1997) (providing an extensive discussion of sexual harassment in Latin America).
234 The U.S. State Department reported:
Violence and extensive societal discrimination against women, abuse of
children, and child prostitution are serious problems. Extensive societal
discrimination against indigenous people and minorities continued. Labor
leaders and activists continued to be targets of high levels of violence. Child
labor is a widespread problem. Trafficking in women and girls for the purpose
of sexual exploitation is a problem. 'Social cleansing' killings of street
children, prostitutes, homosexuals, and others deemed socially undesirable by
paramilitary groups, guerrillas, and vigilante groups continued to be serious
problems.
BUREAUOFDEMOCRACY, HUMAN RIGHTS, & LABOR, U.S. STATE DEP'T, Colombia, in COUNTRY
REPORTS ON HUMAN RIGHTS PRACTICEs-2001 (2002), http://www.state.gov/g/drl/rls/hrrpt/2001/
wha/8318.htm.
235 Although the Colombian Constitution does not single out women for special protection,
it states:
The state will promote the conditions so that equality may be real and
effective and will adopt measures in favor of groups which are discriminated
against or marginalized.
The state will especially protect those individuals who on account of their
economic, physical, or mental condition are in obviously vulnerable
circumstances and will sanction the abuses or ill-treatment perpetrated against
them.
COLOM. CONST. art. 13, translated in 4 CONSTITUTIONS, supra note 5.
236 Id art. 43.
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regulation of political parties and in the electoral system."237 A 1991 law
already mandated the use of gender quotas by all political parties in national
elections and an implementing decree in 1993 confirmed the requirement "that
a minimum of thirty percent of all political party lists of candidates be
female."2 3' The Brazilian Constitution guarantees specific incentives for
women in order to help them compete in the job market.239 In Paraguay, the
Constitution confirms the equality of rights but recognizes that "[t]he State will
create conditions conducive to, and create adequate mechanisms for, making
this equality true and effective by removing those obstacles that could prevent
or curtail this equality as well as by promoting women's participation in every
sector of national life."24
In the post-Soviet republics, the commentators observed the de facto
decreased participation of women in political life in comparison to their
activities in socialist parliaments."' Although politically oppressive,
communist doctrine incorporated the concept of full equality regardless of any
gender factors. Although democratization in the last decade of the twentieth
century brought progress in many areas of life, it nevertheless frequently
marginalized women. The number of poor women increased considerably in
comparison with the number of poor men; their pauperization risk became
237 ARc. CONST. art. 27, translated in 1 CONSTITUTIONS, supra note 5.
238 BUREAU OF DEMOCRACY, HUMAN RIGHTS & LABOR, U.S. STATE DEP'T, Argentina, in
COUNTRY REPORTS ON HUMAN RIGHTS PRACTICES-2001 (2002), http://www.state.gov/g/drl/rls/
hrrpt/2001/wha/8278.htm.
As a result, the presence of women in Congress has increased. The number of
female members in the Lower House rose from seventy-one to seventy-five
(out of 257 total members) after the October 14th national legislative
elections. Until the October 14th elections, gender quotas had not applied in
the Senate, where there were only two female members in the seventy-two-
person body. However, a December 2000 presidential decree mandated that
at least one-third of all senatorial candidates in future elections must be
women. There are twenty-five women in the Senate that took office in
December. For most of the year, there was one female cabinet-level
official-the Minister of Labor, Employment, and Human Resources
Training. There are no female justices on the Supreme Court although women
are prominent in lower levels of the judiciary system.
Id.
239 BRAZ. CONST. art. 7, § XX.
240 PARA. CONST. art. 48, translated in 14 CONSTITUTIONS, supra note 5 (emphasis added).
241 See data collected by Barbara Einhom, Concepts of Women's Rights, in PRIVATIZATION
AND DEMOCRATIZATION IN CENTRAL AND EASTERN EUROPE AND THE SOVIET UNION: THE
GENDER DIMENSION 63 (Valentine M. Moghadam ed., 1992); see also Katarina Tomasevski,
Women's Rights, in HUMAN RIGHTS: CONCEPT AND STANDARDS, supra note 89, at 231.
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larger, especially in rural localities. This problem often resulted in increased
control of women by social communities and dramatically decreased political
activity in comparison to their activities in previous socialist parliaments.242
The human rights reports on the situation in Central Asia, and even in the
European countries of the former Soviet Union,243 confirm that despite
constitutional protection, traditional societal discrimination against women
continues to be significant. Trafficking in women and girls for the purposes of
prostitution is still a highly used practice and women are discriminated against
in workplaces.
Under the pressure of non-governmental organizations (NGOs) and
international human rights monitoring organizations, some post-socialist states
recognized the necessity of special protection for women. For example, in the
late twentieth century, Kazakhstan's government issued several decrees to
increase the role and participation of women in social and political life, to
promise better health protection and to prevent violence against women in their
private lives. 2" The Armenian Electoral Code offered a concrete program to
242 In 2001, the U.S. State Department reported on the situation in Turkmenistan:
The percentage of women in government and politics does not correspond to
their percentage in the population, although there are no legal restrictions on
the participation of women in the political process. Thirteen members of the
fifty-member Mejilis are female. Women serve in the following positions:
Deputy Chairman for Economy and Finance; Prosecutor General; Ambassa-
dor to the U.N.; Chief of Presidential Protocol; Head of the Mejilis (Parlia-
mentary) Committee on Science, Education, and Culture; Deputy Minister for
Economy and Finance; and Deputy Minister for Social Protection. No
women serve as provincial governors (Hakims); however, the position of
deputy Hakim often is given to a woman.
BUREAU OF DEMOCRACY, HUMAN RIGHTs, & LABOR, U.S. STATE DEP'T, Turkmenistan, in
COUNTRY REPORTS ON HUMAN RIGHTS PRACTICES-2001 (2002), available at http://www.state.
gov/g/drl/rls/hrrpt/2001//eur/8359.htm.
243 In Moldova, sixty-five percent of women are unemployed. The trafficking of women
involved in prostitution has increased in the last decade, reaching levels alarming to the
International Organization for Migration and the International Organization of Labor. The
number of women participating in active political life is also alarmingly low; in 1998, there was
one woman in the government and nine female deputies. The representative figures for 2001 are
no women in the government and eleven in the parliament. United Nations Division for the
Advancement ofWomen (DAW), Replies to Questionnaire on the Implementation ofthe Beijing
Platform for Action, at http://www.un.org/womenwatch/daw/followup/responses/Moldova.htm
(last visited Jan. 13, 2005).
244 See Government Decree No. 999 on the National Plan of Action to Improve the Situation
of Women in the Republic of Kazakhstan (Text No. 311), at 94-155 (Aktiler Zhinagy, 1999-09-
00. No. 35, July 19, 2999); Presidential Decree on the Presidency of the Republic National
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reserve at least five percent of candidate seats on the party lists for women.245
Some states promised elaborate protections to pregnant women and single
mothers working and raising children.26 Nevertheless, most of these actions
were taken at the sub-statutory level and did not create an effective legal
framework of protection enforceable in the constitutional courts. The
improvement of the system of protection of human rights still remains one of
the priorities of the region. This fact must be recognized by legislative bodies
and combined with educational programs, especially in rural areas and among
refugee women. These programs would enable the elimination of the approach
focusing on the rights of heads of families, without providing adequate
protection for women and children. Without the constitutionalization of
affirmative action and the development of grassroots movements to supplement
the constitutionalization, the post-Soviet countries will lag behind countries in
the Latin American region.
V. CONSTITUTIONALIZATION OF RIGHTS AND FREEDOMS IN
COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE
A. Civil and Political Rights
Most of the constitutions of both regions guarantee the principal civil and
political rights.247 The tendency to adhere to international standards resulted
in numerous similarities in the constitutional protection of these rights. In
order to avoid unnecessary repetition, this part of the article attempts to expose
the more striking differences in approaches to civil and political rights
protection. The examples illustrate some trends rather than exhaustively
analyze all the countries' bills of rights.
Committee for Matters Concerning Family and Women (Text No. 425), at 54-58 (Aktiler
Zhinagy, 1998-12-00. No. 48); Instruction No. 3395 on the Fundamentals of State Policy to
Improve Women's Situation (Text No. 74), pp. 51-62 (Aktiler Zhinagy, 1997-04-00. No. 11,
Mar. 5, 1997).
245 Electoral Code art. 100(2) (Arm.).
246 Labor Code ch. XV (Kyrg.).
247 There are a few exceptions. For example, it has to be noted that the Constitution of
Argentina does not have any separate cluster of articles covering substantive personal rights. It
does not address directly the right to dignity or life and refers to capital punishment only
occasionally, when it prohibits the penalty of death for political offenses. ARG. CONST. art. 18.
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1. Dignity
The most important international human rights documents do not define
dignity or address the issue of its individual or collective character.248
Following a more liberal standpoint, they recognize that dignity is an inherent
feature of the human person. According to this liberal perspective, dignity
adheres to individuals due to the fact that they are human and their group
membership is irrelevant.249 Most constitutions follow this pattern and
recognize dignity as one of the crucial personal freedoms, and some deduce
from this right the general prohibition against torture and inhuman or
degrading treatment or punishment.250 Very few constitutions place dignity at
the top of personal substantive rights as a value most fundamental to individual
identity. For example, the 1997 Polish Constitution states that human dignity
is the source of all freedoms and rights25' and the Peruvian Constitution singles
out dignity and defense of the human person as the supreme goals of the
state.252 Most of the other constitutions in both regions simply prohibit any
discrimination against human dignity and guarantee this right to all persons.
Interestingly, however, the Constitution of Turkmenistan grants the right to
dignity only to citizens.253 Generally, the word "dignity" with regard to
children, workers, and older people is more often used in the Latin American
constitutions than in the constitutions of the post-Soviet states.254 However,
248 The Preamble of the Charter of the United Nations declares: "We the Peoples of the
United Nations [are] determined to reaffirm faith in fundamental human rights, in the dignity and
worth of the human person, in the equal rights of men and women and of nations large and
small." U.N. CHARTER pmbl. The Universal Declaration of Human Rights states, "All human
beings are born free and equal in dignity and rights." Universal Declaration of Human Rights,
G.A. Res. 217, U.N. GAOR, 3d Sess., art. 3, U.N. Doc. A/810 (1948) [hereinafter UDHR]. The
Preambles of the International Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights and the
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights recognize that "the equal and inalienable
rights of all members of the human family... derive from the inherent dignity of the human
person." See, e.g., ICCPR, supra note 222, pmbl.
The Preambles of the International Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights
and the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights recognize that these rights "derive
from the inherent dignity of the human person."
249 See DONNELLY, supra note 91, at 27.
250 See, e.g., ARM. CONST. art. 19; KAz. CONST. art. 17.
251 POL. CONST. art. 30.
252 PERUCONST. art. 1. This article has been separated from the lengthy Article 2, which lists
the other rights of all persons. Id. art. 2.
253 TuRKM. CONST. art. 40.
254 There are eight references to this right in the 1991 Constitution of Colombia. See, e.g.,
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despite the problems with the protection of indigenous persons' identities in
Latin America and discussions of their right to collective dignity,255 this
concept has not yet received a firm foothold in the constitutions of the region.
2. Right to Life
The Constitutional provisions on the right to life generally repeat the
fundamental declarations of the major international human rights documents.256
These acts recognize the fundamental value of human life and ban the arbitrary
or intentional deprivation of life or summary execution,257 without prohibiting
the deprivation of life in toto. The adoption of additional protocols, such as
the 1983 Protocol No. 6 to the 1950 European Convention of Human Rights,
the Second Optional Protocol to the International Covenant on Civil and
Political Rights of 1989, and the Protocol to the American Convention on
Human Rights of 1990, evidence, however, the well-recognized trend in
international human rights law to abolish the death penalty.258 These protocols
have been signed and ratified by several post-Soviet states and Latin American
states. The implementation of these international commitments warrants
several observations.
In Latin America, the constitutionalization of the abolishment of capital
punishment has been slow and only a group countries incorporated a ban on
the death penalty into their constitutions promptly after signing the
protocols.5 9 The bills of rights usually present lists of the most severe crimes
still penalized by capital punishment.2' The drafters of most of the constitu-
COLOM. CoNsT. arts. 1, 2, 21,42, 51, 53, 68, 70; BRAZ. CONST. arts. 1, 42, 170, 226, 227, 230.
255 Rhoda Howard wrote: "Many indigenous groups (that is, the remnants of precapitalist
societies destroyed-physically, culturally, or both--during the process of European conquest
and/or settlement) now make claims for the recognition of their collective or communal rights."
Howard, supra note 180, at 399.
256 See UDHR, supra note 248, art. 3; ECHR, supra note 208, art. 2, § 1; ACHR, supra note
224, art. 4.
257 See Novak, supra note 226, at 75-78 (commenting on numerous cases of violations of the
right to life established by the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights and by the
European Court of Human Rights).
258 See Michael Marshall, Death PenaltyShouldBeNarrowedto Fewer Crimes, Bonnie Says,
Univ. of Virginia School of Law, http://www.law.virginia.edu/home2002/html/news/2004
..spr/bonnie-dp.htm (posted Mar. 5, 2004).
259 The ban against capital punishment has been constitutionalized (with the exception of
wartime punishment) by Brazil, BRAZ. CONsT. art. 5, § XLVII(a), Colombia, COLOM. CONST.
art. 11, and Puerto Rico, P.R. CONST. art. II, § 7.
260 See, e.g., PERU CONST. art. 140, translated in 14 CONSTrrUTIONS, supra note 5 ("The
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tions do not explain what the right to life entails and refer instead to the
standard limitations recognized by international conventions.2 6  Most
constitutional drafters leave the more detailed explanation of the state's
approach to fundamental issues, such as the death penalty, conception of
human life, or euthanasia, to the statutory laws and the courts.262
The process of constitutionalizing the abolishment of capital punishment
in the countries of the former Soviet Union was equally disappointing. Several
new constitutions merely have short statements confirming that "[tlhe right to
life of individuals shall be protected by law., 263 They guarantee the right to
life to "all persons"; however, some are inconsistent in the protection they
offer.2"
Most drafters of the bills of rights incorporated the Russian formula, 2
65
which states that the death penalty is applied "exceptionally" and "until its
abolition" for especially grave crimes against life.266 It was widely expected
that after Russia's accession to the Council of Europe, capital punishment
would be eliminated in the country. In fact, Yeltsin's decree in 1996
suspended executions, but the parliament refused to take any more decisive
position on the issue. As a result, the Russian Constitutional Court ruled on
death sentence may only be applied for the crime of treason to the fatherland in wartime and for
terrorism, in accordance with the laws and treaties obligating Peru."); MEX. CONST. art. 22,
translated in 12 CONSTITUTIONS, supra note 5 (providing a list of crimes for which capital
punishment may be imposed: "high treason committed during a foreign war, parricide, murder
that is treacherous, premeditated, or committed for profit, arson, abduction, highway robbery,
piracy, and grave military offenses").
261 Constitutionalization of exceptions to the inviolable right to life is rather rare. See, e.g.,
AZER. CONST. art. 27, § III.
262 Some exceptions have to be noted. See, e.g., GUAT. CONST. art. 3 (recognizing the right
to life from the moment of conception); EL SAL. CONST. art. I (amended Jan. 1999) (protecting
the right to life from the moment of conception). Abortion is strictly prohibited in El Salvador.
The law criminalizes abortion in all circumstances, even to save a woman's life or in cases of
rape or incest. Both abortion-providers and the women are subject to prison terms up to twelve
years. See Severe Abortion Law in El Salvador Persecutes Women, Center for Reproductive
Rights (Nov. 30, 2001), available at http://www.crlp.org/pr_01-1130salvador.html.
263 LITH. CONST. art. 19, translated in I I CONSTITUTIONS, supra note 5.
264 For example, the Constitution of Azerbaijan declares that "everyone has the right to life,"
but later states that "every citizen's right to life is inviolable." AZER. CONST. art. 27, §§ 1, 2.
265 See, e.g., ARM. CONST. art. 17 (stating that the death penalty may be prescribed by law as
an exceptional punishment).
266 RUSS. CONST. art. 20, § 2; see also ARM. CONST. art. 17; GEOR. CONST. art. 15, § 2; KAZ.
CONST. art. 15, § 1; TuRKM. CONST. art. 20 (stressing that the death penalty is an exceptional
punishment but not declaring its temporary character).
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February 2, 1999, that the courts could not impose or enforce death sentences
until the adoption of a new law limiting capital punishment to jury cases.267
In other countries, the courts also attempted to speed up implementation of
the ban on capital punishment. On December 29, 1999, the Constitutional
Court of Ukraine ruled that the provisions of the Criminal Code of Ukraine,
which provided for the death penalty, were unconstitutional. 28 According to
the Law of Ukraine of February 22, 2000 (On the Introduction of Amendments
to the Criminal, Criminal Procedure and Correctional Labour Codes of
Ukraine), the Criminal Code of Ukraine has been brought into conformity with
1999 ruling of the Constitutional Court. 69 The death penalty was replaced by
life imprisonment with one exception.27°
3. Personal Liberty and Related Rights
Manfred Novak wrote:
Personal liberty is one of the oldest human rights already to be
found in the British Magna Carta Libertatum of 1215. Its
meaning must not be confused with that of liberty in a general
sense. Liberty of the person relates only to the freedom of bodily
movement in the narrowest sense, that is to the freedom from
forcible detention of a person at a certain, narrowly bounded
location, such as a prison, police detention centre, psychiatric
hospital, concentration camp or a detoxification facility for
alcoholics or drug addicts.
27
'
267 HERMAN SCHWARTZ, THE STRUGGLE FOR CONSTITUTIONAL JUSTICE IN POST-COMMUNIST
EUROPE 158 (2000).
268 Similar decisions were issued by the Constitutional Court of Albania in December 1999
and the Constitutional Court of Lithuania in December 1998. See Constitution Watch: A
Country-by-Country Update on Constitutional Politics in Eastern Europe and the Ex-USSR, 8
E. EUR. CONST. REV. 2, 2, 23 (1999).
269 Communication Contained in a Letter from the Permanent Representative of Ukraine
(June 29, 2000) (listing Ukraine's declarations to Protocol 6 to the Convention forthe Protection
of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms Concerning the Abolition of the Death Penalty),
available at http://conventions.coe.int/Treaty/EN/cadeprincipal.htm.
71 Id. The Law of Ukraine "On the Ratification of Protocol 6 to the Convention for the
Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms Concerning the Abolition of the Death
Penalty, of 1983" provides for retention of the death penalty for offenses committed in time of
war by the introduction of appropriate amendments to statutory law. Id
27' Novak, supra note 226, at 81.
[Vol. 33:1
CONSTITUTIONALIZATION OF HUMAN RIGHTS
Protection of personal liberty requires the establishment of procedural
guarantees and minimum standards against arbitrary arrest and detention.2
The Universal Declaration of Human Rights confirms each person's right to
liberty and security.273 More elaborately, the International Covenant on Civil
and Political Rights prohibits arbitrary arrest and detention.274 The Covenant
also lists several main principles on detention and imprisonment, such as the
requirement of established legal procedures for the deprivation of freedom,
including communication to the arrested or detained person of information
about the reasons for arrest and eventual charges; prompt confrontation with
judicial authorities; recognition of the right to trial in a reasonable period of
time; recognition that detention pending trial is the exception rather than the
rule; the right of the arrested or detained person to counsel, interpreter, or
translator; notification of the family; prohibition of compelled confessions; and
the humane treatment of persons deprived of liberty.275
The European Convention provides a long list of prerequisites to the legal
deprivation of liberty.276 It requires, among other things, the reasons and
conditions of pre-trial detention, the boundaries of a speedy trial, communica-
tion with arrested persons, and the right of the individual subjected to unlawful
arrest or detention to compensation.277 Most of these standard requirements
can also be found in the American Convention on Human Rights, which
provides an elaborate list of prerequisites to the legal deprivation of liberty.278
The American Convention requires state signatories to establish the conditions
of permissible deprivation of liberty in their constitutions and to adopt laws
pursuant to those provisions.279
272 Id. at 82.
273 UDHR, supra note 248, art. 3.
274 ICCPR, supra note 222, art. 9.
275 See U.N. HIGH COMM'R FOR HUMAN RIGHTS, CENTRE FOR HUMAN RIGHTS, INTERNA-
TIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS STANDARDS FOR LAW ENFORCEMENT 6-9 (1996) (providing a more
detailed list of the basic principles).
276 ECHR, supra note 208, art. 5.
277 See Novak, supra note 226, at 81-83 (examining the minimum standards of deprivation
of liberty set up by international human rights documents).
278 ACHR, supra note 224, arts. 7, 8.
211 On the basis of these acts, the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights prepared a list
of principles which helps to determine the lawfulness of an arrest or detention. The principles
include information at the time of arrest of the reason for the deprivation of freedom and of the
charges against the arrested or detained person, prompt confrontation with judicial authorities,
the right to be released if the detention is unlawful, the right to timely trial or release, the right
to a lawyer and/or an interpreter, and the opportunity to communicate with a legal representative
concerning the details on the record of the arrest, the right of the detainee to be given an
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The priority for the drafters of the post-Soviet constitutions was to
incorporate the general requirements of the European Convention into their
countries' bills of rights; they differed, however, regarding the regulation of
temporary preventive detention and pre-trial arrest, access to the courts' files,
and constitutionalization of the right to legal assistance. The terms of
preventive detention vary from forty-eight to seventy-two hours and in some
countries unlawful arrest must be compensated.80
The Constitution of Turkmenistan differs from other post-Soviet constitu-
tions in that it only guarantees personal liberty to citizens. The Constitution
allows prosecutors and even unspecified "governmental organs" to temporarily
detain citizens in circumstances prescribed by law.28' This provision makes the
constitutionalization of the habeas corpus right meaningless. This right loses
its significance if the Constitution allows statutory laws to define urgent
situations in which citizens may be detained without a court order or allows
opportunity to familiarize himself with this record, the right to notify the family, and the right
not to be forced to confess or testify against himself. See INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS
STANDARDS FOR LAW ENFORCEMENT, supra note 275, at 7.
280 For example, the Russian Constitution states that a detainee must promptly (within forty-
eight hours) be brought before a court, which will either confirm the validity of the arrest or
release the detained individual. Russ. CONST. art. 22. The Ukrainian Constitution requires a
court order for an arrest and limits the time for the court's verification of a temporary preventive
detention to seventy-two hours. UKR. CONST. art. 29. The Constitution requires immediate
notification of the relatives of the arrested person concerning the reasons for the deprivation of
freedom and the initiation of the criminal proceeding, and confirms the right of the arrested
person to legal assistance. Id. The Moldovan Constitution requires that searches, arrests, and
detentions be in accordance with the law, and limits a temporary preventive detention to a
maximum of twenty-four hours and a pre-trial arrest to thirty days. MOLD. CONST. art. 25.
The Azerbaijani Constitution requires only immediate notification of the arrested person.
concerning the reasons for the deprivation of freedom and the initiation of the criminal
proceeding. AZER. CONST. art. 67. The Georgian Constitution is slightly more detailed. It
declares the general principle of inviolability of personal freedom, and states that a person
detained must promptly (within forty-eight hours) be brought before a court that will either
confirm the validity of arrest or release the detained individual. GEOR. CONST. art. 18. The term
of detention should not exceed seventy-two hours before indictment and the imprisonment
cannot last longer than nine months before the court makes a decision on the case. Id. In
addition, unlawful arrest must be compensated. Id. Such provisions are, however, almost
entirely missing in the Armenian Constitution. Compare id, with ARM. CONST. art. 18. Given
Armenia's reported record of arbitrary arrests and cases in which the police imprison detainees
without notifying their family, the weak constitutional guarantees for liberty and security of the
person are disappointed. See BUREAU OF DEMOCRACY, HUMAN RiGHTS, & LABOR, U.S. STATE
DEP'T, Armenia, in COUNTRY REPORTS ON HUMAN RIGHTS PRACTICES-2002 (2003), available
at http://www.state.gov/gdrl/rls/hrrpt/2002/1835 l.htm.
281 TURKM. CONST. art. 21.
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detentions on the basis of a prosecutor's decision without a clear requirement
of a court's approval.
The Latin American states' record of the constitutionalization of the right
to personal liberty is equally uneven. Evaluated against international
standards, the provisions of many constitutions of this region are chaotic and
not elaborate enough. Some of them give an archaic impression in comparison
with the newly adopted post-Soviet bills of rights. For example, the Argentin-
ean Constitution guarantees only the authorization of an arrest by a competent
authority282 and the proper conditions of the prisons, which per se cannot be
used as instruments of punishment.283 The Constitution of Colombia, in
several provisions dispersed chaotically among many articles of Chapter I
(Fundamental Rights), confirms basic habeas corpus rights. 4 The Peruvian
Constitution is more elaborate: it pronounces the right of habeas corpus2"5 and
constitutionalizes certain minimum conditions for the lawful deprivation of
liberty,286 but surprisingly allows statutory laws to permit additional restric-
tions.287 The Brazilian Constitution provides that, with the exception of an
arrest in flagrante delicto military offenses or specific military crimes as
defined in law, no one can be arrested without a written and justified order of
a competent judicial authority.2 8 The Constitution requires immediate
notification of the family concerning the place where the arrested person is
being held and an explanation to the arrested person of his rights.2t 9
282 ARG. CONST. art. 18. The Constitution does not precisely state that this "authority" must
function as a judicial organ. See id.
283 id.
284 See, e.g.,COLOM.CONST.,translatedin4CONSTITUTtoNS, supranote 5 (guaranteeingthat
"[e]very individual is free"); id. art. 12 (stating that "[n]o one will be subjected to forced
sequestration, torture, cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment or punishment"); id. art. 17
(prohibiting slavery, servitude, and the slave trade).
285 PERU CONST. art. 200, § 1.
286 Id. art. 2, § 24.
287 The Constitution guarantees that no one may be detained without a judge's order except
when captured by the police in flagrante delicto. Id. art. 2, § 24(f). Aside from cases of
terrorism, espionage, and drug trafficking, when the police may (for preventive reasons) detain
persons for fifteen days, the detainee must be presented to the judge within twenty-four hours
or at the end of the time allowed for the distance traveled. Id. The Constitution prohibits
solitary confinement and imposes an obligation on the detaining authority to notify the family
of the detainee without delay and in writing identifying the place of detention. Id. art. 2, § 24(g).
Furthermore, it prohibits torture, violence, cruel or humiliating treatment, and makes statements
obtained by force illegal. Id.
288 BRAZ. CONST. art. 5, § XI.
29 Id. art. 5, §§ LXII-LXIII. Additionally, the Constitution states:
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4. Due Process Rights
The approach of the drafters of the constitutions in both regions differs also
with regard to the constitutionalization of the most seminal principles of the
Western doctrine of due process. Some of them, such as the right to access the
courts in all civil and criminal cases,29 ° presumption of innocence, and the right
to counsel are guaranteed by most of the constitutions.29' Several other rights,
such as the right to appeal, the principle of double jeopardy, the right to a
public trial, the right not to be tried in default, the necessity of proof beyond
a reasonable doubt, and the poisonous tree doctrine are not commonly
constitutionalized.292 Some of the constitutions clearly recognize that the
courts should apply a lesser penalty if the penalization of the act was reduced
after its commission, while others disqualify this approach.293 The constitu-
[Olne under arrested has the right to identification of those responsible for
his arrest or his interrogation by police;
judicial authorities shall direct immediate release of those illegally arrested;
no one shall be taken to prison or held therein when the law permits
provisional liberty, with or without bond;
There shall be no civil imprisonment for debt, except for a person who
voluntarily and inexcusably defaults on a support obligation and for an
unfaithful depository;
Habeas corpus shall be granted whenever a person suffers or is threatened
with suffering violence of coercion in his freedom of movement through
illegality or abuse of power.
Id. art. 5, §§ LXIV-LXVIII, translated in 3 CONSTITUTIONS, supra note 5 (section numbers
omitted).
290 For example, in Russia, the right to appeal is constitutionalized exclusively with regard
to criminal procedures. RUSS. CONST. art. 50.
291 The formulation of some ofthese rights is sometimes unnecessarily vague. For example,
the Constitution of Armenia confirms a right to access the courts, ARM. CONST. art. 38, but the
drafters also incorporated in Article 38 an awkward and unclear statement authorizing any person
to defend rights and freedoms "by all means not otherwise prescribed by law," id, translated in
1 CONSTITUTIONS, supra note 5. This clause was intended to allow victims of human rights
violations to appeal to international human rights organizations. In its recent wording, however,
it only repeats the well-known idea that the individual's freedoms are in the area not prohibited
by law.
292 These rights have usually been recognized by the new East-Central European
constitutions. See, e.g., LAT. CONST. art. 92; LnTH. CONST. art. 31.
293 For example, the "lesser punishment principle" was introduced by the constitutions of
Russia, Azerbaijan, and Estonia; however, it was rejected by the Armenian Constitution. ARM.
CONsT. art. 42 (providing that laws limiting or increasing liability shall not have retroactive
effect). With the exception ofTajikistan, TAJ. CONST. art. 20, the issue was not addressed by
other Central Asian states.
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tions vary also with regard to the right to moral and material compensation for
wrongs resulting from unjust and revoked court verdicts.294
The constitutionalization of due process rights in Latin American states is
selective and the criteria for the distinction between fundamental rights, which
are given constitutional coverage, and other rights guaranteed by implementing
laws are by no means clear. For example, Article 18 of the Argentinean
Constitution gives constitutional protection against arbitrariness, confirms the
right to trial, guarantees that an offense will be judged on the basis of prior
law, and prohibits ad hoc tribunals. It also repeats the old Roman principle
nemo tenetur seipsum accusare295 prohibiting self-incrimination.296 The
Constitution does not mention, however, several other equally fundamental
rights listed above.297
The Constitution of Brazil states that the list of due process rights is not
exhaustive.298 It expressly mentions the principle of non-retroactivity (except
for situations which benefit the defendant), presumption of innocence, the right
to a fair and public trial (restricted only for the protection of privacy or social
interest), the prohibition of evidence obtained through illicit means, and free
legal assistance to those who may not have sufficient income to cover the costs
of counsel.299 The Constitution also guarantees the right to compensation for
damages caused by illegal actions. 3°°
29" For example, this right is guaranteed by the Armenian and Russian constitutions but not
by the Constitution of Moldova. Compare ARM. CONST. art. 40, and Russ. CONST. arts. 52, 53,
with MOLD. CONST. The protection of the rights of persons who suffered from crimes and their
rights to compensation is less clearly expressed by the Constitution ofAzerbaijan. AZER. CONST.
art. 68, § I, translated in I CONSTITUTIONS, supra note 5 ("The rights of a person who has been
a victim of a crime and abuse of power shall be protected by the State. A victim has the right to
participate in court examination and to demand compensation for damage caused to him.").
295 No one is obliged to betray himself.
296 ARG. CONST. art. 18. The Constitution of Costa Rica also extends this right to descendents
of the accused person. COSTA RICA CONST. art. 36.
297 Similarly, the Peruvian Constitution confirms that the list of fundamental rights is not
exhaustive and expressly constitutionalizes very few procedural guarantees in criminal trials.
Besides rights protecting individuals against arbitrary arrest, it includes the right to defense,
freedom from expostfacto laws, and the presumption of innocence. PERU CONST. art. 2, §§ 23,
24(d), (e). Venerated principles of due process, such as the prohibitions against double jeopardy
and self-incrimination, the lesser punishment principle, and the exclusion of illegally gathered
evidence, are not directly covered by the Constitution.
291 BRAz. CONsT. art. 5, § 20.
299 Id. art. 5.
300 Id.
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The constitutions of Colombia and Mexico are more elaborate with regard
to due process rights. They emphasize the right to access the courts and the
right to appeal.3 ' The constitutions declare several well-recognized principles
of criminal law, such as the right to counsel, presumption of innocence,
preponderance of evidence, the double jeopardy clause, non-retroactivity, the
lesser punishment principle, and the inadmissibility of improperly seized
evidence (the poisonous tree doctrine).30 2
5. Freedom of Movement
The major international human rights documents require parties to
guarantee freedom of movement within the country and freedom of selection
of residence to everyone lawfully within the territory of the state.3"3 These
standards are generally guaranteed by the constitutions of Russia, Kazakhstan,
Kyrgyzstan, Georgia, and Azerbaijan, while the Armenian and Uzbekistani
laws are more restrictive and guarantee freedom of movement only to
citizens."° The Constitution of Tajikistan does not address freedom of
movement within the territory of the country; it only allows citizens to choose
their place of residence and to leave and return to the state."' The Constitution
of Ukraine guarantees this freedom to everyone legally admitted to the
country.3"6 In 1998, the regulation requiring foreigners to obtain special
permits to visit areas within eighteen to thirty miles of Ukraine's border was
rescinded.30 7 Citizens are also permitted to travel freely abroad. The U.S.
301 COLOM. CONST. arts. 28-36; MEX. CONsT. art. 23.
302 Compare COLOM. CONST. arts. 29, 30,35 (prohibiting life imprisonment, confiscation of
property, extradition for political crimes, and confirming the rights against self-incrimination or
testifying against immediate family members-but not explicitly guaranteeing a right to apublic
trial or the right not to be tried in default), with MEX. CONST. art. 20 §§ IV, VI, IX (confirming
the right to cross-examine and confront witnesses, the right to counsel, the right to a public trial
by a judge or jury, and the right to bail).
303 See, e.g., ICCPR, supra note 222, art. 12, § 1; ACHR, supra note 224, art. 22.
'04 See generally AZER. CONST.; GEOR. CONST.; KAZ. CONST.; KYRo. CONST.; RUSS. CONST.
But see ARM. CONST. art. 22 (granting everyone the right to leave the country, but only entitling
citizens to return).
303 TA. CONST. art. 24.
'06 UKR. CONST. art. 33.
307 BUREAU OF DEMOCRACY, HUMAN RIGHTS, & LABOR, U.S. STATE DEP'T, Ukraine, in
COUNTRY REPORTS ON HUMAN RIGHTS PRACTICES-2002 (2003), available at http://www.state.
gov/g/drdrs/hrrpt/2002/18398.htm. The Report states:
The Constitution provides for these rights [the right to free movement], and
the Government generally respected them in practice; however, there were
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State Department reports, however, that the registration or "propyska" system
is still retained by the Ukrainian government. a8
In Latin America, the scope of the right to freedom of movement varies as
well. For example, the constitutions of Brazil, Chile, Mexico, and Peru grant
to every person the right to freely move throughout the territory of the country
in time of peace; °" the Constitution of Argentina guarantees the right to
freedom of movement to "[a]ll inhabitants of the Nation;-"31 and in Colombia
and Costa Rica, this right is reserved only to citizens and even they are
exposed to the limitations established by statutory laws.
311
B. Property Rights
The main international documents on human rights do not contain elaborate
statements on property. The Universal Declaration of Human Rights declares
the general right to own property and prohibits its arbitrary deprivation. 3'2 The
European Convention does not refer to property rights, but the First Protocol
to the Convention confirms the right to peaceful possession of property as well
as the limited right of the state to control the use of property in accordance
with the general interest and principles of international law.313 The American
some limitations. Until November 2001, the propyska system-a nationwide
requirement to register at the workplace and place of residence in order to be
eligible for social benefits--remained in place; access to certain social
benefits was limited to the place where one was registered.
Id.
308 Id.
309 BRAz. CONsT. art. 5, § XV; MEX. CONST. of 1917, art. 11; CHILE CONST. art. 19, § 7(a)
(stating that every person has the right to move in Chile if it does not affect equal rights of other
persons and does not violate the law); PERU CONST. art. 2, § X; 137, § I (making the right to free
movement subject to limitations based on health, judicial mandate, application of foreign law,
and potential restriction during state of emergency).
310 ARG. CONST. art. 14, translated in I CONSTITUTIONS, supra note 5.
311 COLOM. CONST. art. 24; COSTA RICA CONST. art. 22.
312 UDHR, supra note 248, art. 17. International law commentators observed, "There is lack
of agreement on the scope of this right and permissible limitations on it, but the right of an
individual to own property and not to be deprived of it arbitrarily is recognized as a human
right." BURNS H. WESTON ET AL., Editor's Note, INTERNATIONAL LAW AND WORLD ORDER: A
PROBLEM ORIENTED COURSEBOOK 776 (3d ed. 1997).
"I Protocol [No. I] to the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fudamental
Freedoms, March 20, 1952, art. 1, 213 U.N.T.S. 262, 262 [hereinafter Protocol No. 1]. The
references to the right to property have been eliminated from international covenants as a result
of opposition by socialist states. Novak, supra note 226, at 100-01. As a result, the violation
of property rights in the countries which signed the UN international covenants is exceptional.
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Convention on Human Rights prohibits exploitation and guarantees everyone's
right to the use and enjoyment of property.3 14 However, individual property
rights are subordinated to the interest of society.315 The Convention grants
states a limited right to expropriate "for reasons of public utility or social
interest, and in the cases and according to the forms established by law." '316
International law usually confirms the right of the state to control the
property of nationals within its boundaries, and it is not always consistent
regarding the state's liability for taking the property of aliens. The so-called
Western doctrine insists that a "legal" taking of the property of nationals of
other states be (1) for public interest, (2) nondiscriminatory, and (3) accompa-
nied by just compensation.3 17 However, some elements of this doctrine are
missing in several international resolutions adopted by the UN General
Assembly. Commenting on Article 2 of the Charter of Economic Rights and
Duties of States, Bums Weston wrote: "A break from the past seems clear.
The so-called public purpose (or public utility) doctrine is disregarded. The
'doctrine of alien nondiscrimination' is ignored. And the much heralded
international law principle of compensation appears to be 'domesticated,' i.e.
rejected as an international regulatory norm., 318 The doctrine developed by
Argentine writer Carlos Calvo in the second half of the nineteenth century also
departed from the main assertions of the Western doctrine. Calvo's doctrine,
which focused on the prohibition of discrimination of nationals rather than of
foreigners,3" 9 has been adopted in many Latin American constitutions and is
well-known to socialist constitutionalism.
The drafters of the bills of rights in Latin America and the states of former
Soviet dominance were familiar with the basic international standards of
protection of private property rights. All new constitutions in these regions
have incorporated the right to property. A more detailed comparison of the
constitutional coverage of this right reveals a common tendency to incorporate
into the constitutions of both regions elements of social or distributive justice
314 ACHR, supra note 224, art. 21, § 3.
31 Id. art. 21, §§ 1,2.
316 Id. art. 21, § 2.
317 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 712
(1987).
318 WESTON, supra note 312, at 790 (quoting Bums Weston, The Character of Economic
Rights andDuties ofStates andthe Deprivation ofForeign-Owned Wealth, 75 A.J..L. 437,438-
39(1981)).
3' CARLOS CALVO, LE DROIT NTERNATIONALTHEORIQUE ET PRATIQUE § 1276 (5th ed. 1896).
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permitting the state's significant role in the relatively egalitarian distribution
of wealth. Several examples illustrate variations of this trend.
The drafters of the Russian and Ukrainian constitutions attempted to meet
Western standards of protection by permitting the taking of property only on
the basis of a court decision, in situations involving public interest, and for fair
and immediate compensation.32 ° These constitutions do not explicitly prohibit
discrimination in the process of expropriation; however, this may be prevented
by upholding the general principle of equality before the law.
Although the other post-socialist countries tried to follow suit, differences
still exist. They are particularly visible in an uneven approach to the
ownership of the land. Some constitutions restrict the right to purchase certain
land only to citizens of the country,32" ' while other constitutions, such as the
constitution of Georgia, take a more market-oriented approach and extend this
right to everyone.322
Some constitutions, namely, the Latvian and Estonian constitutions,
prohibit the use of property in a manner contrary to public interest.2 3 States
such as Tajikistan, permit the taking of property for "the needs of state, 324
rather than for more justifiable public purposes. The different wording has
consequences as it gives excessive discretion to the government to expropriate
for political rather than social reasons. In Moldova, the right to private
property is linked to specific duties of the owners.3 21 Some of these obliga-
tions, such as the obligation to respect "good neighborly relations" or the
indeterminate reference to "all the other duties that have to be fulfilled by
owners of private property under the law, 326 leave considerable freedom to the
state to impose limitations which might discourage foreign private investors.327
320 Russ. CONST. art. 35, § 3; UKR. CONST. art. 41.
321 See, e.g., LITH. CONSr. art. 47; EST. CONST. art. 32, translated in 6 CONSTITUTIONS, supra
note 5 ("The law may establish, in the public interest, categories of property in Estonia which
are reserved for ownership by Estonian citizens, certain categories of legal persons, local
governments or the Estonian state.").
322 GEOR. CONST. art. 21, § 1.
323 EST. CONST. art. 32; LAT. CONST. art. 105.
324 TAJ. CONST. art. 32. On the other hand, the provision of the Constitution requiring the
consent of the owner for a taking of property seems unusual and contradicts the per se
compelling character of expropriation. Id. This should go further, the Tajikistan Constitution
allows state confiscation only (1) on the basis of law, (2) with consent of the owner, and (3) with
full compensation. TAJ. CONST. art. 32.
325 MOLD. CONST. art. 46, § 5.
326 Id.
327 The drafters of the Belarusian Constitution went even further and incorporated the old-
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A general overview of the Latin American constitutions reveals more
elaborate coverage of property rights than in the post-Soviet constitutions.328
As observed above, the drafters of several Latin American constitutions seem
to share with their post-socialist counterparts a general sensitivity to a possible
collision between the full and unlimited protection of individual property
rights and the public or communal interest. Several examples illustrate this
tendency.
Social or communal sensitivity can be clearly identified in the constitutions
of Colombia3 29 and Peru;33° this trend is also reflected by the Brazilian
fashioned socialist statement that the exercise of property rights is contingent on social benefits
and security and cannot be harmful to the environment, historical, and cultural treasures, or
infringe upon the rights of other persons. BELR. CONST. art. 44, § 3. These types of vague
constitutional restrictions may encourage governments to use regulatory and taxation measures
to take control over property without formal transfer of title and just compensation. See Bums
H. Weston, "Constructive Takings" Under InternationalLaw: A Modest Foray into the Problem
of "Creeping Expropriation ", 16 VA. J. INT'L L. 103, 133-70 (1975) (commenting on the
strategies of so-called "creeping expropriation" or "constructive taking"); see also Mirjam
Schiffer & Beatrice Weder, Catastrophic Political Risk Versus Creeping Expropriation: What
Determines Private Infrastructure Investment in Less Developed Countries? (July 2000), at
http://www.isnie.org/ISNIEOO/Papers/Schiffer-Weder.pdf.
328 For example, in Argentina, property is the most covered right in comparison to other
substantive personal rights. ARG. CONST. art. 17. Following international standards of
protection, the Constitution prohibits arbitrary deprivation of property, but grants the state the
limited right to control the use of property in accordance with the general public interest. It
distinguishes confiscation from expropriation-while confiscation is prohibited by the
Constitution, the expropriation of property by the state is allowed if authorized by a court
judgment in accordance with the law, done for public utility, and preceded by compensation.
If.
329 In Colombia, property rights are not recognized as fundamental. Chapter I of the
Constitution does not cover the right to property but surprisingly guarantees the right to work
as a fundamental right, although promising no more than "dignified and equitable" conditions
of work and the right to choose a profession. COLOM. CONST. arts. 25-26, translated in 4
CONSTITUTIONS, supra note 5. Instead, property rights are covered by the chapter on economic
and social rights. Id. arts. 58-64. The Constitution guarantees the right to private property and
other related rights, but states that they may be restricted by "public necessity or social interest."
Id. art. 58. These limitations are reminiscent of socialist statements that "property is a social
function that implies obligations." U.S.S.R. CONST. art. 13 (1977).
The Colombian Constitution prohibits the confiscation of property, but allows
expropriation "[b]ecause of public necessity or social interest as defined by the legislator [sic]."
COLOM. CONST. art. 58, translated in 4 CONSTITUTIONS, supra note 5. The Constitution does
not mention a prohibition against discrimination in the expropriation process. It allows the
legislature to expropriate property without compensation for the vague reasons of equity and
public necessity without any available appeal for judicial review of these decisions. Id. In
addition, during wartime, the government may decide to expropriate property without any prior
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Constitution's references to the "social function" of the property33' and the
provisions of the Constitution of Mexico claiming that "[o]wnership of the
lands and waters within the boundaries of the national territory is vested
originally in the Nation."332
The concern about social justice confirms again the close links between the
legal and political culture of both regions. The approach, rooted in the
socialist legacy of post-Soviet states, is admittedly less explainable in Latin
America; in both cases, however, it makes the constitutions less consistent
with Western market-oriented priorities.
C. The Right to Privacy and Related Rights
The right to privacy is widely guaranteed by international declarations and
agreements, such as the Universal Declaration of Human Rights,333 the
European Convention on Human Rights,334 and the International Covenant on
indemnification. Id. arts. 58-59. Even expropriation based on ajudicial organ's decision might
undermine the confidence of investors in the stability of the Colombian economic system as the
Constitution reserves unusual discretion for the courts to "nullify ownership of property when
[it] is injurious to the public treasury or seriously harmful to social morality." Id. art. 34.
330 The Fundamental Personal Rights Chapter in Peru's Constitution laconically lists property
and inheritance among rights guaranteed to everyone. PERU CONST. art. 2, § 15. The
Constitution elaborates on these rights in separate chapters on property and the economic system
of the state. Chapter I of Title III recognizes economic pluralism and the coexistence of diverse
forms of property and enterprise. Chapter III of Title III guarantees the inviolability of the right
to property although it again emphasizes that property rights have to be exercised in "harmony
with the common good." Id. art. 70. Peru's Constitution appeals to "collective interests" in the
manner typical ofpost-socialist constitutionalism. See LUDWIKOWSKI, CONSTITUTION-MAKING,
supra note 15, at 230.
A legal taking of property in Peru requires compensation and non-discrimination against
foreigners and has to be carried out for reasons of national security or public interest. PERU
CONST. arts. 70-71. The Constitution, however, provides for some exceptions prohibiting
foreigners from acquiring or possessing property, such as mines, forest, land, waters, and natural
resources within fifty kilometers of the borders and permitting the state to adopt laws temporarily
limiting property rights for reasons of national security. Id. arts. 71-72.
331 BRAZ. CONST. art. 5, § XXIII, translated in 4 CONSTITUTIONS, supra note 5. Article 5 also
allows expropriation on the basis of procedures established by law and "upon just and prior
compensation in cash, with the exception of cases provided in this Constitution." Id. art. 5, §
XXIV.
3" MEX. CONST. art. 27, translated in 12 CONSTITUTIONS, supra note 5 (confirming the right
of the Nation "to transmit title [to lands and waters within its national territory] to private
persons, thereby constituting private property").
131 UDHR, supra note 248, art. 12.
... ECHR, supra note 208, art. 8.
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Civil and Political Rights.3 35 This right was defined by Resolution No. 42
(1970) of the Council of Europe's Parliamentary Assembly as "the right to
protection of everyone's life with minimum interference," which usually
encompasses the right to privacy of family life, the home, and
correspondence.3 3 According to international standards, constitutions protect
privacy rights from arbitrary interference by attempting to specify most of the
exceptions in the constitutional acts themselves. For example, restrictions on
the right to privacy might be permitted only for social reasons, such as
security, health, morals, or prevention of crimes. Collecting, storing, and
disseminating information on a person's private life without consent thus
should be prohibited.
Some of the post-socialist constitutions, predominantly those in the satellite
countries of the former Soviet Union, are quite elaborate with regard to the
right to privacy and related rights. Clearly, the constitutional drafters in
several of these countries recognized the importance of this right as one of the
inventions of post-socialist constitutionalism. For example, in Poland, the
right to privacy received only partial recognition in the Press Law of January
26, 1984 (Article 14.6), but the Constitution of 1997 gives much broader
coverage to this right. The 1997 Polish Constitution guarantees everyone the
legal protection of private and family life; honor and good reputation, which
includes the right of parents to raise their children in accordance with their
convictions; freedom and privacy of communication; and the inviolability of
the home.337 The related right to privacy of information is less clearly
delineated. The Constitution confirms the general right of everyone to access
official documents and data collected on them and to demand the correction
of incomplete or false information.338 Nevertheless, the limitations imposed
on the right of public authorities to collect information on citizens and on the
right to demand the disclosure of private information were left to statutory
regulations, creating an impression of insecurity and indecisiveness among the
constitutional drafters.339 The relatively elaborate provisions of Articles 30
through 32 of the Constitution of Ukraine also guarantee the protection of the
privacy of individuals and their families, as well as the inviolability of the
331 ICCPR, supra note 222, art. 17.
336 See Novak, supra note 226, at 88-89.
... POL. CONST. arts. 49-50.
338 Id. art. 51.
"9 Marek Safjan, Prawo do ochrony zycia prywatnego [Right to the Protection of Private
Life], in PODSTAWOWE PRAWA I ICH OCHRONA [Fundamental Rights and Their Protection] 144
(L. Wisniewski ed., 1997).
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home, correspondence, and other means of communication.3 4' The other new
constitutions of the former Soviet Republics put much less emphasis on the
protection of the right to privacy. The wording of right to privacy clauses in
the constitutions of Latvia and Lithuania is so general that it leaves a great deal
to be desired.34'
Some constitutional provisions nevertheless may surprise commentators.
For example, Article 20 of the Armenian Act goes beyond the typical
statements of the new constitutions of this region and pronounces an individ-
ual's right to defend his or her private and family life and honor and reputation
from attack. The scope of the right to self-defense as well as its necessary
limitations is not explained by the Constitution. Confronted with the principle
of the direct applicability of constitutional provisions, the decision of the
drafters to leave the concept of self-defense to the courts' interpretation
confirms only their indecisiveness as well as the vague character of the
Constitution itself.
The Georgian Constitution protects individuals' private life, place of
personal activity, and the inviolability of correspondence and other means of
communication.342 Restrictions on this freedom can be imposed only on the
basis of a court order or for reasons determined by law.343 The Act does not
explicitly confirm the inviolability of family life; it does, however, declare the
state's protection of the family, children, and equal rights of spouses.3"4
340 UKR. CONST. arts. 30-32. The Constitution also protects the right to marry, prohibits
forced marriages, and guarantees equality of spouses. Id. art. 51. Collecting, storing, and
disseminating information on private life without consent is prohibited. Id art. 32. The
Constitution lists the prevention of crime as the only reason for the limitation of the right to
privacy. Id. art. 31.
"' The constitutions protect individuals' inviolability of correspondence and other means of
communication, privacy of information, and privacy of family life. LAT. CONST. art. 96; LITH.
CONST. art. 22. They declare the inviolability of private residences, which can be invaded only
on the basis of a court order or for the protection of public order, individual life, health, or
property, or for the apprehension of criminals. See LAT. CONST. arts. 26,27; LrrH. CONST. arts.
22, 24. The explanation of the substance of these rights and their limitations were left to
implementing laws and court rulings. The Moldovan Constitution confirms only "everybody's"
right to access information, and permits limitation of this right only for the protection of citizens
and national security. MOLD. CONST. art. 34. The constitutions of Armenia and Azerbaijan
confirm the right to privacy and the inviolability of the home, correspondence, and other means
of communication. ARM. CONST. arts. 20, 21; AZER. CONST. arts. 32, 33.
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The laconic provisions of the constitutions of the countries of Central Asia
generally duplicate standards of protection provided for in Article 17 of the
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. The constitutionalized
right to privacy covers personal or family life; the protection of honor and
dignity; confidentiality of communication, bank deposits and savings; and
access to public information concerning a person's rights and interests.345
Although the older Latin American constitutions did not usually refer to the
right to privacy, the current trend of extending coverage of this right is clear.
For example, neither the 1853 Constitution of Argentina nor the 1917
Constitution of Mexico directly addressed the right to privacy. Although the
constitutional reforms of the second half of the nineteenth century were
adopted to strengthen the constitutional protection of human rights, the
amended constitutions are not very elaborate concerning these rights. The
Constitution of Argentina prohibits arbitrary interference with the family,
home, or correspondence, leaving the law to determine of the reasons for
allowable searches and seizures.3" The Constitution of Mexico prohibits
violations of sealed correspondence and requires a judicial warrant for
searches.347 However, it allows administrative officials to enter private homes
to check on compliance with sanitary, fiscal, and police regulations,
limitationed only by vaguely described "respective laws., 348
The Latin American constitutions adopted in the last two decades of the
twentieth century put more emphasis on the protection ofprivacy. The drafters
attempted to follow Article 11 of the American Convention on Human Rights
in a manner generally resembling the approach of the drafters of the new post-
socialist constitutions trying to meet their regional human rights standards. For
example, the Constitution of Brazil refers directly to the protection of privacy
and private life, 9 and guarantees the secrecy of correspondence and electronic
communication,350 access to information,35' and the inviolability of the home
3' See, e.g., KAZ. CONST. art. 18; KYRG. CONST. art. 39, §§ 2, 3; TAi. CONST. arts. 22, 23.
346 ARG. CONST. art. 18, translated in I CONSTITUTIONS, supra note 5 ("The residence is
inviolable, as are letters and private papers; and a law shall determine in what cases and for what
reasons their search and seizure shall be allowed."). Although the government generally respects
these prohibitions, monitoring agencies reported that "[i]n practice, local police stop and search
individuals without probable cause." Argentina, in COUNTRY REPORTS-2001, supra note 238.
'4' MEX. CONST. arts. 16, 25.
141 Id. art. 16.
349 BRAZ. CoNsT. art. 5, § X, translated in 3 CoNsTITUTIoNs, supra note 5.
350 Id. art. 5, § XII.
"I Id. art. 5, § XIV.
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except in "cases of flagrante delicto, disaster or rescue, or, during the day, with
a court order." '352
The 1991 Constitution of Colombia guarantees everyone legal protection
of private and family life, which includes freedom and privacy of communica-
tion and the inviolability of the home.353 The 1993 Constitution of Peru follows
suit. It covers personal and family life; the protection of honor and good
reputation; confidentiality of bank deposits, savings, and tax information; and
the inviolability of the home.354 The related right of "privacy of information"
confirms the general right of all persons to access official documents and data
collected on them and the right to demand corrections of incomplete or false
information.355 Information that affects national security or is expressly
excluded by law cannot be disclosed.356
D. Political and Civil Freedoms
Protection of political and civil freedoms, such as freedom of thought,
conscience, religion, speech, opinion and expression, information and media,
association, and assembly, is usually recognized as conditio sine qua non of
the protection of participatory political rights in democratic societies. 357 The
self-organizing functions of societies and the participation of citizens in power
are impossible without free communication between individuals and freedom
tojoin others in establishing groups, social units, or gatherings that would help
them to manifest their opinions and pursue social and political goals independ-
ent of the state.
Both political and civil freedoms and participatory political rights are
constitutionalized by all democratic constitutions; however, the level of
generality of these acts varies from state to state. There are no uniformly
adopted standards of protection for freedom of speech and religion by the new
352 Id. art. 5, § XI.
... COLOM. CONST. art. 15. The related right of "privacy of information" is less clearly
explained. The Constitution confirms the general right of all persons to access official
documents and data collected on them but does not explicitly give individuals the right to
demand corrections of incomplete or false information. Some limitations imposed on the right
to privacy of information for tax purposes were left to statutory regulations. Id
314 PERU CONST. art. 2, §§ 3-9.
355 Id. art. 2, § 4.
356 Id. art. 2, § 5.
311 These freedoms are recognized in Articles 9-11 of the European Convention on Human
Rights, ECHR, supra note 208, and Articles 18-22 of the International Covenant on Civil and
Political Rights, ICCPR, supra note 222.
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post-socialist constitutions, and in some states, namely, the countries of South
Caucasus and Central Asia, the coverage of these rights is exceptionally weak.
Given human rights monitoring organizations' reports on numerous violations
of religious freedoms in this area, the weak constitutionalization of the right
to religious freedom is especially alarming,"' and this fact should be brought
to the attention of the drafters of the regional bills of rights.359
Most of the states of Central Asia prohibit religious parties.36° The position
of Tajikistan is an exception. Constitutional amendments, added by the
national referendum held on September 26, 1999, changed the provisions of
the May 1998 law prohibiting the entry of religious political groups into the
parliament.36' The amended Article 28 states, "Citizens have the right of
association; a citizen has the right to participate in creation of political parties
including those ofa democratic, religious and atheistic character, professional
unions, and other social associations, [and] to voluntarily join or leave such
organizations. '"362
The constitutionalization of religious freedom in the Slavic Republic of the
former Soviet Union is more extensive. The Russian Constitution guarantees
freedom of conscience and religion.363 This freedom encompasses the
... See generally BUREAU OF DEMOCRAcY, HuMAN RIGHTS, & LABOR, U.S. STATE DEP'T,
COUNTRY REPORTS ON HUMAN RIGHTS PRACTICES-2002 (2003), available at http://www.state.
gov/g/drl/rls/hrrpt/2002.
"9 For example, the Armenian, Georgian, and Tajik constitutions simply mention freedom
of religion; most of the other constitutions of the non-Slavic "southern cluster" of republics of
the former Soviet Union do not even explain the relationship between the state and religious
organizations or between religious institutions themselves. Instead, they ambiguously state that
restrictions on the freedom to exercise religion might be imposed only on the grounds prescribed
for in the imposition of martial law. Nevertheless, some exceptions can be observed. The
Azerbaijani Constitution, for example, elaborates on the relationship between the state and
religion more than the constitutions of the other states in this region. It clearly emphasizes the
secular character ofthe state, AZER. CONST. art. 7, § I, and guarantees freedom ofconscience and
the right to manifest and disseminate religious beliefs, id. art. 48, § § 1, 11. It also lists permissible
restrictions imposed on the right to express convictions. E.g., id. art. 48, § III. The Constitution
of Uzbekistan also confirms the separation of church and state and nonintervention of the state
in religious associations. UZB. CONST. art. 61.
360 See, e.g., KAZ. CONST. art. 5, § 3; KYRG. CONST. art. 8, § 4.
361 TAj. CONST. art. 28.
362 Id., translated in 18 CONSTITUTIONS, supra note 5. The new constitution allowing
religion-based political parties paved the way for the introduction of members of opposition
parties into parliament, including the most important opposition group, the Islamic Renaissance
Party. In this way, some democratic aspects of political pluralism have been implanted into the
authoritarian framework of the Tajik system of governance.
363 RUSS. CONST. art. 28.
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selection of religion or faith and the manifestation of choice in the form of
worship, observance, and practice and dissemination of religious beliefs.3 4
The Constitution guarantees public, private, individual, and group manifesta-
tions of religious convictions.365 It does not directly address the concept of
religious equality, but it guarantees the separation of the state and religious
organizations.366 The Constitution prohibits propaganda of "social, racial,
national, religious or racial superiority" and behaviors inciting "social, racial,
national hatred and strife. '367 Additional restrictions might be imposed by law
for general reasons enumerated in Article 55, such as protection of health,
dignity, private life, morals, defense of the country, security of the state, and
protection of the constitutional order.3
61
The Ukrainian Constitution guarantees public or private and individual or
group manifestations of religious convictions.369 The exercise of this right may
be restricted for public order, health, morality, and equal rights and freedoms
of others.370 Instead of addressing the concept of religious equality, the
Constitution elaborates on the separation of church and state and the secular
364 Id.
365 Id.
366 See id. In 2000, the U.S. State Department reported that
On November 23, the Constitutional Court upheld the provision of the 1997
religion law that requires religious organizations to prove fifteen years of
existence in the country in order to be registered. However, the Court also
ruled that religious organizations that were registered before the passage of
the 1997 religion law are not required to prove fifteen years' existence in the
country in order to be registered.
BUREAU OF DEMOCRACY, HUMAN RIGHTS, & LABOR, U.S. STATE DEP'T, Russia, in COUNTRY
REPORTS ON HUMAN RIGHTS-1999 (2000), available at http://www.state.gov/g/drl/rlslhrrpt/
1999/356.htm.
36? Russ. CONST. art. 29, § 2, translated in 15 CONSTITUTIONS, supra note 5.
368 Id. art. 55. On September 19, 1997, Russia adopted the Law on Freedom of Conscience
and Religious Organizations. Many international commentators claim that this law is more
selective than its 1990 version, which granted religious rights basically to all religious faiths.
The law was also criticized by Oleg Mironov, Russia's Human Rights Commissioner. During
his visit at Zaoklsky Theological Seminary, Mironov observed that the law "does not agree with
the national constitution." See Comments on Russian Implementing Laws Related to the
Protection of Rights and Freedoms of Citizens; see also Rebecca Scoggins, Russia's Human
Rights Commissioner Questions Religion Law, Adventist News Network: Freedom & Faith
(July 3, 2001), at http://www.adventist.org/news/data/2001/06/0994163787/index.html.en.
369 UKR. CONST. art. 35.
370 Id.
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character of education.37' It recognizes the right of conscientious objectors to
perform alternative non-military services. 72
The Constitution of Belarus guarantees the freedom to choose, profess, and
spread religious beliefs and to participate in religious activities. 373 However,
the drafters departed from the Russian model of a relatively full
constitutionalization of religious freedom and reserved for the legislature the
right to prohibit some rites and rituals without listing in the Constitution any
reasons which may justify the imposition of restrictions.3 74
It may have been expected that with regard to freedom of thought and
speech, inexperienced constitutional drafters from the remote areas of the
former Soviet Union would follow the approach of the Russian
constitutionalism. To some extent, this proved true, but only in the post-Soviet
Slavic republics, while the countries of the Caucasus and Central Asia covered
this right only symbolically.
The Russian Constitution guarantees freedom of thought and speech,375
while prohibiting censorship.37 Similar to the European Convention, the
Russian Constitution links freedom of expression with freedom of information
and mass media.377 Similar to the Russian Constitution, the Ukrainian
Constitution's bill of rights protects freedom of thought and speech while also
addressing permissible restrictions on the freedom of expression.3 7' The
rationale of restrictions imposed for "authority and impartiality ofjustice '3 79
is vague and it can authorize far-reaching interference of the state in the right
of individuals to criticize state policies.
In comparison, the coverage of this right by the constitutions of the South
Caucasian and Central Asian states is exceptionally sketchy. All the
371 Id.
372 Id.
373 BELR. CONST. art. 3 1.
374 Id.
371 Russ. CONST. art. 29, § 1.
376 Id. art. 29, § 5.
177 Id. art. 29.
... UKR. CONST. art. 34. The limitations of this right stem from the generally recognized right
of states to protect national security, society against crimes, territorial indivisibility, public order,
health of the population, reputation and right to confidentiality of other persons.
"' Id. With the exception of the short declaration of Article 15 that "[c]ensorship is
prohibited," id. art. 15, translated in 19 CONSTrruroNs, supra note 5, the right to a free press
is noticeably absent from the Constitution. The absence of express protection of the press in the
Constitution is compensated to some extent by the Law on News Agencies, which entered into
force on February 28, 1995.
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constitutions of the region guarantee freedom of expression. Some constitu-
tions address freedom of the press separately and in so doing only confirm the
prohibition of preventive censorship.3 0  The Armenian Constitution, in
contrast, does not clearly confirm freedom of the media or place prohibitions
on censorship.
The constitutions of the Latin American states do not differ much from the
approach of non-Slavic republics of the former Soviet Union and most of them
provide superficial coverage of political and civil freedoms. Given the record
of serious violations of these rights in Latin America, their late and weak
constitutionalization is especially alarming.3"'
For example, in Argentina these rights are covered by the declaration of
Article 14 covering the protection of property rights; freedom of work;
navigation and trading rights; freedom of movement; and freedom of speech,
press, and religion.8 2 Collecting all these rights in a single article might have
looked satisfactory in the nineteenth century, but it does not fit the standards
of twentieth or twenty-first century constitutionalism. Using a similar
approach as in Argentina's Constitution, omnibus Article 5 of the Constitution
of Brazil guarantees freedom of expression; thought; and "intellectual, artistic,
scientific, and communication activit[ies] ... independent of censorship or
license." '383 Article 5 also guarantees the inviolability of freedom of con-
science and belief and the free exercise of religious beliefs within a framework
determined by law.3"
The coverage of these rights by the Colombian Constitution is also very
shallow. Article 20 guarantees freedom of expression and the right to receive
information and establish mass communication media.385 Freedom of the
media is guaranteed and the Constitution prohibits censorship. 386 However, the
reference to a "social responsibility" of the media387 is so vague that it may
invite abuse.
380 See, e.g., AZER. CONST. art. 50.
"' See Paul E. Sigmund, Religious Human Rights: Religious Human Rights in Latin
America, 10 EMORY INT'L L. REv. 173 (1996).
382 ARG. CONST. art. 14. Freedom ofpress is also confirmed by Article 32, which bans federal
jurisdiction over the press. Id. art. 32.
13 BRAZ. CONST. art. 5, §§ IV, IX, translated in 3 CONSTITUTIONS, supra note 5.
3- Id. § VI.
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The formal separation of church and state was not recognized in Latin
America before the twentieth century and in some countries, such as Argentina
and Bolivia, not before the second half of the century.388 Several states in the
region still recognize the special role of Catholicism. For example, the
Constitution of Peru draws a distinction between the Catholic Church and
other religions. It confirms the independent and autonomous character of the
state, but avoids a straightforward declaration of the principle of separation of
church and state. It recognizes the historical role of the Catholic Church and
its traditional collaboration with the state, but admits that other religious
denominations may establish mechanisms of cooperation as well.3 8 9 The
Constitution confirms the "freedom of information, opinion, expression and
diffusion of ideas whether oral, written, or visual through any communications
media without previous authorization or censorship or restraint whatsoever,
under protection of law."'390 At the other extreme, the 1917 Constitution of
Mexico adopted a number of anti-clerical provisions nationalizing church
property and prohibiting church-sponsored education. "These provisions were
circumvented through a variety of devices, but only in 1992 did the govern-
ment of Carlos Salinas amend the anti-clerical, and indeed anti-religious,
constitutional provisions. '
E. Political Rights
In most modem constitutions, political rights stem from the
constitutionalization of the fundamental principle of the state's democratic
character. Constitutional expression of this principle emphasizes that (1) the
people as a whole are a subject of sovereignty; (2) people manifest their will
in a variety of ways, and the principle of political pluralism is fundamental to
an efficient constitutional government; (3) "government of the people" means
rule by the people's majority and respect for the rights of minorities and
individuals; (4) government "by the people" incorporates representative
government and elements of direct democracy; and (5) government "for the
people" means the idea of civic society, which subordinates the state to
388 Sigmund, supra note 381, at 174.
389 PERU CONST. art. 50.
'90 PERU CONST. art. 2, § 4, translated in 14 CONSTITUTIONs, supra note 5. Article 2 also
criminalizes "[a]ny action which suspends or forbids any means of expression or impedes [its
circulation] .... The rights to informing and expressing an opinion include those of establishing
communications media." Id.
'3 Sigmund, supra note 381, at 180.
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societal interests.392 While most of these rights are covered by general
principles of the state organization, some rights are commonly placed in the
constitutional chapters encompassing the bill of rights.
Most constitutions reserve political rights for citizens.3 93 Citizens have
exclusive rights to appeal to state bodies and to participate in the governance
of the state either through the exercise of electoral rights or access to
governmental positions. Constitutionalized electoral rights usually cover the
fundamental principles of a secret ballot and elections based on universal and
equal suffrage, leaving the details of electoral systems to statutory
regulations.394
Even in this relatively narrow and widely duplicated framework, some
disparities in the formulation of political rights exist. Such differences are
cross-national rather than cross-regional. For example, in some countries of
both regions, citizens have exclusive rights to assembly and association; 395 in
others, these rights are granted to all people.396 In Russia, the right to associate
is granted to everyone,3 97 but the right to assemble is reserved for citizens of
the Russian Federation.398 In contrast, the right to assemble in Moldova is
guaranteed to everyone with the exception of gatherings that are not peaceful
or that are attended by armed persons.399 Only citizens have the right to
associate, however.400 Party activities of foreigners and secret associations are
392 See Wojciech Sokolewicz, Democracy, Rule of Law, and Constitutionality in Post-
Communist Society of Eastern Europe, 2 DROIT POLONAIS CoNTEMPORAIN 6-7 (1990)
(describing the constitutionalization of the principle of democracy and modem constitutional
references to Abraham Lincoln's famous formula of"government of the people, by the people,
for the people").
... The Constitution of Chile is an exception. It states, "Foreigners residing in Chile for more
than five years and who comply with the requirements prescribed in the first paragraph of Article
13, may exercise the right to vote in the cases and in the manner determined by law." CHILE
CONST. art. 14, translated in 4 CONSTITUTIONS, supra note 5.
4 See, e.g., Ludwikowski, supra note 16, at 17-30 (analyzing electoral systems under the
new post-socialist constitutions).
391 ARM. CONST. art. 25 (guaranteeing citizens the right to form parties and everyone to create
associations).
396 E.g., ARG. CONST. art. 14, translated in I CONSTITUTIONS, supra note 5 (guaranteeing the
right "of associating for useful purposes" to all inhabitants). The Constitution does not directly
cover the right to assembly; it prohibits a "meeting of persons that attributes to itself the right
to stand for the people." Id. art. 22.
... RUSS. CONST. art. 30, § 1.
'9' ld. art. 3 1.
399 MOLD. CONST. art. 40.
400 Id. art. 41, § i.
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prohibited.4"' Costa Rica grants the right to assemble to everyone402 and the
right to associate to inhabitants,403 but only citizens have the right to organize
political parties. °
Moreover, some constitutions deprive all imprisoned citizens sentenced by
the courts of electoral rights;4° others state that the deprivation of this right
may be ordered by the courts, in accordance with international standards. 6
The drafters of the Azerbaijani Constitution surprisingly decided not only to
restrict the electoral rights of professional military persons, judges, govern-
ment officials, persons sentenced to imprisonment by court orders and clergy,
but left the determination of the rights of "other people mentioned in the
present Constitution and laws" to legislators' discretion.4 7 Placing the
declaratory statement, "if [the rights and freedoms of foreign persons and
persons without citizenship] do not contradict the law, ' 4 8 among the purely
normative constitutional provisions on political rights only confirms the
indecisiveness of the inexperienced constitutional drafters.
The referendum or plebiscite forms of direct participation in state power are
recognized in the new post-socialist and Latin America constitutions.
References to these instruments can be found in all new constitutions of the
region of former Soviet dominance; the Constitution of Belarus even explains
such mechanisms in separate chapters. 4°9  The constitutional draft of
Kyrgyzstan further envisaged a model of plebiscitary democracy in which the
state was "a state of people's self-government" and most important decisions,
such as adopting the constitution, creating the parliament, electing the senate
and the president, dissolving the legislature, and removing the president,
occurred by referenda. °
The tendency to increase the people's political participation is clear in
Latin America as well. While the original Argentinean Constitution stressed
401 Id. art. 41, §§ 5, 6.
402 COSTA RICA CONST. art, 26.
403 Id. art. 25.
41 Id. art. 98 (amended 1975).
405 E.g., BRAz. CONST. art. 15, § III.
4' For example, in Russia, citizens may be deprived of participatory political rights only if
they are recognized as "under special disability" or they are detained under a court decision.
Russ. CONST. art. 32, § 3, translated in 15 CONSTITUTIONS, supra note 5.
407 AZER. CONST. art. 56, § III, translated in I CONSTITUTIONS, supra note 5.
401 Id. art. 69, § 1.
4- BELR. CoNST. § Ill, ch. 2 (Referendum (National Voting)).
411 See generally Koichuyev Draft of Kyrg. Const. (on file with Central East European Law
Initiative).
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the predominantly representative character of the country's political system,41'
amendments emphasized the forms of the people's direct participation in state
power and became recognized as important democratic instruments. In order
to ensure sufficient integration of the population and its contribution to an
organized political life, the Constitution vests in the people the right to initiate
the presentation of bills in the Chamber of Deputies; such bills must be
processed within twelve months." 2 The Constitution also allows the Congress
to submit bills to a popular referendum, which may have a binding or non-
binding character." 3 The Colombian Constitution is also relatively elaborate
with regard to direct participatory rights. These rights are repeatedly
referenced to and cover the rights to participate in the direct administration of
the state's affairs through plebiscites, referenda, popular consultations, and
other measures in defense of the Constitution and the law.a" a The right to
participate in referenda, plebiscites, and people's initiatives are also guaran-
teed by the Constitution of Brazil. a"5
In sum, the constitutionalization of political freedoms and rights in both
regions is uneven. A study of the constitutional texts reveals that the
constitutional drafters attempted to meet basic international standards, but they
did not have the time or patience for exhaustive comparative analyses that
would have allowed them to avoid ambiguities or excessive references to the
implementing laws. In many cases the laws still do not fill gaps left by the
constitutions, which results in severe manipulation of citizens' participatory
rights. Governmental and nongovernmental human rights organizations
monitor violations of political rights and provide alarming reports, which
should be carefully studied by constitutional experts in both regions, who often
seem to disregard existing divergences between theory and practice.
F. Economic, Social, and Cultural Freedoms and Rights
Traditionally, the American and European approaches to the protection of
economic, social, and cultural rights differed. Following the tradition of
French constitutionalism, European constitutions stressed the social duties of
citizens and became replete with positive rights that an individual might claim
41 See ARG. CONST. art. 22.
412 ARG. CONST. art. 39 (excluding constitutional amendments, international treaties, taxes,
budgetary issues, and penal matters from popular initiatives).
413 Id. art. 40.
414 COLOM. CONST. art. 40, §§ 2, 6.
41 BRAZ. CoNST. art. 14.
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against the government. While under the U.S. Constitution the government
does not provide economic and social benefits to citizens,4"6 in the beginning
of the twentieth century, the constitutions of the European welfare states
imposed numerous positive obligations on the government. For example, the
German Constitution of 1919 stated, "It shall be the duty of the state and of the
municipalities to maintain the purity, health, and social welfare of the family.
Families of many children shall have the right to compensatory public
assistance."417 The Constitution of Finland (1919) provided, "The state shall
support, or in case of need shall give grants-in-aid to institutions for instruction
in the technical professions, in agriculture and its allied pursuits, in commerce
and navigation, and in the fine arts."41
Bills of rights with numerous provisions addressing economic, social, and
cultural rights also became a typical component of the socialist constitutions.
Those provisions included the rights to work, rest and leisure, health, pensions,
housing, education, and cultural benefits. The purpose of the incorporation of
long lists of these rights was to emphasize the superiority of socialist
constitutionalism over capitalist doctrine. Socialist experts proudly proclaimed
that the elevation of these rights to the top of the list of fundamental constitu-
tional principles emphasized the commitment of communist governments to
eliminating capitalist exploitation and inequality.4" 9 Constitutional guarantees
for social, economic, and cultural rights were recognized as basic criteria for
distinguishing between the doctrine of socialist democracy and the so-called
formal Western democracy.420 According to socialists, formal democracy only
offered freedom and equality before the law for producers and consumers who
used market mechanisms. Capitalist constitutionalism placed social and
416 Louis Henkin concluded:
[E]conomic-social rights generally are not constitutionally protected [in the
United States]. The United States has set an example of commitment and
growth in civil and political rights, and has followed Europe in the respect of
economic-social rights; although President Roosevelt proclaimed that the
commitment of the United States to "Freedom from want" would be equal
with other freedoms, economic-social rights have not achieved constitutional
status in the United States.
Louis Henkin, Introduction to CONSTITUTIONALISM AND RIGHTS, supra note 79, at 8-9.
417 [GRUtDGESETZ] [GG] [CoNsTITTION] art. CXIX, in HOWARD LEE MCBAIN & LINDSAY
ROGERS, THE NEW CONSTITUTIONS OF EUROPE 199 (1922).
418 Id. art. 81.
419 See Vyshinsky, supra note 159, at 552-57.
420 id.
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economic rights in a second category, while socialist democracy embodied true
distributive justice.42'
After the fall of communism, the discussion about the differences between
political, civil, economic, social, and cultural rights resurfaced, with commen-
tators in the Americas and Europe exchanging arguments in favor and against
a qualitative distinction between the rights.422 It was clear that the new post-
socialist democracies and economically vulnerable Latin American states
hardly could afford to provide their societies significant packages of social
benefits. Building on this argument, some constitutional experts tried to
distinguish between fundamental and other rights, placing social and economic
rights into the other judicially unenforcable category.423 Several arguments
have been produced to support this position.
First, it was argued that social and economic rights are by nature collective
rather than individual and it is very difficult for the courts to assess an
appropriate remedy which could compensate for violations of these rights.424
Second, these types of rights require positive intervention from the state rather
than negative protection.425 Legislative or governmental bodies can better
provide social, economic, and cultural benefits than courts. Third, the level of
protection of these rights can be measured by results rather than conduct, and
the evaluation of results usually occurs in the political rather than judicial
process.426 Fourth, objective evaluation of the content of these rights is
difficult and would impose formidable tasks on judges.427 Fifth, a decision of
the judges on a violation of the other rights would involve courts in conflicts
with other powers that might adversely impact the relationship between the
three branches of government.428
Other constitutional experts argued against the distinction between the
rights of first and second rank, claiming that all rights are interdependent,
indivisible,429 deliver benefits, and contain no qualitative difference among
421 See Ludwikowski, supra note 71, at 87-90.
422 See Spencer Zifzak, Adjudicating Social Rights: Lessons from the Hungarian Constitu-
tional Experience, 4 E. EUR. HUM. RTS. REV. 51, 56-58 (1998).
423 See id. at 51-54.
424 Id. at 54.
425 Id.
426 Id. at 54-55.
421 See id. at 55.
421 Id. at 55-56.
429 See Asbjorn Eide, Economic and Social Rights, in HUMAN RIGHTS: CONCEPT AND
STANDARDS, supra note 89, at 109.
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political, social, and economic benefits.43° Experts also asserted that rights do
not lose their human character because they are not justiciable.43" '
Utilizing some of the above arguments, the constitutionalism of the new
post-socialist democracies tried to resolve the problem of protection of these
rights in accordance with three different doctrines. The first doctrine claims
that very few economic and social rights are fully enforceable; others have a
programmatic character which identifies the goals of the state's activity.43
The second doctrine maintains that constitutions should guarantee socio-
economic rights, but the scope of protection should be decided by legislatures.
Within the scope determined by law, these rights may be claimed in court. The
third doctrine seems to impose on the government the performance of duties
of an economic and social nature, but in fact recognizes that these obligations
have a political rather than legal character.433 In most of the new democracies,
the legislatures attempted to blend all these concepts; the courts, however,
predominantly followed the approach of the third doctrine and declared that
these rights are not judicially enforceable and governments not performing in
accordance with the voters' expectations may be held politically
accountable.434
430 Wojciech Sadurski, Myslenie Konstytucyne: Prawa Drugiej Kategorii [Constitutional
Thinking: The Second Rank Rights], Kultura [Culture], Oct. 3, 1994, at 230.
431 Eide, supra note 429, at 112.
432 Several examples illustrate this doctrine. Some constitutional provisions are fully
enforceable. E.g., UKR. CONST. arts. 43,44 (prohibiting the use of forced labor and granting the
employed the right to strike); Russ. CONST. art. 43, § 4 (providing that general basic education
is compulsory). Other statements describe only goals of the states. E.g., GEOR. CONST. art. 30
(declaring the State's obligation to promote the development of free enterprise and competition.);
BELR. CONST. art. 21 (making the protection of the rights and freedoms of citizens the "supreme
goal" of the State).
133 The approaches of the second and third doctrines are reflected in several constitutional
provisions. For example, the Ukrainian Constitution confirms that "[e]veryone who is employed
has the right to rest," but specifies that "[t]he maximum number of working hours, the minimum
duration of rest and of paid annual vacation, days off and holidays as well as other conditions
for exercising this right, are determined by law." UKR. CONST. art. 45, translated in 19
CONSTITUTIONS, supra note 5. In these cases, the limits of enforcement of constitutionally
guaranteed rights are determined by implementing laws and the justiciability of these rights are
determined by the courts. Some statements identify the commitments of the government. E.g.,
AZER. CONST. art. 41, translated in 1 CONSTITUTIONS, supra note 5 ("The State, acting on the
basis of various forms of property, implements necessary measures to promote the development
of all aspects of health services .. "); id art. 32 ("Family and marriage are under the protection
of the State."). Although the governments might be politically responsible for the fulfillment of
the goals affirmed by the constitutions, the state's obligations are legally unenforceable.
"3 See ANNA LUDWIKOWSKA, SADOWNICTWO KONSTYTUCYJNE W EUROPIE
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The old Latin American constitutions varied significantly in their approach
to the protection of socio-economic rights.43 In the second and third decades
of the nineteenth century, the attitude of the drafters began to change and some
constitutions, such as the 1925 Constitution of Chile and the 1946 Constitution
of Brazil, provided more extensive protection of these rights.
Socio-economic rights are also covered by the newly adopted or amended
constitutions of Latin America. Usually they are not well-organized or listed
separately but are blended with personal, political, and due process rights.
However, similar to the new post-socialist states' approach, the constitutional
provisions on these rights either have a predominantly declaratory character,
or leave the determination of the scope of protection for the laws. The
drafters' reluctance to impose too many positive obligations for the state is
especially perceptive with regard to work-related rights, which are at the center
of the discussion on the affordable level of constitutionalization of socio-
economic rights in Latin America.
Most often the drafters attempted to follow the protection offered by Article
6 of the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights,
which cautiously states that the general right to work "includes" some
derivative rights, such as "the right of everyone to the opportunity to gain his
living by work" and "the right to freely choose and accept work.' 36  In
practice, the levels of state protection vary. The minimum standard is usually
limited to access to the job market. 37 More extended systems of protection
SRODKOWOWSCHODNIEJ [Constitutional Courts in East-Central Europe] 154 (1997).
41' For example, following the prevailing trend in U.S. constitutionalism, the 1853
Argentinean Constitution did not protect soci-economic rights. The Constitution of Mexico,
adopted in 1917, guaranteed relatively few socio-economic rights. In contrast, the 1871 Costa
Rican Constitution had a separate section, "Concerning Social Guarantees," with fourteen
articles covering employment-related rights, COSTA RICA CONST. of 1871, tit. III, § 3, translated
in THE CONSTITUTIONS OF THE AMERICAS, supra note 85, at 208-09, while Title III of the 1886
Constitution of Colombia, "Civil Rights and Social Guarantees," referred to the social
obligations of the state and covered labor-oriented rights, COLOM. CONST. tit. IlI.
436 International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, opened for signature
Dec. 16, 1966, art. 6, 993 U.N.T.S. 3, 6 (entered into force Jan. 3, 1976). This approach is
reflected by most of the Latin American constitutions although sometimes the difference is not
clearly expressed. For example, the 1994 Argentinean Constitution does not refer explicitly to
the "right to access work" but states, "Labor in its diverse forms shall enjoy the protection of the
law." ARG. CONST. art. 14 bis, translated in 1 CONSTITUTIONS, supra note 5. The Constitution
does not guarantee work but focuses on derivative rights, such as "dignified and equitable
working conditions," "a limited working day," "fair remuneration," "adjustable minimum
working wages," and "equal pay for equal work." Id.
41' Asbjorn Eide wrote with regard to the right to employment:
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include insurance programs paid for jointly by workers and employers. The
most developed arrangements of the welfare states include obligatory and
comprehensive programs with coverage for disability, unemployment, old age,
child allowances, and pregnancy leaves. 38
Among several examples, the Argentinean model falls between these
standards ofprotection. The state does not offer any general protection against
unemployment. Coming closer to the concept of social management, the
Constitution just lists such organizational schemes as the right of workers to
share profits of enterprises, collaborative management, protection against
arbitrary discharge, free and democratic organization of trade unions, and
permanence of public employment.439 The Constitution guarantees the right
of trade unions to collective bargaining, the right to conciliation and arbitra-
tion, the right to strike, and the right to secure employment for the unions'
representatives."0 While it guarantees "comprehensive and unwaivable" social
benefits, it leaves the explanation of terms such as "compulsory social
security," "adjustable retirement pay and pensions," "full protection for the
family," and "protection of the welfare of the family" to specific statutory
regulations."'
Colombian constitutionalism shows a stronger tendency to leave the power
to regulate work-related rights to the legislature. The Constitution imposes
upon the Congress the obligation to pass a labor statute which would further
guarantee:
Equality of opportunity for workers; minimum essential and
flexible renumeration proportional to the amount and quality of
work; stability in employment; irrevocability of minimum
benefits established in labor regulations; options to negotiate
about and reconcile uncertain and arguable rights; a situation
No such right exists, however, nor would it be possible to implement such a
right, unless other human rights were intolerably restricted. It would, at the
extreme, imply forced labour. When states under Article 6 of the Interna-
tional Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights recognize the right
to work, this includes 'the right of everyone to the opportunity to gain his
living by work which he freely chooses or accepts.'
Eide, supra note 429, at 144.
438 Id. at 148.
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more favorable to the worker in case of doubt in the application
and interpretation of the formal bases of the law; the primacy of
facts over established formalities in issues of labor relations;
guarantees to social security, training, instruction, and necessary
rest; special protection of women, mothers, and minor-age
workers." 2
The drafters of the Peruvian Constitution followed a mixed approach. The
Constitution's provisions on social and economic rights are lengthy but they
cover relatively few rights; instead, these rights are singled out from political
and social rights and placed in a separate chapter." 3 Most of the provisions on
economic and social rights have a declaratory character. Moreover, the state's
activities are supposed to supplement community or individual efforts.4 "
With regard to the right to work, the Peruvian Constitution does not clearly
make the routine distinction between the right to work and the free choice of
occupation and profession." 5 It provides declaratory statements that "[w]ork
is a duty and a right" and that the state recognizes diverse forms of work,
protects the workers' dignity, and encourages productive employment, and
vocational training." 6
442 COLOM. CONST. art. 53, translated in 4 CONSTITUTIONS, supra note 5. The right to
collective bargaining and the right to strike are also guaranteed, except in the case of essential
public services defined by the legislature. Id. arts. 39, 56. The Constitution provides for the
establishment of a permanent commission composed of employer, worker, and government
representatives in order to facilitate the settlement of labor disputes, id. art. 56, and confirms the
right of workers and employers to establish trade unions without the intervention of the state, id
art. 39.
Despite these formal guarantees, the Colombian government was unable to give sufficient
protection to trade union activists, who were exposed to numerous acts of harassment, including
assassinations. Genocide Against the Central Union of Colombian Workers [CUT] Continues,
May 2, 2002, available at http://www.colombiasupport.net/cutgenocide.html. In 2002, the
killings oftrade union leaders became so frequent human rights organizations reported that these
events escalated to the level of genocide. Id.
443 PERU CONST. tit. I, ch. II (Concerning Social and Economic Rights).
' For example, Peru's Constitution states that "[t]he community and the State are especially
mindful to protect the child, the adolescent, the mother, and the elderly when they are dependent.
The State also protects the family and encourages marriage." Id. art. 4, translated in 14
CONSTrrUTIONS, supra note 5. More specific regulations of marital unions, such as separations
and divorces, are left to statutory laws. See id.
"5 Compare id., with UDHR, supra note 248, art. 23.
446 PERU CONST. arts. 22, 23, translated in 14 CONSTITUTIONS, supra note 5. Other
employment-related rights, such as the right to minimum wage, just remuneration, social
benefits, and paid vacation are confirmed but not specifically regulated by the Constitution; the
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The new post-socialist constitutions follow the approach of the Latin
American states and usually do not promise more than access to jobs. There
are, however, exceptions. For example, the lists of economic and social rights
in the Turkmen and Uzbek Constitutions are must shorter than in the other
constitutions of the former Soviet republics." 7 The reduction of the list of
economic and social rights seemed to justify the intention of the drafters to
grant at least some of them full constitutional protection. However, reversing
the prevailing position of the post-socialist doctrine, every person is not only
guaranteed the right to choose a profession or job, but is granted the right to
work. Given the low level of economic development in these countries, the
implementation of these promises would impose unbearable obligations on the
states.
In sum, the similarities in the approaches to the constitutionalization of
socio-economic rights in both regions are remarkable. Sharing many economic
and social problems, the constitutional drafters in Latin America and post-
socialist states show some ambivalent reactions. On the one hand, they share
sensitivity to the possibility that social and economic rights might be treated
differently than political rights and citizens' freedoms; on the other hand, they
feel uncomfortable promising something that cannot be delivered. As a result
they produced a constitutional language which to some extent still gives the
provisions on socio-economic rights a window dressing character.
G. Duties
Socialist constitutions proclaimed that the protection of rights and freedoms
is inseparable from the performance of duties. The inclination of post-socialist
constitutionalism to play down the role of duties is discernible in all countries
under examination. In very few countries, the constitutions preserved separate
chapters on citizens' obligations."8 In some states, the drafters purged the
constitutional texts entirely of citizens' duties and decided to impose
scope of these rights may be determined by agreements between workers and employers or by
law. Id arts. 24,25. Similarly, the law grants the worker "adequate protection against arbitrary
dismissal," but the Constitution does not explain what the term "adequate" means. Id. art. 27.
The Constitution more specifically guarantees the ordinary workday of eight hours and the
average maximum workweek of forty-eight hours. Id. art. 25. The last two articles of the chapter
recognize the right to collective bargaining; the right to strike, limited by national interest, and
the right of workers to participate in business profits. Id. arts. 28, 29.
447 See TuRKM. CONST. arts. 31-36; UZB. CONST. ch. 9 (consisting of seven articles).
44 See, e.g., POL. CONST. ch. II.
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obligations only on the state's agencies; in others, rights are not linked to the
fulfillment of obligations" 9 and are reduced to several main constitutionalized
obligations: defense of the state; respect for fiscal duties; and respect for the
Constitution, the laws, the environment, and the rights and freedoms of other
citizens.
While most Latin American constitutions clearly focus on rights and
freedoms, some follow the socialist approach, attempting to find a balance
between citizens' rights and obligations. For example, the Colombian
Constitution states that "[tihe exercise of rights and liberties recognized in this
Constitution implies responsibilities.""45 It presents a long list of citizens'
duties and duties assigned to everyone portrayed in a programmatic fashion,
which essentially precludes any sensible enforcement of these social
obligations.
H. Judicial Enforcement of Human Rights
1. Constitutional Courts in the Region of Former Soviet Dominance
Marxist-Leninist jurisprudence rejected the doctrine of separation of
powers and the need for judicial enforcement of the constitution. Socialists
allocated state functions to three governmental authorities (legislature,
executive, and judiciary), but assumed that these segments of the socialist state
worked under the leadership of the party."' The branches of government were
not separated and by no means equal. The supremacy of the legislative bodies
was recognized as the fundamental premise of socialist legal theory. Lenin
claimed, "[tihe representation of the people is a nullity if it does not have full
"' The remnants of the old-fashion socialist approach still can be found in the Ukrainian
Constitution: "Every person has the right to free development of his or her personality if the
rights and freedoms of other persons are not violated thereby, and has duties before the society
in which the free and comprehensive development of his or her personality is ensured." UKR.
CONST. art. 23, translated in 19 CONSTITUTIONS, supra note 5.
450 COLOM. CONST. art. 95, translated in 4 CONSTITUTIONS, supra note 5.
451 See generally GRAEME GILL, THE RULES OF THE COMMUNIST PARTY OF THE SOVIET UNION
1-71 (1988). As the Communist Party of the Soviet Union stated in 1986, "The Communist
Party... is the militant, tried-and-tested vanguard of the Soviet people, which unites on a
voluntary basis the most advanced, conscious part of the working class, Kolkhoz peasantry and
the intelligentsia of the USSR." Rules of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (adopted at
the XXVII Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, Feb.-Mar. 1986), GILL, supra,
at 228.
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power." '452 Thus, the courts, being inferior institutions, could not nullify the
acts of superior legislative bodies. Traditional socialistjurisprudence assumed
that an individual who believed that his constitutional rights had been violated
could file a complaint in the executive branch supervising the office blamed
for the violation or in the appropriate office of the procurator.5 3 Socialist
constitutionalism claimed that in the mature socialist state the administration
could not be "set against" individuals.454 In accordance with Trotsky's logic,
"the workers could not defend themselves against the workers."455  The
institution of "bourgeois judicial review" was criticized as manipulative and
instrumental in the hands of owners of big capital. Andrei Vyshinsky wrote:
Every sort of statute (in bourgeois countries) is considered as
having force until it occurs to some private person or capitalist
enterprise to file a petition in court to have it, or a separate
paragraph of it, declared unconstitutional. Naturally this right is
broadly used by monopolist cliques of exploiters to obtain a
declaration of "unconstitutionality" as to laws running counter to
their interests.456
In the late 1950s, the attitude toward judicial control of administrative acts
began to change in the socialist countries. The right of individuals to challenge
the legality of administrative decisions was introduced by statutes and
confirmed by constitutional amendments in Yugoslavia in 1 952, Hungary in
452 TEORIAPANSTWASOCJALISTYCZNEGO[Theoryofthe Socialist State] 201 (N.P. Farbierow
ed., 1976).
411 U.S.S.R. CONST. art. 164 (1977).
414 J. Letowski, Administracja i Obywatele w PRL [Administration and Citizens in Polish
Peoples' Republic], 7 PANSTWO I PRAWO [State and Law] 52-60 (1984).
411 SAMUEL HENDEL, THE SOVIET CRUCIBLE: THE SOVIET SYSTEM IN THEORY AND PRACTICE
94 (5th ed. 1980).
456 Vyshinsky, supra note 159, at 339-40. Other socialist theorists also widely criticized the
institution ofjudicial review. In Poland, Stefan Rozmaryn wrote: "The constitutional control
of statutes by extra-parliamentary bodies, particularlyjudicial and quasi-judicial, is a reactionary
institution and because of that, there is no room for it either in a socialist State or in a State of
people's democracy, which trusts the people's justice and the will of the people." Kontrola
Sprawiedliwosci Ustaw [Control of Legality of the Laws], 11-12 PANSTWO I PRAWO [State and
Law] 866 (1946).
457 See Ludwikowski, supra note 88, at 89-108 (commenting on the development ofjudicial
review in socialist states). See generally ANNA LUDWIKOWSKA, SADOWNICTWO
KONSTYTUCYJNE w EUROPIE SRODKOWO-WSCHODNIEJ [Judicial Review in East-Central Europe]
(2002) (offering an analysis of the system of judicial review in socialist states).
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1957,458 Romania in 1967, 459 and Bulgaria in 1970.460 Poland established the
Supreme Administrative Court in 1980;461 in 1985, it established the Constitu-
tional Tribunal, which was granted the right to review sub-statutory acts
(orders, ordinances, and instructions) and a limited right to review statutory
laws. 62 The Tribunal began to review cases as of January 1, 1986.463
After the fall of communism, judicial review became one of the greatest
novelties of post-socialist constitutionalism. It has been constitutionalized in
all post-socialist democracies in transition except Turkmenistan. Predictably,
the so-called American decentralized model, rooted in the concept of
constitutional supremacy and the stare decisis principle, did not attract the
drafters of the new constitutions, who preferred to experiment with the
centralized or Austrian model, which reserves the right of constitutional review
to one special judicial organ,4 " or with the French preventive model of
review. 65 Although the tendency to adopt the well-tested European models is
common, significant discrepancies can be found in the selection ofjustices and
the scope of review by courts.
Most of the post-socialist states decided that both legislative and executive
organs should cooperate in the selection of justices, yet the competence of
these organs varies. In Hungary, the appointing functions were reserved
exclusively for the legislatures.6  In Russia, the president nominates
candidates for appointment by the Federation Council (the federal component
of parliament). 67 This model was adopted by Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan
where justices are elected and removed by parliament upon the motion of the
president of the republic."8 In other countries, the appointing prerogatives
were distributed in a proportionate manner among several organs. For






414 See Ludwikowski, supra note 16, at 50-51 (examining the reasons for the rejection of the
American model).
465 The French Conseil Constitutional must review organic laws and other laws if submitted
before promulgation by the president of the republic, the prime minister, the president of one of
the parliamentary chambers, or by one of the sixty members of the national assembly or senate.
FR. CONST. art. 61.
466 HUNG. CONST. art. 19, § 3(k).
467 Russ. CONST. art. 83.
468 KYRG. CONST. art. 46, § 5; TA. CONST. art. 49, § 12.
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example, Romania follows the French model and splits the power to appoint
justices between the president and the two chambers of parliament, each
having the right to choose one-third of the court's membership.469 In 1995, the
French system was also duplicated by Kazakhstan, which replaced the
constitutional court with a constitutional council composed of seven members
appointed for six years.470 The president and two justices are appointed by the
president of the republic; the remaining two justices are appointed by the
chairpersons of the senate and the assembly (majilis).471
The scope of review by constitutional courts varies as well. All constitu-
tional courts are vested with the right to control abstract acts submitted for the
court's review, but only some of them have the right to institute this control
preventively or before the acts are given legal force. Romania, following the
French model, grants the constitutional court the exclusive right to preven-
tively control laws.472 In Poland, Estonia, and Hungary, the president, before
signing a bill, may ask the constitutional court to give a judgment on its
conformity with the constitution.473 In Kazakhstan, the constitutional council
reviews laws, if submitted before promulgation, and international treaties, if
before ratification; determines the legality of elections and referenda; officially
interprets the Constitution; and participates in the dismissal of the presidents
due to illness or impeachment procedures.474 In Tajikistan, the court also has
the power to preventively review international agreements that have not
entered into force.4" The drafters of the constitutions in other post-socialist
469 RoM. CONST. art. 140.
470 KAz. CONST. art. 58, § 7, art. 71, §§ 1-3.
471 Significant differences can also be found in the selection ofjustices in other former Soviet
republics. In Uzbekistan, the Constitution vests in the parliament the right to select judges of
the constitutional court, supreme court and higher arbitration court. UZB. CONST. art. 78, §§ 12-
14. The constitutional court of Azerbaijan also consists of nine judges appointed by the
parliament on the basis of recommendation by the president of the republic. AZER. CONST. art.
130.
471 ROM. CONST. art. 144.
473 POL. CONST. art. 133, § 2; EST. CONST. art. 107; HuNG. CONST. art. 26.
474 KAz. CONST. arts. 47, 72.
475 The preventative right to review the consistency between international treaties and the
constitution is vested in the constitutional courts by the constitutions or by the implementing
laws of Bulgaria, BuLG. CONST. art. 149, § 1 (4), Tajikistan, TAJ. CONST. art. 89, and Russia,
Russ. CONST. art. 125, § 2(d). The Czech Constitution allows the constitutional court to
disqualify a law for its inconsistency with international agreements. CZECH REP. CONST. art. 87,
§ 2. In Poland, the court adjudicates on the conformity of international agreements to the
constitution and all other legal acts to international agreements. POL CONST. art. 188, § 1. A
judgment of the Polish constitutional court on the nonconformity of the legal act to an
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states took the position that preventive review interferes with the legislative
process and stripped their constitutional courts of the right to review laws
before promulgation.
The constitutional drafters in several new democracies tried to incorporate
into the post-socialist model of judicial review elements of concrete control,
which can be triggered by actual legal controversy between the parties. This
type of control brings regular courts into the process of review. Judges, who
are bound by the constitution and the statutes, have a positive obligation to
apply legal acts that are constitutional in their decisions. 47 6 They may not be
allowed to invalidate the acts which they recognize as illegal or unconstitu-
tional, but they must apply only those norms that are compatible with the
constitution and statutes.477  A judge can disqualify a sub-statutory act
(regulation, administrative decision, ordinance) as a valid basis for his
decision, but being bound by the statute, he can only stay the proceeding and
request the constitutional court review the constitutionality of the challenged
law. 
4 78
In some new democracies, the decisions of the constitutional courts on the
constitutionality of the law are final and the acts recognized as unconstitutional
are void from the day of the enactment of the ruling.479 In other countries, only
the rulings on the legality of the sub-statutory laws are binding, but the
decisions on the constitutionality of statutes can be overruled by a qualified
majority of two-thirds of the legislative chamber. The Kazakh Constitution
allows the president of the Republic to veto the ruling of the constitutional
council. The veto can be overruled by two-thirds of the council's votes.480
international agreement is a basis for re-opening proceedings if the legal act was based on a
legally effective judgment of a court, or a final administrative decision was issued. Id. art. 190,
§ 4. In Lithuania, the parliament has the final decision in cases when the constitutional court has
ruled on the conformity of international agreements with the constitution. LITH. CONST. art. 107.
The constitutions of Georgia and Armenia prohibit the ratification of international agreements
challenged in the constitutional court prior to the court's decision. See, e.g., GEOR. CONST. art.
65, § 4. The Azerbaijani court determines the correspondence of international agreements with
both the constitution and laws of the republic. AZER. CONST. art. 130, § 111(b).
476 See, e.g., POL. CONST. art. 178, § 1.
477 See, e.g., CZECH. REP. CONST. art. 95.
478 Id.
4"9 The decisions of the Armenian, ARM. CONST. art. 102, Azerbaijani, AZER. CONST. art. 130,
and Georgian, GEOR. CONST. art. 89, § 2, constitutional courts are final, and the acts recognized
as unconstitutional are void from the time of publication of the decision.
410 KAz. CONST. art. 73, § 4.
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A controversial issue which arose during the drafting of the new constitu-
tions was the extension of the constitutional courts' jurisdiction over the right
to hear individual complaints. On the one hand, the constitutional complaint
gives private persons direct access to the constitutional courts, and as such, is
one of the most democratic features of judicial review. On the other hand, its
introduction overburdened numerous European constitutional courts,
comprising over ninety percent of their cases. Until recently, this institution
made slow but steady inroads in the practice of the new European constitu-
tional courts."'
Besides functioning as the organs ofjudicial review of the constitutionality
of laws, the constitutional courts in the new post-communist democracies play
several other roles. Some constitutions vest in the constitutional courts the
right to interpret the constitution.482 Some constitutional courts are allowed to
decide disputes between central and local governments,483 some may
participate in the impeachment process, 4 4 and still others may rule on the
legality of elections and referenda.485
2. Development of Judicial Review in Latin America
The early experiments of the Latin American countries with instruments of
judicial enforcement of the constitution were difficult. On the one hand, the
colonial elites in the predominantly Spanish and Portuguese territories of
Central and South America carefully watched the legal developments in the old
continent. In the nineteenth century, Europe, with its philosophy of Enlighten-
ment and newly drafted, Napoleonic era legal codes, was dragging Latin
America into the family of civil law countries." On the other hand,
Europeans, who did not begin seriously to experiment with judicial review
481 E.g., CZECH REP. CONST. art. 7, § 1(d); POL. CONST. art. 79, § 1.
48 E.g., BUL. CONST. art. 149, § 1(1) (permitting the constitutional court to interpret the
constitution); KAz. CONST. art. 72, § 1(4) (permitting the constitutional council to interpret the
constitution).
483 E.g., Russ. CONST. art. 125, § 3 (allowing the court to resolve disputes on a horizontal
level within federal and state administrative structures and on a vertical level between federal and
state organs of power).
48 E.g., CZECHREP. CONST. art. 87, § 1 (g). Certain constitutional courts also may de-legalize
political groupings and parties. E.g., ROM. CONST. art. 144, § j.
485 E.g., ALB. CONST. art. 131, §§ g, h. Some constitutional courts even have legislative
initiative. E.g., Russ. CoNsT. art. 104, § 1.
486 Robert C. Means, Codification in Latin America: The Colombian Commercial Code of
1853, 52 TEx. L. REv. 18, 21-22 (1973).
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before the second decade of the twentieth century,487 could hardly recommend
any models of judicial enforcement of the constitution.
Early experiments in Latin American countries with their own instruments
of constitutional enforcement were unsuccessful. Robert Barker wrote:
In 1836, Mexico adopted a new constitution which established a
fourth branch of government, called the Supremo Poder
Conservador, a commission whose duty it was to safeguard the
constitution. It was empowered to, inter alia, nullify acts of the
executive, legislative, and judicial branches, which were contrary
to the constitution. The Supremo Poder Conservador acted on
only four occasions, none of which involved constitutional
matters. After five years, it was abolished.488
Disappointed in their own experiments and deprived of clear European
traditions to follow, early Latin American leaders became determined to draw
from the U.S. constitutional model. Encouraged by Alexis de Tocqueville's
writings, they borrowed the decentralized model ofjudicial review, disregard-
ing concerns about its adaptability in countries with a civil law system. Allan
Brewer-Carias noted that, following Tocqueville's Democracy in America, the
decentralized U.S. system of review became particularly popular in the federal
states of Latin America.489 The system was tested in Mexico in 1857,
Venezuela in 1858, Argentina in 1860, Brazil in 1890, as well as in other states
487 Europeans followed the so-called Austrian "'centralized' type of control [that] confines
the power of review to one single judicial organ." CAPPELLETrl, supra note 13, at 46-47. This
model is usually contrasted with the United States' "decentralized" model that vests the power
of control in all judicial organs. Id. at 46. The Austrian model was first tested in 1867 and was
adopted in the Austrian Constitution of October 1, 1920, as amended in 1929. Id. at 46-47. The
power to review the constitutionality of laws was vested in the constitutional tribunal, but the
power to review the legality of administrative actions was vested in the Supreme Administrative
Court. Following the Austrian experience, judicial control of constitutionality was adopted by
the Czechoslovakian Constitution of 1920; in 1921, the Supreme Administrative Tribunal was
formed in Poland. See ZDZISLAW CZESZEJKO-SOCHACKI, TRYBUNAL KONSTYTUCYJNY w PRL
[The Constitutional Tribunal in the Polish People's Republic] 15-17 (1986); see also Marek
Wierzbowski & Stephen C. McCaffrey, 8 MODERN LEGAL SYSTEMS CYCLOPEDIA 159 (1985);
Barker, supra note 21, at 906.
488 Barker, supra note 21, at 906.
489 See BREWER-CARiAS, supra note 29, at 71, 156.
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with brief or no federal experience, such as Colombia in 1850 and the
Dominican Republic in 1844.490
The adoption of the decentralized model of review in civil law countries
proved to be a formidable challenge for the Latin American region. The U.S.
model, vesting all regular courts with the power to nullify an unconstitutional
law and rooted in the concept of constitutional supremacy, assumes that the
validity of a court decision could be extended to other cases through the
principle of stare decisis. In civil law countries, in which judges are only
expected to apply law, but are not allowed to formulate legal rules or interpret
-them creatively, the law disqualified by some courts could easily be applied by
others. This could result in the chaotic application of the law and a lack of
certainty as to the meaning of the law.
Latin American constitutionalism tried to accommodate the decentralized
model of judicial review in the civil law fabric of the legal system, testing
several devices. In the second half of the nineteenth century, Latin American
judges were eager to borrow from early Greek experiments with the decentral-
ized system. In 1847, the Greek Supreme Court ruled that it has the power to
review the constitutionality of all legal acts.49' The Court did not claim that it
might nullify legislative acts, but insisted that judges have to apply only laws
which are constitutional.492 The approach allowed the courts to signal
inconsistencies in the law without violating the well-recognized European
principle of parliamentary supremacy. The concept that the courts have the
right to declare the law voidable but not void has become an important feature
of Latin American jurisprudence's attempt to avoid the situation in which
some courts could nullify the law and others could still recognize its constitu-
tionality.
The second device was supposed to blend the Latin American civil law
traditions with some-namely, precedential-features of the common law
system. The idea was borrowed from the Spanish concept known as doctrina
legal (legal doctrine), which was a major deviation from the traditional
assumption that the fabric of the civil law is statutory and non-precedential.493
490 Id. at 156.
491 See id. In 1871 and 1879, however, the Greek Supreme Court reversed the 1947 decision,
holding that it "has the power not to apply [a statute] in the case" only when the statute "is in
evident contraction with a superior provision of the Constitution." Id. (quoting Greek Supreme
Court Judgments No. 18 (1871) and No. 23 (1897)).
42 See id.
4" L. Neville Brown, The Sources of Spanish Civil Law, 5 INT'L &COMP. L.Q. 364,364-70
(1956).
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The Spanish courts worked out the concept of doctrina legal while addressing
the problem of gaps in the statutory laws. The judges, admitting that
legislation might not provide answers regulating all controversies, began to
assert that general principles of law could also be found in opiniojuris or in
jurispudencia, the high court's opinions.494 Following this argument, the
Spanish Supreme Court, in a decision on November 4, 1838, permitted
cassation on the basis that the lower court did not respect the legal doctrine
established by the higher courts. 95
At the end of the nineteenth century, the concept of legal doctrine was used
by Latin American jurists. Although Latin American jurisprudence had never
officially recognized the principle of stare decisis, it authorized the higher
courts to allow appeals against judges' decisions which did not respect
concordant and recognized doctrinal interpretation of the law. In Colombia,
for example, the violation of a legal doctrine could be invoked against a
decision that did not follow three uniform decisions of the Supreme Court;
496
in Mexico the jurisprudencia could be established by five consecutive
decisions of the Supreme Court or the collegiate circuit courts.497
The application of legal doctrine in the Latin American countries has never
been sufficiently clear. The Colombian Law of 1896, introducing this concept,
referred to the "probable doctrine";49 the Mexican constitutional amendment
of 1967 referred to precedent, but left its definition to the law.499 The jurists
also confirmed that poorly organized court reports expose thejudges to the risk
of violation ofjurisprudencia for mere lack of information."
494 Id.
'" Subsequently, the right to formulate the "legal doctrine" through "the established case
law" was reserved exclusively to the Supreme Court. See id. (examining this decision and the
decision of December 10, 1894).
496 "Three uniform decisions given by the Supreme Court in cassation on the same point of
law constitute probable doctrine, and the judges should apply them in analogues cases, however
the Supreme Court may change doctrine if it judges the previous decisions to have been
erroneous." SEYMOUR W. WURFEL, FOREIGN ENTERPRISE IN COLOMBIA: LAWS& POLICIES 286-
87 (1965) (quoting Colombia Law No. 169, art. IV (1896)).
497 BREWER-CARiAS, supra note 29, at 167.
498 RICHARD D. BARKER, JUDICIAL REVIEW IN MExIco: A STUDY OF THE AMPARO SUIT 251
(1971).
49 See MEX. CONST. art. 107, § XIII (amended 1967).
500 Seymour Wurfel observed:
The Judicial Gazette [Gaceta Judicial], published since 1887, prints the full
text of the decisions of all chambers of the Supreme Court and other material
as ordered by the court. This is published somewhat irregularly in periodic
form and is not itself converted into bound volume form. There is nothing in
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The doctrine ofJurisprudencia and the concept of law that can be declared
voidable but not void were both incorporated into proceedings of amparo in
some of the Latin American regions. Robert Barker wrote:
Jurisprudencia (jurisprudence), in Mexico as elsewhere, is
susceptible to a wide variety of definitions. We have seen,
however, that in amparo the term carries the special, technical
meaning of obligatory precedent. Although the Supreme Court
has been assigned the power to establish such precedents in all
the amparo legislation since 1909, explicit constitutional
recognition of this function was lacking until the amendments of
1950-51 were adopted.50'
The amparo proceeding in Mexico has been constitutionalized in Article
107 of the 1917 Constitution. °2 It provides for the protection by courts of any
person's constitutional rights violated either by the final court's decision or by
acts of public authorities." 3 According to a decentralized system of review,
a proceeding of amparo vests the right to review the violation and provide
protection in all federal courts.5" The petitioner for a writ of amparo may
challenge the final court's decisions in criminal and civil cases and administra-
tive actions. 5 Decisions in direct amparo rendered by district judges are
reviewable by the supreme court; the decisions of a full circuit court, however,
may not be appealed with the exception of challenges against the constitution-
Colombia comparable to the various official reporter series of the respective
states of the United States nor the West Publishing Company series of
unofficial reports. There is no topical digest system and no case headnotes,
except annotations to codes and texts by individual authors.... Official
reporters of the Supreme Court or individual judges or lawyers, as a private
enterprise, on occasion prepare digests of Supreme Court decisions for a
period ofyears. These are not complete nor always consecutive. These works
are known as jurisprudencia. They constitute the only readily available
source of court decisions and are usually not current.
WURFEL, supra note 496, at 286-88.
' Barker, supra note 498, at 905-07.
02 MEX. CONST. art. 107. It was confirmed in 1957 by the court in the Angel Siri case. See
BREWER-CARiAS, supra note 29, at 162; see also G.R. CARRiO, ALGUNOS ASPECTOS DEL
RECURSO DE AMPARO 9 (1959).
503 MEx. CONsT. art. 107, § V (amended 1968, 1976, 1987).
'04 Id. art. 107, § VIII (amended 1968, 1976, 1987).
"' Id. art. 107, § V.
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ality of a law or interpretation of the Constitution. 0 6 Thus, the regular courts
were left with the right to identify the voidability of laws and the Constitution
imposed on the judges the duty to respect the supreme court'sjurisprudencia.
Moving toward the classic U.S. decentralized model of review, some other
Latin American states were less inclined to vest the right to declare a law void
exclusively in the highest courts. In Argentina, the right of review exercised
by all judges has been claimed by the Supreme Court, following arguments
used by Marshall in Marbury v. Madison, and constitutionalized in the 1994
Constitution.0 7 The Constitution clearly confirms that "the judge may declare
the norm upon which the harmful act or omission is founded unconstitu-
tional."50 8 The harmful act can be challenged in an amparo action after the
exhaustion of other judicial remedies for protection of a person's rights
recognized by the supreme law of the country (the constitution, treaties, or
statutory laws), and violated by public authorities or private individuals."°
Complaints concerning violations of a collective nature may also be filed by
consumer associations, organizations protecting the environment, or by the
defender of the people. Through amparo proceedings, the interested parties
may also ask the court to reveal the data collected on them and demand the
information's suppression, rectification, confidentiality, or updating. When a
person's physical liberty is in jeopardy, the person or anyone on his behalf may
request a writ of habeas corpus; the petition will be reviewed by the court even
in a state of siege.
1 0
Some of the Latin American states, such as Mexico, exclusively use the
writ of amparo; other countries single out a separate writ of habeas corpus;
and still others supplement these remedies by additional actions, which blend
the decentralized model of review with some features of European centralized
or preventive models. The 1993 Peruvian Constitution illustrates the third
56 Id art. 107, §§ Viii (amended 1968, 1976, 1987), IX (amended 1987).
... As Barker noted, the Argentinean Supreme Court declared an act of Congress unconstitu-
tional for the first time in 1888. See Barker, supra note 21, at 12-14 (discussing the Supreme
Court's decisions in Municipalidad de la Capital v. Elortondo, 33 Fallos de la Corte Suprema
de Justicia de la Nation [fallos] 162 (1888)); see also H. QUIROGA LAvIE, DERECHOCONSTITU-
TIONAL 478 (1984).
508 ARG. CONST. art. 43, translated in 1 CONSTITUTIONS, supra note 5; see also id. art. 116
(confirming that "[t]he Supreme Court of Justice and the lower courts of the Nation have
jurisdiction over and decide all cases that deal with matters governed by the Constitution and the
laws of the Nation, except as provided in clause 2 of article 75"); id art. 75, § 12 (singling out
the civil, commercial, penal, mining, labor, and social security codes).
'09 Id. art. 43.
510 Id.
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approach well. Title V on constitutional guarantees borrows from the U.S.
diffused system and grants the Constitutional Court the right to initiate actions
protecting constitutional rights and freedoms.5"' In addition, the Peruvian
system follows the continental European model of centralized review and
establishes the Constitutional Court as the supreme organ supervising
adherence to the Constitution."1 2
The Constitution provides for six actions, which may be taken the protect
the Constitution and constitutionally guaranteed rights.
1. The action of habeas corpus is an independent "concrete" proceeding
instituted to protect a petitioner whose liberty or related constitutional
rights have been violated or threatened by the acts or omissions of the
authorities. 13
2. The action of habeas data are initiated in protection of the right to
privacy, honor and good reputation, and access to public information. 14
5" PERU CONST. tit. V.
512 As Brewer-Carias noted, the first constitutional court in Peru was established on the basis
of the 1979 Constitution. See BREWER-CARiAS, supra note 29, at 324. The Court was composed
of nine judges, with a Congress, the executive, and the Supreme Court each appointing three.
Id. The Court had a cassational jurisdiction with regard to the lower courts acting in habeas
corpus and amparo proceedings and worked as a court of sole jurisdiction in abstract challenges
against unconstitutional laws. Id. In proceedings initiated by privileged petitioners (abstract
reviews), the decisions of the Court were final with regard to sub-statutory acts. Id. at 325. The
statutes declared unconstitutional were submitted to the Congress. Id. If the legislative body did
not amend the act in forty-five days, the challenged act became invalid.
The 1993 Constitution changed the composition of the constitutional courts and the scope
of the review. The Court now is composed of seven members elected by the Congress and
enjoying the same immunity and prerogatives as congressmen. PERU CONST. art. 201. Judges
and prosecutors can be appointed to the constitutional court only if they quit their positions at
least one year prior to election. Id. The court has sole jurisdiction in actions of unconstitutional-
ity and appellate jurisdiction on the decisions of the common courts rejecting the petitions in
actions of habeas corpus, amparo, habeas data, and actions of compliance. Id. art. 202, §§ 1,
2. The Court also decides jurisdictional conflicts and other cases specifically reserved for the
Court by the laws. Id. art. 202, § 3. The decisions of the Court are final and become effective
on the following day after their announcement. Id. art. 204. The decisions are not retroactive;
they operate ex nunc, meaning that they have only prospective impact on persons' rights and
duties. Id The Constitution allows further appeal to international organizations or tribunals
after exhaustion of all local remedies. Id. art. 205.
513 PERU CONST. art. 200, § 1.
s14 Id. art. 200, § 3.
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3. The action of amparo is a proceeding initiated to protect all other rights
guaranteed by the Constitution."'
4. The action of unconstitutionality is an abstract type of review exercised
by the Constitutional Court'16 upon the petition of the president of the
republic, the public prosecutor of the republic, the defender of the
people, twenty-five percent of congressmen, 5000 petitioning citizens,
the presidents of regions, or professional colleges in the fields of their
specialty."' 7
5. The popular action may be instituted against implementing regulations
and administrative resolutions violating the Constitution and the laws. 8
6. The action of compliance may be filed against any authority or
administrative officer unwilling to respect the law or administrative
acts.5"9
I d. art. 200, § 2.
16 The Constitutional Court has proven to be an active but also a controversial institution.
In 1997, the three members of the Court ruled that President Fujimori's attempts to secure a third
presidential term were unconstitutional. Human Rights Watch, Elections in Peru: Democracy
at Risk (May 31, 2000), at http://www.hrw.org/press/2000/05/oas053 .htm. When the Court
could not obtain the necessary quorum of six of seven judges, the three judges used their power
of "decentralized" review and decided not to apply the challenged law allowing a new election.
INTER-AMERICAN COMM'N ON HUMAN RIGHTS, International Obligations: Peru and the Inter-
American Human Rights System, in SECOND REPORT ON THE SITUATION OF HUMAN RIGHTS IN
PERU, ch. 3, n.9 (2000), at http://www.cidh.org/countryrep/Peru2000en/chapter3.htm. The
subsequent removal of three judges by the Congress was challenged by the Inter-American
Commission on Human Rights (IAHCR), which, on July 2, 1999, filed an application with the
Inter-American Court on Human Rights. Id. 33. In the same month, the Inter-American Court
decided that Peru should retry in civilian courts four Chileans accused and sentenced for
terrorism by the military courts. See Peru to Recognize Human Rights Court, USA TODAY, Jan.
12, 2001, available at http://www.usatoday.com/news/world/nwsfri0l.htm. In response, the
Peruvian government "withdrew" the country's declaration recognizing the permanent
jurisdiction of the Court. Abraham Lama, Inter-American Court No Longer to Rule Here,
Committee to Free Lori Berenson (July 8, 1999, http://www.freelori.org/news/99ju08ips.html.
The Peruvian Constitutional Court reached the headlines again in 2003 when it recognized as
unconstitutional only one of the four anti-terrorism decrees issued by former President Fujimori.
The Court disregarded the decision of the IAHCR clearly recognizing the decrees as violating
the international humanitarian law. Rhoda Berenson & Mark Berenson, Pert 's Constitutional
Court Fails to Make Adequate Changes Needed to Comply with International Standards,
Committee to Free Lori Berenson (Jan. 7,2003), http://www.freelori.org/familyupdates/03jan07.
html.
"' PERU CONST. art. 200, § 4.
518 Id. art. 200, § 5.
s19 id. art. 200, § 6.
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The right to initiate these actions is not suspended in emergency
situations.52 The courts have discretion to decide whether restrictions
imposed on constitutionally guaranteed rights and freedoms during emergency
situations are proportional and reasonable. 2 '
The 1988 Constitution of Brazil makes the Supreme Federal Tribunal the
main organ ofjudicial review. The Tribunal decides, in abstract, direct actions
of unconstitutionality challenging federal or state normative acts. The
reviewing activity of the Tribunal may be triggered by the president of the
republic, the executive committees of the chambers of parliament, a state
governor, the procurator general, the Federal Council of the Brazilian Bar
Association, a political party represented in the national Congress, a syndical
confederation, or a national class entity.52 2 Unlike the U.S. model,523 the
rulings of the Tribunal are not binding only on the parties to the controversy;
they have an erga omnes character and have to be respected by "the rest of the
Judiciary and the Executive. 5 24 Further, in the case of a declaration of
unconstitutionality due to lack of measures to make a constitutional rule
effective, the Tribunal shall notify the appropriate branch to remedy the
situations.52 The Tribunal also has jurisdiction in actions for writs of habeas
corpus when the petitioner is the president or vice president of the republic, a
deputy of the Congress, justice of the Tribunal, or the procurator-general. 26
The Tribunal moreover has jurisdiction in actions for writs of security527 and
habeas data against acts of the president, Congress, the Federal Tribunal of
Accounts, the procurator-general, and the Tribunal itself. 28 Finally, the
120 Id. art. 200.
521 Id.
522 BRAZ. CONST. arts. 102, 103.
523 As Justice Sutherland explainedthe U.S. "declaratory" model ofreview, the courts declare
an unconstitutional law not applicable to the concrete controversy between the parties. Mass.
v. Mellon, 262 U.S. 447, 488 (1923). See BREWER-CARiAS, supra note 29, at 144-45.
524 BRAZ. CONST. art. 102, § 2.
521 Id. art. 103, § 20.
526 Id. art. 102, § I(d).
127 Barker explains, "In 1934, Brazil established a new procedural remedy, the mandato de
sequaranca (literally, writ of security), a summary proceeding to protect 'clear and certain rights'
not protected by habeas corpus." Barker, supra note 21, at 910-11.
520 Id.
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Tribunal has jurisdiction in other constitutional actions529 or in actions in
response to a lower court's denial of appellate jurisdiction to the Tribunal 3
Several elements of the European model were also adopted in Colombia.
First, following some of the features of the French judicial system, the
Constitution established the Council of State, comprised of an uneven number
of judges determined by law53' elected for eight years,532 as the supreme
administrative and consultative body of the government.533 Second, it
constitutionalized the powers of the Superior Council of the Judicature,
composed of the administrative and disciplinary chambers,534 to administer the
legal career, to select candidates for judicial positions, to monitor the activity
and productivity of judicial authorities, to draft the budgetary bill, and to
resolve jurisdictional conflicts. 535 Third, the Colombian Constitution vests the
right of constitutional review in the Constitutional Court with an uneven
number ofjudges elected by the senate for single terms of eight years from the
candidates presented by the president of the republic, the Supreme Court, and
the Council of State.5
36
The Constitution adopted a model that is a mixture of decentralized and
centralized, preventive and ex post facto systems. The Constitutional Court
has original jurisdiction to decide on the constitutionality of referenda and
other instruments of plebiscitary democracy,537 actions initiated to amend the
Constitution,5 38 adopted constitutional amendments,539 statutory laws,540 and
governmental decrees. 54' In all these actions the initiative to activate the Court
was reserved for public institutions and for citizens.542 The Court also has
appellate jurisdiction to revise the decisions of regular courts protecting the
529 Such actions are permitted when it is claimed that the appealed court decision "is contrary
to a provision of the Constitution; declares a treaty or a federal law unconstitutional; upholds a
law or act of local government challenged as violative of this Constitution." BRAZ. CONST. art.
102, § III, translated in 3 CONSTITUTIONS, supra note 5 (subsection numbers omitted).
3 See id. art. 102, § I(1).
COLOM. CONST. art. 236.
532 Id. art 233.
133 Id. art. 237, §§ 1, 3.
134 Id. art. 254.
531 Id. art. 256.
536 Id. art. 239.
137 Id. art. 241, §§ 2, 3.
538 Seeid art. 241, § 8.
139 Id. art. 241, § 1.
540 Id. art. 241, § 4.
541 Id. art. 241, §§ 5, 7.
542 Id. art. 242, § 1.
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constitutional rights of citizens.543 Preventive review by the Court can be
initiated on the petition of the government challenging the constitutionality of
the bills.5" The Court reviews the constitutionality of international treaties
and implementing legislation. 45 Treaties should be submitted to the Court by
the government and citizens may intervene in these actions by either defending
or challenging the constitutionality of the treaties. '" In all these actions,
before taking a final decision on their constitutionality, the Court should give
the acting organ the opportunity to amend or repeal the challenged
instrument.547 The Constitution makes the public defender responsible for the
promotion of human rights and the supervision of the public system under their
protection.148 The public defender office is a part of the public ministry which
is headed by the public prosecutor of the republic.549
In sum, judicial control of the constitutionality of the laws became a
standard element of the reviewed constitutions. The states of both regions
experimented with mixed systems of judicial review. it has to be noted,
however, that even blending features of different models requires some
consistency; it should not bring syncretic results, mixing features that can
hardly be combined into a logical unity. The problem is most clearly visible
in the Latin American states which attempted to insert concepts of precedent
into a legal system founded on civil law traditions and marry elements of
centralized and decentralized models.
The development of constitutional review in post-Soviet states took a
different swing, as this region preferred to follow the European model of
control and concentrate authority in a supreme court or in a constitutional
tribunal. The post-Soviet region experienced problems ranging from extreme
activism by justices on constitutional courts, who were accused of confusing
judicial and political functions, to passivity and submission to the control and
directives of the executive bodies. 50
541 Id. art. 242, §§ 1, 2.
5" Id. art. 241, § 8.
141 Id. art. 241, § 10.
W Id.
147 Id. art. 241.
548 Id. art. 277, §§ 1,2,5,6.
549 Id. art. 275.
550 The constitutional courts in several countries have been quickly recognized as formidable
enemies by both the executive and the legislature branches. The political conflicts between these
courts and the presidents in Belarus, Kazakhstan, and Russia (before Yeltin's decision to
dissolve Parliament in 1993) have been well documented. In Bulgaria and Romania, the
constitutional challenges of almost all legislative acts became almost routine. On the other hand,
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VI. CONCLUSION
The main objective of this article is to expose similarities and differences
in the constitutionalization of human rights and the possible lessons that Latin
American and post-Soviet states can learn from their mutual experiences. The
following summaries wrap up the above observations.
1. Latin American states and several republics of the former
Soviet Union showed a predilection to adopt some features of
the presidential system. This article aimed to determine
whether such an adoption hampered the democratization
process and contributed to the weak protection of human
rights. The comparative analysis demonstrated no clear
evidence that presidentialism as such is less conducive to the
protection of democratic values and the rule of law than
parliamentary or mixed systems. The countries of both
regions adopted some features of the U.S. presidential system
but deviated from the pure presidential model of governance
toward authoritarianism. The research confirms that simply
meddling with the prerogatives of governmental institutions
is not a remedy for the problems faced by both regions.
Without strengthening grassroots movements and components
of civic societies and creating a well-balanced system of
checks and balances, providing a quick fix for all regional
problems is hardly possible. From this perspective, Latin
American multiculturalism is a step toward involving indige-
nous groups and racial minorities in everyday politics.
Without similar efforts, the post-Socialist societies will still
long for communist equality in misery and promote compli-
ant, conformable yes-men who support the post-communist
dictators.
2. The constitutional drafting in both regions shows some
deficiencies. Generally, the Latin American constitutions are
in some states of the former Soviet Union, particularly the states of South Caucasus, the actual
control of the president over the appointment ofjudges exposes the judges to political pressure
and has a serious impact on their independence. See Rett R. Ludwikowski, Constitutional
Culture in East-Central European Democracies, 29 GA. J. INT'L & COMp. L. 1, 27 (2000)
(commenting on "politicization" of the constitutional courts and "judicialization of the
constitution").
2004]
GA. J. INT'L & COMP. L.
excessively long and detailed; they chaotically provide
regulations and norms, which often overlap and are poorly
organized. While the new post-Socialist constitutions are
usually shorter and crisper, they endlessly refer readers to the
implementing laws. In both regions, the drafters attempted to
make their constitutions flexible, but missed finding a proper
balance between normative and programmatic statements and
between constitutional rules and statutory regulations. This
results in a great deal of uncertainty as to the meaning of the
law, gaps between theory and practice, and weak public
identification with the constitutions. Although these observa-
tions might not be equally applicable to all of the constitu-
tions, they still characterize constitution-making in both
regions.
3. The language of the bills of rights varies and comparative
analysis of constitutionalism in both regions shows that some
constitutional drafters implemented a great deal of positivistic
philosophy in their constitutions; others opted for more
naturalistic concepts of rights. Generally, Latin American
constitutionalism absorbed a lot of nineteenth century
European positivistic philosophy, while the concept of
granted rights gained an upper hand in socialist
constitutionalism. However, with regard to the newly
developed constitutions, there is no clear-cut distinction
between positivistic and naturalistic acts. Several bills of
rights in both regions refer to "inalienable and inviolable"
rights in recognition of the fact that they are protected as
features of human nature. In some instances, however, the
philosophy of the drafters is vague and it is difficult to
determine to what extent they deliberately followed more
positivistic or naturalistic approaches, and to what degree they
simply transplanted into the bills of rights the rhetoric with
which they were familiar.
4. Studying the constitutionalization of human rights in
multicultural and ethnically diversified societies confirms that
collisions between individual and group rights are a leitmotiv
of constitutional discussions. In Latin American and post-
Soviet states, the disputes resulted in the polarization of those
who presented merely liberal philosophy supporting the rights
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of equal individuals and others who claimed that improvement
in the protection of human rights hardly can be achieved
without protection of group rights. The search for a proper
balance between these positions should be a priority for the
constitutional experts ofboth regions. Several remedies, such
as regionalization of ethnic groups, power-sharing,
proportional representation of minority interests, and
affirmative action, have traditionally been tested in many
regions of the world. The constitutional drafters in Latin
American and post-Soviet states are familiar with these
instruments, but their priorities in utilizing them are different.
In the countries of former Soviet dominance, recognition of
the limited autonomy of ethnic minorities has been most
important. In spite of the relocation practices of the Soviet
governments, historic ethnic minorities either survived or
returned to their original territories. Their longing for at least
cultural, if not political autonomy, is clearly expressed.
Ethnic regionalism was, and still is, a policy which satisfies
some of these aspirations.
The common problems with dictatorial regimes and
defense against terrorism by paramilitary organizations
resulted in a stronger trend toward internationalization of
human rights movements in Latin America. The region
showed a stronger tendency to constitutionalize affirmative
action programs directed at protecting women's rights and
transforming grassroots social actions into organized
movements for human rights. Although regionalism in the
post-Socialist countries (often chaotic, poorly organized, and
reflecting some of the weaknesses of political culture in the
region) did not resolve all the major problems of national
minorities, it became a significant and instructive experiment
in power-sharing. Regionalism, combined with grassroots
efforts to create a civic society, may be a promising
perspective for the post-Soviet region in the same way that
multicultural constitutionalism combined with limited
regionalism may effectively complement the process of
internationalization of the human rights movements in Latin
America.
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5. Comparison of the bills of rights shows that the states of both
regions differ significantly in implementation of international
standards of protection of civil and political rights and
fundamental freedoms. It is clear that the drafters
familiarized themselves with basic international human rights
documents but did not make an exhaustive comparative
analysis of the constitutionalization of rights even in their
own regions. The ability of the drafters to learn from the
experience of others is still limited. The lack of a
comparative approach often resulted in a chaotic selection of
the rights covered by the constitutions and poor organization
of the catalogues of rights. The new post-Soviet constitutions
attempted to follow the Russian template. However, this
tendency was not entirely consistent and sometimes the most
important constitutional values were missing in the
constitutional bills of rights, especially in the states of Central
Asia and Caucasus.
Although the constitutionalization of rights in larger Latin
American states, such as Argentina, Brazil, or Mexico, has
been studied more carefully by the drafters of the
constitutions in other countries of the region, no Latin
American state has built a reputation as a model entity of the
region. In sum, the constitutional drafters' studies must go
beyond a mere examination of international documents.
Well-balanced, cross-boundary comparisons would facilitate
the logical standardization of human rights protection without
unnecessary duplication of details failing to fit national needs.
Several specific observations on the most striking gaps in
constitutional protection of social and political rights and
freedoms should be brought to attention of the lawmakers in
both regions:
a. The delay in constitutionalizing some recognized
standards of protection of rights frequently violates the
international commitments of both regions. This is
especially well evidenced with regard to capital
punishment in the post-Soviet states and the right to
privacy, which is still not adequately guaranteed by
several older Latin American constitutions.
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b. In spite of the general tendency to expand the rights
guaranteed to all persons, some countries offer
constitutional protection of the most crucial rights
exclusively to citizens, including the rights to dignity,
life, personal liberty, property, and free movement.
c. The rationale for the decisions to constitutionalize or to
skip the most seminal due process rights is often
entirely unclear.
d. While there is nothing inherently controversial in
constitutionalization of the concepts of social justice in
the protection of property, states claiming market or
market-oriented economies should clearly guarantee
the protection of all forms of property. The
incorporation of vague provisions, which might
authorize so-called creeping expropriation or
constructive taking, into the constitution undermines
investors' confidence in protected market mechanisms.
e. One of the most potentially controversial aspects of the
constitutionalism in both regions is the coverage of
freedom of religion and expression. In several states
free exercise of religion is subject to explicit and
implicit limitations. Most constitutions still do not
have specific provisions concerning the treatment of
conscientious objectors and several do not address the
relationships between the state and religious
associations and between churches themselves. The
scope of freedom of expression is unclear and freedom
of the press and prohibition against censorship are
often not explicitly guaranteed.
6. The disputes over the distinction between rights of the first
and second category did not undermine the constitutional
status of social and economic rights. Most commentators
admit that there is a clear link between both categories; in
order to enjoy political and civil rights and freedoms, people
must be guaranteed decent living conditions. The controversy
is not whether to protect social and economic rights but how
to enforce the constitutional obligations. The level of
protection given to social and economic rights is a matter of
social choice concerning how to allocate resources needed to
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guarantee the benefits of these rights. If the state cannot
afford promising social and economic benefits, it has to be
declared clearly. The discussions over the
constitutionalization of economic and social rights in both
regions should increase the drafters' awareness that
constitutional language has to be precise and the policy of the
state cannot be hidden behind vague constitutional statements.
In other words, clarification of the distinction between rights
which are judicially enforceable and those which impose only
political obligations on the governments should be recognized
as a priority of constitutionalism in both regions.
7. Judicial decisions began shaping the constitutional culture of
the Latin American and post-Soviet countries equally with
legislative actions, implementing decisions of the
administration and the opinions of the media. Both regions
tried to experiment with mixed models of judicial control.
However, drafters of the post-socialist constitutions followed
at least one pattern. Searching for the structural design of
their constitutional courts at relatively the same period of
time, they tried to adopt the German or French mixed systems,
but showed reluctance to follow the U.S. decentralized model
rooted in the concept of common law precedent. The Latin
American states began their experiments with judicial review
much earlier and were not given equal chance to review the
mixed, but well-balanced and democratically organized,
systems that gave individuals direct access to the
constitutional courts. The post-socialist experience with
judicial review has not been an overwhelming success more
because of the lack of political safeguards than because of
inherent problems with the adopted models. The Latin
Americanjudicial system fostered instability for both reasons.
Both systems might be greatly improved by a mutual careful
comparison of the experiences of judges, constitutional
experts, and political analysts.
In conclusion, the above comments provide evidence that the process of
transforming objective constitutional rules into safeguards serving individuals
and protecting group rights is extensive and ongoing. However,
constitutionalization alone, without the accompaniment of efficient enforce-
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ment mechanisms and developed civil societies, is not a single panaceum for
abuses of human rights. It is, however, a starting point and a condition sine
qua non of the process of reform of the human rights protection system in both
regions.

